faith upon representations of their agent that the property as cord wood piled near a railroad-is not properly protected from fires burning in the surrounding forests, the danger however not being imminent.' Where policies were determinable at pleasure by either side, the assured by request, the company by notice, it was held that the company's making an assignment for the benefit of its creditors did not cancel existing policies, nor did the institution of proceedings by the superintendent of insurance have this effect until it resulted in the decree dissolving the company. When the life of one is insured. for the benefit of another, the contract cannot be canceled without the consent of the beneficiary. Employing an agent to procure a policy does not make him the agent of the insured to receive notice of cancellation. The fact that a husband applied for and received a policy of life insurance for his wife, as her agent, does not empower him to surrender it without her consent.5 An insurance company may be liable to a bona fide purchaser for value of the property and the policy, notwithstanding the person who procured the policy has, by mistake, ordered it canceled; and notwithstanding the money for the premium was never actually delivered in payment, if the party originally insured held an off-set against the company which operated as payment." ILLUSTRATIONS.-Defendants, in their policy, reserved the right to cancel them, "on giving notice to that effect, and refunding a ratable proportion of the premium for the unexpired term." Before a loss occurred, the policy was returned for cancellation to the company's agent, who notified plaintiff's agent that he was ready to pay the unearned premium, but he did 1 Home Ins. Co. v. Heck, 65 Ill. 111. 2 Relfe v. Ins. Co., 10 Mo. App. 393. 3 Forsyth v. Ins. Co., Ill. Sup. Ct., 1873; May on Insurance, sec. 67; Trager v. Ins. Co., 9 Ins. Law J. 817; Marvin v. Ins. Co., 4 U. C. App. 330; Chase v. Ins. Co., 67 Me. 85. • Von Wein v. Ins. Co., 52 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 490; Hermann v. Ins. Co., 100 N. Y. 411; 53 Am. Rep. 197. But see Grace v. Ins. Co., 16 Blatchf. 433. Stilwell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 72 N. Y. 385. 6 Marsh v. N. W. Nat. Ins. Co., 3 Biss. 351. not in fact pay it until a month subsequent; in the mean time the loss occurred. Held, that plaintiff could recover: Hollingsworth v. Germania Ins. Co., 45 Ga. 294; 12 Am. Rep. 579. A general agent, having instructed a local agent to cancel a certain policy, the latter sent the canceling card in a letter to the assured, and stated that the unearned premium was in his hands, subject to the order of the assured. But before the assured received the letter, the local agent told him not to mind the card, as he would carry the risk till the assured heard from him again. Afterwards the assured wrote to the local agent to transfer the policy to another company, of which he was also agent, but before compliance the loss occurred. Held, that there was no cancellation of the policy: Ætna Ins. Co. v. Maguire, 51 Ill. 342. The charter of an insurance company provided that the cancellation of any policy could not take effect until entered on the books of the company, to which time the right to make assessments was reserved. In 1861 the board of directors passed a resolution that, owing to the civil commotion and consequent great number of incendiary fires, risks on all policies outside the county of St. Louis would be discontinued on notice thereof by the secretary. Held, that such notification to a policy-holder would not terminate the liability, without such entry: Landis v. Home Mut. Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 56 Mo. 591. § 2050. Duration of Risk-When It Commences and Terminates-Renewals. A policy of insurance, as a general rule, takes effect from its date, and covers risks, beginning at that time, unless otherwise provided.1 If the agreement is, that it is to cover risks prior to its date, the insurer will be bound for a loss occurring during that period. If the premium be paid, and the policy be not delivered till afterwards, the policy takes effect by relation as of its date, even though a loss intervenes. If it be delivered, but upon the express stipulation that it is to take effect on a certain day, that stipulation will control; or upon the express understanding that it is not to take effect till another policy has been surrendered, it will not. 1 Ruse v. Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 516; Whitaker v. Ins. Co., 29 Barb. 312. Hallock v. Ins. Co., 26 N. J. L. 268. Lightbody v. N. A. Ins. Co., 23 Wend. 18; City of Davenport v. Peoria 3 Mar. & Fire Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 276; American Horse Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 28 Ind. 17; Western v. Genesee Mut. Ins. Co., 12 N. Y. 258. relate back so as to cover a loss which occurs prior to the required surrender.' When the property is distant, and its status unknown to either party, an insurance against fire will bind the insurer for a loss occurring before the date of the contract, if such appears, either from the policy or from attending circumstances, to have been the intention of the parties.2 Insurance from a given day until a certain other given day, and for so long after as the insured shall pay the premium paid on the first day, extends to and includes the latter day. Where a policy fails to state for how long it is issued, and in fourteen days the property burns, an action on the policy may be maintained. A parol agreement with an insurance company, made in October, that a policy for twelve months should be issued in the early part of November, would, by its terms, cover