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in assessments, does not prevent the legislature from restricting "the
power of the courts to disturb assessments when made by a provi-
sion in a city charter." Re Mead (1878) 74 N. Y. 216.

"There is no limitation in the Constitution which at all affects
the right of the legislature to place the power of determining the
amounts to be raised for municipal purposes in the hands of such
municipal officers as they may see fit, and their power, unless so
limited, has been held to be, . . in all respects relating to
taxation, supreme.” Townsend v. New York (1878) 16 Hun, 362,
affirmed in (1879) 77 N. Y. 542, sustaining the act of 1873, chap.
779, creating a board of estimate and apportionment for the city of
New York.

The act of 1875, chap. 2, which ratifies and confirms the proceed-
ings of the common council in the matter of the repairs of the
Hamburg turnpike, does not violate the provision of this section
requiring the legislature to restrict local assessments. This section
"is not a limitation upon the legislature in the exercise of the legis-
lative discretion and power to tax and assess; it is a limitation only
upon its power to delegate authority to cities and villages to tax
and assess." Tifft v. Buffalo (1880) 82 N. Y. 204. See also Re
Livingston Street (1880) 82 N. Y. 621; Sweet v. Syracuse (1891)
129 N. Y. 316, 331, 27 N. E. 1081, 29 N. E. 289.

"A municipal corporation possesses not only the powers specific-
ally conferred upon it by its charter, but also such as are neces-
sarily incident to, or may fairly be implied from, those powers, in-
cluding all that are essential to the declared object of its existence.
. . . An ordinance adopted by such a corporation, pursuant to
authority expressly delegated by the legislature, has the same force
within the corporate limits as a statute passed by the legislature
itself." Carthage v. Frederick (1890) 122 N. Y. 268, 10 L. R. A.
178, 19 Am. St. Rep. 490, 25 N. E. 480; People ex rel. Oak Hill
Cemetery Asso. v. Pratt (1891) 129 N. Y. 68, 29 N. E. 7, as to
ordinances regulating the use of cemeteries; Consumers' Gas &
Electric Light Co. v. Congress Spring Co. (1891) 61 Hun, 133, 15
N. Y. Supp. 624.

The power of the legislature to prescribe the qualifications of
voters on propositions involving municipal taxation was considered
by the court of appeals in Spitzer v. Fulton (1902) 172 N. Y. 285,
92 Am. St. Rep. 736, 64 N. E. 957. It is there said that article 2,
relating to suffrage, and this section, relating to restrictions on
municipal taxation, should be read together. "By the latter section
the manner of restraining municipal corporations from contracting

debts and of preventing abuses in that regard is left to the sound discretion of the legislature, and was to be controlled by such legislation as it should deem proper, and which tended to secure that end. What better or more effective method of preventing such abuses and protecting such taxpayers could be devised than to restrict the right of voting upon propositions for borrowing money or for contracting debts to the persons who are liable to be taxed for the payment of such debts? Indeed, the proposition that the incurring of such indebtedness shall be sustained only when a majority of the taxable inhabitants shall vote in its favor seems not only to be pre-eminently just, but such has been the method which has hitherto been generally, if not universally, adopted by the legislature to restrain the various villages of the state in their power of borrowing money or contracting debts so as to prevent such abuses. . . . The established policy of this state has been to limit the right of suffrage as to the business or financial affairs of its various villages to the taxpayers of the municipality, and it has never been its policy to confide their financial affairs to the general voters therein."

The legislature may authorize the remission of a portion of a municipal tax. Wallerstein v. Bohanna (1889) 1 Silv. Sup. Ct. 363, 24 N. Y. S. R. 814, 5 N. Y. Supp. 319, affirmed in (1890) 125 N. Y. 696, 26 N. E. 141.

§ 2. [City laws; referendum.] — All cities are classified according to the latest state enumeration, as from time to time made, as follows: The first class includes all cities having a population of two hundred and fifty thousand, or more; the second class, all cities having a population of fifty thousand and less than two hundred and fifty thousand; the third class, all other cities. Laws relating to the property, affairs, or government of cities, and the several departments thereof, are divided into general and special city laws; general city laws are those which relate to all the cities of one or more classes; special city laws are those which relate to a single city, or to less than all the cities of a class. Special city laws shall not be passed except in conformity with the provisions of this section. After any bill for a special city law, relating to a city, has been

passed by both branches of the legislature, the house in which it originated shall immediately transmit a certified copy thereof to the mayor of such city, and, within fifteen days thereafter, the mayor shall return such bill to the house from which it was sent, or, if the session of the legislature at which such bill was passed has terminated, to the governor, with the mayor's certificate thereon, stating whether the city has or has not accepted the same.

