insurer had a right to know and which the insured was under a duty to disclose. It is a suppressio veri. It is a fraud on the insurer by leading him to believe that to be true which is not true.' The fact, however, must be known to the applicant; there can be no concealment of a fact which is not known to the insured. And it must also be known to be material to the insurance.3 So it is not concealment not to state facts which the insurer knows or ought to know, or facts which lessen instead of increase the risk. A material concealment cannot be pleaded where the premises have been thoroughly examined by the broker through whom the application has been transmitted to the company, on which such inspection is conclusive." ILLUSTRATIONS.-A had been confined in an insane asylum, but discharged as cured. On applying for insurance on his life, he did not disclose this fact, not thinking it material. Held, no concealment: Mallory v. Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52; 7 Am. Rep. 410. In an action upon a fire insurance policy, a defense was that carpenter-work was being done in the building insured, which was not disclosed to the insurers. There was no actual concealment of fraud proved, no misrepresentation or intentional suppression of facts, nor was any inquiry made, at the time of issuing the policy, as to the uses for which the building was to be applied. Held, that it was for the jury to say whether there was a concealment of the facts by the insured which would avoid the policy: People v. Ins. Co., 2 Thomp. & C. 268. 1 How v. Ins. Co., 64 Barb. 81; Daniels v. Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 416; 59 Am. Dec. 192. The question of materiality is for the jury: Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Walden, 12 Johns. 513; 7 Am. Dec. 340. Concealment of material facts by an applicant for fire insurance will not vitiate the policy, it seems, as it would a marine policy, if no inquiry is made as to those facts; but if such inquiry is made, the concealment is as fatal to a fire policy as to a marine one: Burritt v. Ins. Co., 5 Hill, 188; 40 Am. Dec. 345. 2 Hall v. Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 185; Beebe v. Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 51; 65 Am. Dec. 553. * May on Insurance, sec. 202; Wise v. Ins. Co., 2 Bigelow's L. & Acc. Ins. Cas. 43; 34 Md. 582; Dennison v. Ins. Co., 20 Me. 125; 37 Am. Dec. 42. A concealment which is not fraudulent will avoid a policy if the conditions annexed to the policy and the form of application require the concealed fact to be stated, and if one of the conditions expressly provides that "any misrepresentation or concealment will vitiate the policy: Burritt v. Ins. Co., 5 Hill, 188; 40 Am. Dec. 345. May on Insurance, sec. 207; Fowler v. Ins. Co., 6 Cow. 673; 16 Am. Dec. 460; Home Ins. Co. v. Garfield, 60 Ill. 124; 14 Am. Rep. 27. But see Stoney v. Ins. Co., 3 McCord, 387; 15 Am. Dec. 634. 737. Michael v. Ins. Co., 10 La. Ann. 3 § 2061. What Facts need not be Disclosed.-It has been held that-the questions not being asked of the applicant-it did not constitute concealment not to disclose the following facts: That there is other insurance on the property; in what manner the building is heated or lighted; the character or occupations of the occupants of the building; the character of the adjoining buildings; that the applicant is insolvent, and there are judgment liens on the property; that the agent of the insurer had declined risks near by; that the property is encumbered; the fact of a pending litigation affecting the premises insured; that the building insured stood on the land of another under a verbal agreement terminable at six months' notice; that the property insured, a carpenter-shop, was heated by stoves, or to say what provision was made for warming, unless the heating was effected in an unusual and extraordinary manner; that the federal guards, who were in charge of the property, smoked pipes, and had fire in the immediate vicinity for the purpose of warming themselves;" that lamps were used in the building.12 8 9 ILLUSTRATIONS.-A policy required the insured to state the distance of the building insured from neighboring buildings. Held, that an omission to mention buildings on another street, and from which there was no reasonable apprehension of danger, is not such a suppression of the truth as invalidates the policy, though the fire is communicated from them: Dennison v. Ins. Co., 20 Me. 125; 37 Am. Dec. 42. In an application for insurance on goods, the assured stated, in answer to questions, that the building in which they were was occupied by one tenant; the condition of the policy required a description of the build 1 May on Insurance, sec. 207. 2 Girard Ins. Co. v. Stephenson, 37 Pa. St. 295; 78 Am. Dec. 424; Clark v. Ins. Co., 8 How. 235. 3 Lyon. Ins. Co., 2 Rob. (La.) 266. * Satterthwaite v. Ins. Co., 14 Pa. St. 393. 5 City Ins. Co. v. Carrugi, 41 Ga. 660. G Lightbody v. Ins. Co., 23 Wend. 18. 684. Delahay v. Ins. Co., 8 Humph. 8 Hill v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 2 Mich. 476. 9 Fletcher v. Ins. Co., 18 Pick. 419. 10 Girard Fire Ins. Co. v. Stephenson, 37 Pa. St. 293; 78 Am. Dec. 424. 11 Keith v. Globe Ins. Co., 52 Ill. 518; 4 Am. Rep. 624. 12 Clark v. Ins. Co., 8 How. 235. ing the goods were in, but none of its occupancy, which was specially required when insurance was desired on a building. Held, that the assured was not obliged to state the occupancy; that his statement of it did not amount to a warranty, but only to a representation, the falsity of which was immaterial if the loss was not occasioned by the nature of the occupancy: Howard etc. Ins. Co. v. Cornick, 24 Ill. 455. § 2062. What Facts must be Disclosed. But it has been held that it constituted a concealment to fail to disclose that attempts had been made to burn the insured property' or property contiguous to it. So the omission to mention all buildings within ten rods of an insured building, where the conditions annexed to the policy and the printed form of application furnished to the assured require that fact to be stated, is fatal to an action on the policy where the omitted buildings are of a hazardous nature with respect to danger from fire.3 § 2063. Conditions and Stipulations in Policy - Notice of Change of Circumstances.