2135. Restrictions on Residence and Travel.-A condition that the policy shall be void if the insured resides or goes out of certain limits is valid.' The "settled limits" of the United States means the established boundaries of the Union, and a death beyond the region of actual settlement is covered by the policy. Where a permit is given to reside without the restricted limits a certain time, if the insured remain beyond that time the policy is void, unless, it seems, where by sickness he is unable to travel back. But even in such a case, if the insured, when he obtained the permit, was in bad health, and his sickness, therefore, was not unforeseen, the act of God will not excuse the breach of the policy. Where a person, insured under a policy providing that he should not, without the written consent of the insurers, engage in sea service, procured such written consent to be annexed to his policy, and paid a first additional premium therefor, it was held that the policy was forfeited by the continuance of the insured in sea service for more than a year without payment of another additional premium." A permit to travel beyond the restricted limits must be strictly followed in its terms. Thus a permit to make a except when used to convey the idea There may be a settled region, a settled country, or a settled territory, but there can be no such thing as a settled limit, in the sense contended for." And it was held not to be susceptible of meaning "the region of settlement." Douglas v. Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 492; Evans . Ins. Co., 64 N. Y. 304; Night- of restraint. ť. ingale r. Ins. Co., 5 R. I. 38. Thus a policy on the life of William M. Tweed was held avoided, under its clause restricting travel, by his escaping from imprisonment in New York and going to Vigo, in Spain, which was beyond the limits prescribed: Douglas v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 55 How. Pr. 104; 83 N. Y. 492. Casler v. Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 427, the court saying: "The primary definition of the word 'settled' is fixed, placed, established. It is true, it is also, though more rarely, used as descriptive of a section of country that is planted with inhabitants; but it is obvious that it can never with propriety be used in the latter sense in connection with the word 'limits.' Limit means boundary, border, the outer line of a thing, and nothing else, 5 6 Baldwin v. Ins. Co., 3 Bosw. 530. Ayer v. Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 430. But where a company granted the insured a permit to go to Cuba, "he to take his own risk of epidemics,' and he died from yellow fever in the city of Havana, it was held that, the yellow fever not being prevalent in Havana at that season, the company were liable for the insurance: Pohalaski v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 45 How. Pr. 504. voyage by a certain route will not cover a voyage to the same place by a different, even if safer, route.' But a permit setting forth that the insured is about to proceed to and reside at, Belize and granting liberty to reside there for one year, may be availed of for any year thereafter during the currency of the policy. So a permission to go by sea in a first-rate vessel is not restrictive of the mode of travel, whether by steerage or in the cabin. The receipt of the premium after a violation of the conditions will waive the forfeiture, unless it is provided that the agent who receives the premium has no authority to waive the condition.5 § 2136. Amount of Recovery.-A policy of life insurance is a valued policy. It is not a contract of indemnity. The amount of the insurance is the measure of damages, unless there is such an over-insurance as to render it a wagering policy, and therefore void. Where a policy is taken out on a debtor's life as security for a debt, or a debtor insures his life for the benefit of his creditor, the residue after paying the debt belongs to the debtor's estate." The fact that a woman to whom a policy taken out by her husband on his life payable in four years to her is plaintiff in a pending divorce suit at the time of the maturity of the policy does not preclude her from claiming the amount. The creditors of an insolvent debtor are entitled to the proceeds of insurance policies on his life, taken out in the name and for the benefit of his wife, 1 Hathaway v. Ins. Co., 11 Cush. 448. 2 Notman v. Ass. Co., 4 Com. B., N. S., 476. 3 Taylor v. Ins. Co., 13 Gray, 434. Bevin v. Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244; Garber v. Ins. Co., 5 Big. L. & Acc. Ins. Cas. 221; Lorie v. Ins. Co., 5 Big. L. & Acc. Ins. Cas. 233; Walsh v. Ins. Co., 30 Iowa, 133; 6 Am. Rep. 664; Home Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 75 Ill. 426. Lorie v. Ins. Co., 5 Big. L. & Acc. Ins. Cas. 233. Bliss on Insurance, sec. 31; May on Insurance, sec. 114; Bevin v. Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244; Miller v. Ins. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 268; Grattan v. Ins. Co., 15 Hun, 77; St. John v. Ins. Co., 2 Duer, 419; Hoyt v. Ins. Co., 3 Bosw. 440; Trenton etc. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 24 N. J. L. 581. 7 Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643; American Ins. Co. v. Robertshaw, 26 Pa. St. 189; Courtney v. Wright, 2 Giff. 337. 8 Etna Ins. Co. v. Mason, 14 R. I. 583. only to the extent of the premiums paid after he became insolvent. A stranger who pays the premiums to keep it alive, without any contract with the insured or the beneficiary, cannot claim reimbursement after the policy has matured. The claim of a policy-holder in an insolvent life insurance company should be valued as a death claim, where, from the age and health of the claimant, reinsurance would be impossible.3 ILLUSTRATIONS. After suit was begun on an insurance policy for five thousand dollars, to be paid as a benefit to the assured's "wife and children equally," one of the children died. Held, that the wife and remaining children were entitled to the full sum: Covenant Mutual Benevolent Association v. Hoffman, 110 Ill. 603. A life insurance policy stipulated to pay one third of the amount if death should occur after three and within six months; two thirds if after six months and within a year; the whole if after a year. Held, the insured having died within three months, that the whole amount was payable: Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Drach, 