a loss occurring on the morning of November 19th. A renewal of a policy of fire insurance is in effect a new contract of insurance, and, unless otherwise expressed, on the same terms and conditions as the original policy; and a notice that the insured premises had become vacant, required and given under the original policy, should be given again under the renewed policy, the same state of vacancy continuing. Where the term for which an insurance is effected is about to expire, and a premium is paid for another term, for which a renewal receipt is given, under the conditions contained in the policy, such renewal receipt does not constitute a new agreement of insurance, but merely revives an expiring contract and continues it in force another term. And if a loss occurs within the new term, a recovery must be had upon the original contract, if a recovery is to be had at all. Where a policy having expired June 10, 1878, a Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Goodall, 35 N. H. 328. ✦ Schroeder v. Ins. Co., 109 Ill. 157. Home Ins. Co. v. Adler, 71 Ala. 516. 6 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Walsh, 54 Ill. 164; 5 Am. Rep. 115. New England etc. Ins. Co. v. Wetmore, 32 Ill. 221. renewal dated June 19th by its terms continued the policy in force for a year from June 10th, a loss from a fire occurring June 16, 1879, cannot be deemed within the policy. After a policy is forfeited it cannot be renewed or revived except by an express agreement of the insurers. Mere loose general conversation relating to the renewal of a policy had between the assured and an agent authorized to renew policies cannot be deemed equivalent to a renewal; nor does the fact that the assured, after the expiration of the term of his policy, applied to have it continued in force temporarily, and received no reply, justify him in supposing that the policy was continued.1 ILLUSTRATIONS.- Plaintiff applied for a policy on his premises; the application was accepted, and the policy was made out and executed. But plaintiff not having the money to pay the premium, the policy remained in the hands of the company until two months thereafter, when plaintiff paid the premium and received the policy. Before such payment and delivery, the premises had been destroyed by fire, which fact plaintiff did not disclose to the company. Held, that upon receipt of the premium and delivery of the policy the contract to insure related back to the date of the policy, and that the company was liable for the sum assured: Baldwin v. Ins. Co., 56 Mo. 151; 17 Am. Rep. 671. The term named in the policy was one year, and the premium thirty dollars; it had been renewed for a second year on payment of a like premium, and upon the agreement for a second renewal the same amount of premium was paid, but the testimony did not show that anything was said as to the time the renewed policy was to run. Held, that the renewal was for one year: Scott v. Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 238. A policy was issued by defendant upon plaintiff's "hop-house while drying hops," from August 15, to October 15, 1875. The hop-house was destroyed by a fire which occurred within the time specified, but after plaintiff had ceased drying hops. Held, that defendant was not liable: Langworthy v. Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 632. § 2051. Warranties. — A warranty is a stipulation inserted in writing on the face of the policy, on the literal truth or fulfillment of which the validity of the entire contract depends.' It is in the nature of a condition precedent, and must be strictly complied with. Warranties are said to be affirmative or promissory. An affirmative warranty is one which alleges the existence at the time of a particular fact; a promissory warranty agrees or warrants that something shall be done in the future, or shall be omitted to be done. If the warranty be a statement of facts, it must be literally true; if of an intention or promise to be performed in the future, it must be literally performed. It matters not that it is not material to the risk. And there can be no excuse for its not being performed. "The contract is that the matter is as represented, or shall be as promised; and unless it prove so, whether from fraud, mistake, negligence, or other cause, not proceeding from the insurer, or the intervention of the law, or the act of God, the insured can have no claim." The word "warranty" need not be used; any statement or stipulation or form of words upon the absolute truth of which it is clear the contract is intended by the parties. to depend will amount to a warranty. On the other hand, even the use of the word "warranty" will not make Arnould on Insurance, cited in P. C. 255; Sayles v. North Western May on Insurance, sec. 156. 2 May on Insurance, sec. 157. 3 May on Insurance, sec. 156; Duncan v. Ins. Co., 6 Wend. 488; 22 Am. Dec. 539; Inman v. Ins. Co., 12 Wend. 460; Burritt v. Ins. Co., 5 Hill, 193; 40 Am. Dec. 345; Kennedy v. Ins. Co., 10 Barb. 286; Wall v. Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 385; Jennings v. Ins. Co., 2 Denio, 75; Belings v. Ins. Co., 20 Conn. 137; Washington Ins. Co. v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 5 Ohio St. 450; Mutual Ins. Co. v. Miller, 39 Ind. 475; Wood v. Ins. Co., 13 Conn. 533; 35 Am. Dec. 92; Glendale Woolen Co. v. Proctor, 21 Conn. 19; 54 Am. Dec. 309. May on Insurance, citing Cooper v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 50 Pa. St. 331; 88 Am. Dec. 544; Newcastle Fire Ins. Co. v. MacMorran, 3 Dowl. Ins. Co., 2 Curt. 612; Witherell v. Cro. & M. 348. And see Snyder v. 5 Wright v. Ass. Co., 41 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1; 5 Bigelow's L. & Acc. Ins. Cas. 401. |