- Where by the terms of the policy the insured is required to give notice of any particular fact, no time being specified, it is only essential that the notice be given within a reasonable time.* § 2064. Notice Required Requisites of. If the policy does not otherwise provide, notice by word of mouth to any agent of the insurer is sufficient. The notice need not be given instanter; a reasonable time is allowed to the insured in which to give it. An office which issues a subsequent policy will be presumed to 1 Curry v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 10 Pick. 535; 20 Am. Dec. 547; Bebee v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 51; 65 Am. Dec. 553; New York Bowery Ins. Co. v. New York Ins. Co., 17 Wend. 359; North American Fire Ins. Co. v. Throop, 22 Mich. 146; 7 Am. Rep. 638. Walden v. Ins. Co., 12 La. 134; 32 Am. Dec. 116. 3 Burritt v. Ins. Co., 5 Hill, 188; 40 Am. Dec. 345. May on Insurance, sec. 216. 5 McEwen v. Ins. Co., 5 Hill, 101; Schenck v. Ins. Co., 24 N. J. L. 447. 6 Kimball v. Ins. Co., 8 Gray, 33; Mellen v. Ins. Co., 5 Duer, 101; 17 N. Y. 609. have notice of the prior one. And where both policies are negotiated through the same person, who is agent for both companies, his knowledge is the knowledge of each company. But the knowledge of or notice to the broker through which both insurances are effected is not the knowledge of or notice to the insurers.3 § 2065. Consent of Insurer.-Though the notice is required by the policy to be given in writing, and the consent of the insurer to be indorsed on the policy, yet if parol notice is given of the insurance to the insurer or his agent, and no objection is made, this will be considered as a waiver of the provision, and the forfeiture will not be enforced.4 § 2066. Provisions against "Other Insurance"-In General. Policies usually provide that they shall become void if "other insurance" exist at the time the risk is taken, and is not disclosed, or if additional insurance be subsequently obtained on the same property without notice to the insurer. Such conditions are legal, and a violation of them will work a forfeiture. In a clause in a policy, "if the said insured or assigns shall hereafter make any other insurance," etc., the word "assigns" means, not assignees or transferees of the property, but of the 1 Barnes v. Union Ins. Co., 45 N. H. 21; Horwitz v. Equitable Ins. Co., 40 Mo. 557; 93 Am. Dec. 321. 2 Von Bories v. United Life etc. Ins. Co., 8 Bush, 133. 3 Mellen v. Hamilton Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 609; 5 Duer, 101; McLachlan v. Etna Ins. Co., 4 Allen (N. B.), 173. But see Fishbeck v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 54 Cal. 422. 4 Thompson v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 469; Hayward v. National Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 181; 14 Am. Rep. 400; Horwitz v. Equitable Mut. Ins. Co., 40 Mo. 557; 93 Am. Dec. 321; Franklin v. Atlantic Fire Ins. Co., 42 Mo. 456; Combs v. Hann. Sav. & Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 148; 97 Am. Dec. 383; Northup v. Miss. Val. Ins. 5 Hutchinson v. Ins. Co., 21 Mo. 97; 64 Am. Dec. 218; Obermyer v. Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 573; Conway Tool Co. v. Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 144; 59 Am. Dec. 172; Worcester Bank v. Ins. Co., 11 Cush. 265; 59 Am. Dec. 145; Ill. Ins. Co. v. Fex, 53 Ill. 151; 5 Am. Rep. 38. But see Gee v. Ins. Co., 55 N. Ĥ. 65; 20 Am. Rep. 171. policy. A condition that every person "insuring" must give notice "of any other insurance effected," etc., applies to subsequent as well as prior insurance. Where insurance is effected without any policy being issued, nothing more is required in case of an additional insurance in another company than notice, although the usual form of policies required the notice to be indorsed on the policy, or otherwise acknowledged in writing. Where at the time of insurance the insurers write across the policy, "Privilege for four thousand five hundred dollars additional insurance," such indorsement authorizes the insured to effect additional insurance upon the same property to that amount without notifying the insurers thereof.1 Where an insurance company renews a policy, with the knowledge of the existence of other insurance, contrary to its provisions, it is estopped to afterwards claim that this renewal was inoperative, or the policy void by reason of the existence of such other insurance.5 An insurance on goods in the store is not within the rule of an insurance company making void the policy on the store in case the assured shall be allowed to insure the same or "any other property connected with it in any other company or at any other office." Where a stranger, without the knowledge of the insured, obtains additional insurance, the clause respecting additional insurance is not violated." ILLUSTRATIONS.-A by-law that "persons insuring with this company may insure with other companies, with the consent of the directors indorsed on the policy," was adopted by the directors of an insurance company, and printed on the back of the policies. Held, that this by-law, by reasonable construction, implied a prohibition: Hygum v. Ins. Co., 11 Iowa, 21. A policy required notice of further insurance to be given, and the assent of the company indorsed on the policy, or otherwise acknowl Bates v. Commercial Ins. Co., 1 Cin. Rep. 523. Warwick v. Ins. Co., 44 N. J. L. 83; 43 Am. Rep. 343. Eureka Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 56 Pa. St. 256; 94 Am. Dec. 65. 389. Benedict v. Ins. Co., 31 N. Y. Carroll v. Ins. Co., 38 Barb. 402. Jones v. Ins. Co., 18 Me. 155. 7 Williams v. Cincinnati Co., Wright, 542; Harris v. Ins. Co., Wright, 544. |