kill himself, does not prevent a forfeiture.' Other courts the supreme court of the United States among them— adopt a more liberal rule, which is: "If the assured, being in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, from anger, pride, jealousy, or a desire to escape from the ills of life, intentionally takes his own life, the proviso attaches, and there can be no recovery. If the death is caused by the voluntary act of the insured, he knowing and intending that his death shall be the result of his act, but when his reasoning faculties are so far impaired that he is not able to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences, and effect of the act he is about to commit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane impulse which he has not the power to resist, such death is not within the contemplation of the parties to the contract, and the insurer is liable." But what is known as the "sane or insane" clause-the provision that the policy shall be void if the insured "die by his own hand or by suicide, sane or insane"-will include a suicide, where he knows the physical nature and consequences of the act, and intends to destroy himself, though he does not by reason of insanity — appreciate its moral quality. Where, owing to uncontrollable physical and mental weakness, the assured takes an overdose of whisky, which kills him, this is not dying by his own hand, sane or insane.1

1 Cooper v. Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227; 3 Am. Rep. 451; Dean v. Ins. Co., 4 Allen, 96; Gay v. Ins. Co., 9 Blatchf. 142; Nimick v. Ins. Co., 3 Brewst. 502; St. Louis etc. Ins. Co. v. Graves, 6 Bush, 268; Knickerbocker etc. Ins. Co. v. Peters, 42 Md. 414; Riley v. Ins. Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 315.

2 Breastead v. Ins. Co., 4 Hill, 73; 8 N. Y. 299; 59 Am. Dec. 482; Eastabrook v. Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224; Terry v. Ins. Co., 15 Wall. 580; Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 232; Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121; Phadenhauer v. Ins. Co., 7 Heisk. 567; 19 Am. Rep. 623; Phillips v.

Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 404; 21 Am. Rep. 549; Van Zandt v. Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 169; 14 Am. Rep. 215; Conn. etc. Ins. Co. v. Groome, 86 Pa. St. 92; 27 Am. Rep. 689; Schultz v. Ins. Co., 40 Ohio St. 217; 48 Am. Rep. 676; Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandall, 120 U. S. 527.

3 Bigelow v. Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 284; Adkins v. Ins. Co., 70 Mo. 27; 35 Am. Rep. 410; Chapman v. Ins. Co., 6 Biss. 238.

Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hazelett, 105 Ind. 212; 55 Am. Rep. 192.

An insurance company may stipulate that if the insured kills himself when insane it will refund the premiums, or it may stipulate that it will pay the policy or refund the premiums at its option, in accordance with its judgment of the equities of the case. In the latter case the right to exercise the option cannot be waived until insanity is shown; and the company is not obliged to elect within the sixty days after proof of death, if it does not appear until afterwards that insanity existed.1

§ 2131. "Death by the Hands of Justice."-This means in consequence of a felony, and under and by virtue of a judicial sentence for a crime, and not a mere killing which would be justified in the slayer by the law, as of an escaping prisoner by an officer.2

§ 2132. "Death in the Violation of Law."— To come within this phrase, and excuse the insurer from paying the claim, he must prove that the insured died while engaged in a voluntary criminal act which he knew at the time to be a crime against the laws of the state or country in which he was. That he was at the time engaged in a trespass against property, rendering him liable to a civil action, is not enough. Nor can the phrase be construed to include suicide. And the insured must have received the death-blow during and while engaged in the commission of the crime, and not merely as a consequence of it afterwards. And the violation of the law must have been the cause of the death."

1 Salentine v. Ins. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 159.

2 Spruill v. Ins. Co., 1 Jones, 126. See Harper v. Ins. Co., 18 Mo. 109.

3 Cluff v. Ins. Co., 13 Allen, 308; 99 Mass. 317; Bradley v. Ins. Co., 3 Lans. 341; 45 N. Y. 422; 6 Am. Rep. 115.

Cluff v. Ins. Co., 13 Allen, 308; 99 Mass. 317.

Patrick v. Ins. Co., 4 Hun, 263; Darrow v. Ins. Co., 42 Hun, 245.

Cluff v. Ins. Co., 13 Allen, 308; 99 Mass. 317.

'Harper v. Ins. Co., 18 Mo. 109. In Bradley v. Ins. Co., 3 Lans. 341, 45 N. Y. 422, 6 Am. Rep. 115, Grover, J., says: "The violation of law in which the insured is engaged, whether such law be criminal or civil, must have some connection with the death, as cause and effect; not necessarily the immediate cause, as it is sufficient

ILLUSTRATIONS. —A policy is made void if the insured die "in the known violation of law." He is killed while in the act of adultery. The policy is forfeited. Having committed adultery, he is afterwards killed by the husband on account thereof. The policy is not forfeited: Goetzmann v. Ins. Co., 5 Thomp. & C. 572. A policy was conditioned to be void if the assured should die "in or in consequence of the violation of the laws." The assured and his brothers planned an assault upon B, and in pursuance thereof, one of them seized and held him while the assured beat him. B drew a pistol, and the assured, seeking to escape, was killed by its discharge. B testified that the discharge was accidental. Held, that the policy was avoided: Murray v. New York Life Ins. Co., 96 N. Y. 614; 48 Am. Rep. 658. A policy was to be void "if the assured shall die by suicide, or in consequence of the violation of any law, or shall be convicted of a felony," and he was killed while committing an unprovoked assault on another, under circumstances rendering the killing justifiable homicide. Held, that there could be no recovery, although the crime may have been beneath the grade of a felony: Wolff v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 Mo. App. 236. A policy provided that it should be forfeited if the assured should die "by reason of intemperance," or in "known violation of the laws" of the states of the United States. The assured, while drunk, committed an assault and battery on a married woman, and while so engaged was killed by her husband. Held, that the policy was forfeited: Bloom v. Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478; 49 Am. Rep. 469. A, by a show of force and threats to rob, obtained a sum of money from a public building, and was shot and killed while escaping. Held, that he did not "die while violating any law" within the meaning of a clause in an insurance policy on his life: Griffin v. Western Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, 20 Neb. 620; 57 Am. Rep. 848. A policy provided that it should not extend to a case of death caused by "a breach of the law on the part of the assured, or by his willfully exposing himself to any unnecessary danger or peril." While he and another were driving sulkies in competition alongside of each other at a horse-race for money, -illegal by statute,—a collis