101 Pa. St. 278. An insurance on the life of a husband was payable to his wife or her legal representatives. The husband paid the premiums, and he had the right to change the beneficiary by consent of the insurers. The wife died, and subsequently the husband. Held, that the insurance money belonged to the husband's estate: Washington Beneficial Endowment Association v. Wood, 4 Mackey, 19; 54 Am. Rep. 251. A man insured his life for "his wife, M., and children." He had children by a former wife and by M., and M. had a child by a former husband. Held, that his children by both wives were the children meant: Koehler v. Ins. Co., 66 Iowa, 325. § 2137. Non-forfeiting Policies. A policy defined in its margin as a non-forfeiture policy will be construed as such, if possible. All intendments will be made in favor of such construction. Such a policy is not forfeited by a failure to pay interest on premium notes regarded by the company as a loan to the assured. A provision in an insurance policy that if a policy for its surrender value 1 Central Bank v. Hume, 3 Mackey, 360; 51 Am. Rep. 780. Meier v. Meier, 15 Mo. App. 68. People v. Life Ins. Co., 40 Hun, 44. is taken it must be demanded within one year from the time an accrued premium falls due refers to an accrued premium, for the non-payment of which the company can determine the policy. A participating policy of life insurance for sharing surplus profits of the company with others holding similar policies does not create a trust relation between the holder and the company.2 ILLUSTRATIONS.-A policy provided that, upon default in the payment of a premium, the policy might be exchanged for a paid-up policy upon condition of delivering the policy, receipted, within sixty days from the date of default. Held, that the fact that the company during such sixty days was enjoined from issuing policies afforded no excuse for a failure to deliver up the policy as required by the condition: Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 58 Miss. 226; 38 Am. Rep. 322. A insured his life on the half-note plan, by which he was entitled to have certain dividends applied in reduction of the premiums, which latter he paid yearly, on receipt of a note from the company stating the balance due, though not till several days after the day fixed. Held, that it was the duty of the company to send him such notice, and that they were estopped from pleading a forfeiture on the ground of non-payment ad diem: Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Doster, 106 U. S. 30. A paid-up policy was issued to plaintiff for three thousand dollars. The annual premium was $389.16. Plaintiff made ten annual payments, and then demanded a paid-up policy for the amount of premiums paid. Held, that the company could not contend that plaintiff's right was limited to three thousand dollars, the policy containing no words of restriction: Christy v. Homeopathic Mutual Life Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. 345. A mutual insurance policy was marked "non-forfeitable," the premiums on which were paid by a note given for part of the premium, and "to remain a lien upon said policy until it becomes due by limitation, or by the death of A B, when the note shall be deducted from the said policy, unless sooner paid; the dividends on the policy to be applied to the payment of the note." Held, not forfeited by non-payment of the note: Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 93 Ind. 7. A policy provided that it should not be forfeited for non-payment of premiums, but that it should be continued in force for a period to be determined in a certain manner; or that the assured, at his option, should receive a paid-up policy for the full amount of premiums paid, "provided, that unless this policy shall be surrendered, and such paid-up 1 Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bowes, 42 Mich. 10. 2 Taylor v. Ins. Co., 9 Daly, 489; 59 How. Pr. 468. policy shall be applied for within ninety days after such nonpayment of premium as aforesaid, then this policy shall be void and of no effect." Held, that the option must be exercised within the ninety days, or that the right to have the policy continued or renewed in either form was lost: Knapp v. Homœopathic Mutual Life Ins. Co., 117 U. S. 411. A, a married woman, held a policy on the life of her husband, B, for her benefit, and payable to her, her executors, administrators, or assigns; but in case of her death before B, it was payable to their children. On the surrender of the policy, after two annual premiums had been paid, she was entitled to a paid-up policy. Held, that, she having died before the payment of the second premium, leaving children, B was not entitled, on tendering payment, to a paidup policy: Continental Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 41 Ohio St. 274. § 2138. Assignment of Policy - Change of Beneficiaries. A policy of life insurance, like any other chose in action, is assignable. Where the policy is issued to "the assured, his executors, administrators, and assigns," to pay the "legal representatives" of the assured, the policy is nevertheless assignable, and the provision to pay the legal representatives is designed to apply only to a case where the insured died without having previously assigned the policy, and is not to be construed in any sense as limiting the power of the party insured to assign. A policy made payable at a day named to the insured or his assigns, or to his personal representatives if he should die before the day, is assignable; and the assignee may recover, although the death is before the day named. The proceeds of a life insurance must go as agreed upon and directed in the policy; and no diversion, or agreement for a diversion, will be effectual without the consent of him to whom the proceeds are by the original policy directed or agreed to be paid. Palmer v. Merrill, 6 Cush. 282; 52 Am. Dec. 782; Anthracite Ins. Co. v. Sears, 109 Mass. 383; Fitzpatrick v. Ins. Co., 56 Conn. 116; 7 Am. St. Rep. 289. An oral assignment by a husband to his wife of a policy on his life is valid: Chapman v. McElwrath, 77 Mo. 38; 46 Am. Rep. 1. 2 New York Ins. Co. v. Flack, 3 Md. 341; 56 Am. Dec. 742; Anthracite Coal Co. v. Sears, 109 Mass. 383. 3 New York Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591. * Smith v. Ins. Co., 4 Dill. 353; Dietrich v. Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 662; Stillwell v. Ins. Co., 72 N. Y. 385. The |