In every city of the first class, the mayor, and in every other city, the mayor and the legislative body thereof concurrently, shall act for such city as to such bill; but the legislature may provide for the concurrence of the legislative body in cities of the first class. The legislature shall provide for a public notice and opportunity for a public hearing concerning any such bill in every city to which it relates, before action thereon. Such a bill, if it relates to more than one city, shall be transmitted to the mayor of each city to which it relates, and shall not be deemed accepted unless accepted as herein provided by every such city. Whenever any such bill is accepted as herein provided, it shall be subject, as are other bills, to the action of the governor. Whenever, during the session at which it was passed, any such bill is returned without the acceptance of the city or cities to which it relates, or within such fifteen days is not returned, it may nevertheless again be passed by both branches of the legislature, and it shall then be subject, as are other bills, to the action of the governor. In every special city law which has been accepted by the city or cities to which it relates, the title shall be followed by the words "accepted by the city," or "cities," as the case may be; in every such law which is passed without such acceptance, by the words "passed without the acceptance of the city," or "cities," as the case may be.

[New.]

The history of this section will be found in the chapter on the Fourth Constitution, 1894. The scope and purpose of the new provision are there fully set forth both in the debates and in various propositions submitted to the consideration of the Convention. The new provisions seem to be clearly stated, and the courts have apparently had no difficulty in construing them. The questions that have received judicial attention relate substantially to the application of the section to particular legislation with a view of determining whether, in a given case, a bill should or should not have been submitted to the city, and, in the course of their opinions, the judges have taken occasion to make some general observations concerning the section.

Thus, in the Einsfeld Case (1896) 149 N. Y. 367, 32 L. R. A. 344, 44 N. E. 146, Chief Judge Andrews says that the "manifest purpose" of the new provision "is to give some measure of protection to cities against the evils of special city legislation."

In Chrystal v. New York (1901) 63 App. Div. 93, 71 N. Y. Supp. 352, Justice Ingraham says the object of the section is "to allow a city of the state information of acts before the legislature solely affecting its interest, and an opportunity to communicate to the legislature any objection which existed to the passage of the proposed act. It provided that, before the legislature passed such an act, it should be communicated to the city authorities, so that they could communicate to the legislature any objection that existed to the passage of the act. Many acts had been passed imposing obligations upon the cities of the state without the cities affected having an opportunity to protest against the legislation."

In Sun Printing & Pub. Asso. v. New York (1896) 8 App. Div. 230, 40 N. Y. Supp. 607, Justice Barrett expresses the opinion that the classification of cities "has

no relation to general, private, and local laws, as these terms are used in other provisions of the Constitution. The classification was simply for the purpose of regulating the passage of special city laws, and of giving the local authorities a proper opportunity of asserting themselves with regard thereto. The division in this section

of laws relating to cities into general city laws and special city laws was certainly not intended to affect the wellestablished meaning of general, private, and local laws under existing adjudications.'

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Coming to the position of legal adviser to the governor at the beginning of the year 1895, when the new Constitution took effect, it became my duty to assist in establishing a policy concerning the treatment of bills relating to cities. The Statutory Revision Commission, of which I was chairman, was required to advise the legislature whenever requested, and so, between the two positions, I was brought into close relation with the subject of city legislation, particularly so far as it concerned the governor's action on bills. The first question to be considered by the governor is whether he has jurisdiction to act on a bill, and this, in the case of a bill affecting a city, requires him to determine whether such a bill should have been or has been submitted to the particular city supposed to be affected by it. In the great majority of city bills the question is clear; but in doubtful cases it was customary for the legislature through its officers to obtain the opinion of the revision commission whether the bill should be transmitted to a city, and, after adjournment, the clerks of the two houses attended to this matter, and transmitted bills if this course was deemed necessary.

My service in the positions mentioned covered six legislative sessions,-from 1895 to 1900, inclusive. A policy which might be called rather rigid was adopted in reference to this class of bills, and usually the city was given

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