if it puts in operation that cause. To illustrate: The sale of lottery-tickets is prohibited by the criminal law of New York. No one would contend that had the assured died in the state of New York from heart-disease while engaged in selling lottery-tickets the case would have come within the proviso. It might have been within the strict letter, but not at all within the intention of the parties, for the reason

that the violation of law, although criminal, had no possible connection with the death, and in no possible way increased the risk. Again, the criminal law of New York probihits profane cursing and swearing. Suppose the death happened from some accident while the assured was violating the law, would this bring the case within the proviso? Clearly not, for the reasons above stated."

ion ensued, and he jumped to the ground uninjured, and then started to get hold of the reins of his horse, which were hanging across the axle-tree; and while doing so was killed by getting tangled in them, falling down, and being dragged against a stone. Held, that his death was within the condition: Insurance Co. v. Seaver, 19 Wall. 531.

§ 2133. "Death while in Military Service"-"War and Rebellion"-"Belligerent Forces," etc. Entering the military service, which is a condition of forfeiture in most policies, includes only such service as will compel the assured to enter the field as a combatant; therefore engaging in bridge-building in a hostile country is not within the phrase; nor taking a merely clerical position in the office of the adjutant-general, subject to no military order or service. But that the entering the service was caused by the threat of a conscription is not material. Death from a roving band of robbers and banditti is not a death from "belligerent forces," or a "casualty or consequence of war or rebellion."5

§ 2134.

Death Resulting from Intemperance. That the insured died from the effect of intoxication or intemperate habits is no defense to the policy, unless it so declares. If a policy is by its provisions to be void when the insured shall die by reason of intemperance in the use of intoxicating liquor, it must appear that intemperance is the paramount and proximate cause of death. It is not enough that the insured may have been addicted to habits of intemperance, indulged in for a considerable period prior to his death. Neither intemperance combined with other causes, nor intemperance as a secondary, remote, and predisposing cause, even though it may have

1 Welts v. Ins. Co., 46 Barb. 412; 48 N. Y. 34; 8 Am. Rep. 518; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 24 Gratt. 540. Welts v. Ins. Co., 46 Barb. 412; 48 N. Y. 34; 8 Am. Rep. 518.

3 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 24 Gratt. 540.

Dillard v. Ins. Co., 44 Ga. 119; 9 Am. Rep. 167.

5 Welts v. Ins. Co., 46 Barb. 412; 48 N. Y. 34; 8 Am. Rep. 518.

6

May on Insurance, sec. 299; Reichard v. Îns. Co., 31 Mo. 518; Horton v. Ins. Co., 2 Big. L. & Acc. Ins. Cas. 108.

rendered the insured more susceptible to the attack, and less capable of resisting the ravages of disease, the disease being the controlling and efficient cause of death, will avoid the policy.' Where a policy was conditioned to be void if death should occur "while the insured was, or in consequence of his having been, under the influence of intoxicating drink," it was held that if the insured was under the influence of intoxicating drink when he died, the policy was avoided, and that it was immaterial whether or not the drunkenness was the cause proximate or remote of the death. A specific and separate stipulation that if the assured shall become intemperate to a certain degree the company may cancel the policy supersedes a general stipulation that such a degree of intemperance shall work an absolute forfeiture.3

ILLUSTRATIONS.-The insured, in a fit of delirium tremens, escaped from those having him in charge, ran out into the streets, and was exposed in scanty clothing to the inclemency of the weather, which exposure contributed, with intemperance, to bring on congestion of the lungs, of which he died. Held, that the insurer was not liable under a policy excepting a death "by reason of intemperance from the use of intoxicating liquor": Miller v. Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 216; 34 Iowa, 222.

1 May on Insurance, sec. 301; Miller v. Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 216; 7 Am. Rep. 22; Holterhoff v. Ins. Co., 4 Big. L. & Acc. Ins. Cas. 395; Ranney v. Ins. Co., May on Insurance, sec. 302, the court saying: "The real question in this case is, whether intemperance from the use of intoxicating liquors was the cause of death. If the disease from which the insured was suffering was delirium tremens, or mania a potu, or other disease resulting from intemperance from the use of intoxicating liquors, and that disease, though not necessarily mortal, yet from want of helpful application, or neglect of proper care or treatment, produced exhaustion or fever, and consequent death, the death would properly be considered as resulting from the intemperance, even if the disease were not so mortal in itself but that with good care, and under favorable cir

cumstances, the insured might have recovered; yet if it became the cause of death by reason of the most efficacious mode of treatment not having been adopted, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover. If the death of the assured was caused by any drug administered to him in the course of medical practice for the purpose of cure, in sufficient quantity to produce death, and death was the effect of the drug, and not of the disease, then, in such case, the death could not properly be considered as resulting from the intemperance in the use of intoxicating liquors, and the plaintiff, upon that branch of the case, would be entitled to recover."

2 Shader v. Railway Pass'r Assur. Co., 66 N. Y. 441; 23 Am. Rep. 65.

3 Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Hazelett, 105 Ind. 212; 55 Am. Rep. 192.