Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24; 52 Am. Rep. 245. But in Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 566, the court say: "The general rule recognized by the courts has been that no one can have an insurance upon the life of another unless he has an interest in the continuance of his life. . . . . When the contract between the insured and the insurers is expressed to be for the benefit of another, or is made payable to another than the representative of the insured, it may be sustained accordingly. The same would probably be held in the case of an assignment with the assent of the insurers. But if the assignee has no interest in the life of the subject of the insurance which would sustain a policy to himself, the assignment would only take effect as a designation, by mutual agreement of the contracting parties, of the person who should be entitled to receive the proceeds, when due, instead of the personal representatives of the insured. And if it should appear that the arrangement was a cover for a speculating risk, contravening the general policy of the law, it would not be sustained. The purpose of the clause in the policy forbidding assignments without the assent of the company, in concurrence with the policy of the law, is undoubtedly to guard against the increased risks of speculating insurance." The view that an assignment to one having no insurable interest is invalid is held in Franklin Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116; 13 Am. Rep. 313; Franklin Ins. Co. v. Sefton, 53 Ind. 380; Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643; Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775; Mo. Valley R. R. Co. v. Sturges, 18 Kan. 93; 26 Am. Rep. 761; Helmetag v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183; 52 Am. Rep. 316; Basye v. Adams, 81 Ky. 368. § 2140. § 2144. Change of occupation - Increase of risk. Accident Insurance What is "Accident"? In the case of insurance against accidental injury or death, the meaning of the word "accident" is most material. Death by accident has been defined to be "death from any unexpected event which happens as by chance, or which does not take place according to the usual course of things." And in a recent New York case, an accident is said to be the happening of an event without the aid or the design of the person injured, and which is unforeseen." Insurance against injury by accident includes all accidents not excepted by the terms of the policy. A general insurance, however, against death by "violent and accidental means," followed by a proviso that the insurers will not be responsible for death caused by certain specified means, or happening in certain specified modes, must be construed as covering injuries happening by violent and accidental means, and not by the causes and modes specified in the excluding proviso. The exclusion of responsibility for 1 North Am. Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. St. 43; 8 Am. Rep. 212; McCarthy v. Ins. Co., 8 Biss. 362. In a Connecticut case it was held that "rupture caused by jumping from the cars while in motion, and afterwards running to accomplish certain business purposes, done voluntarily, and in the ordinary way, and without any necessity therefor, and with no unforeseen or involuntary movement of the body, such as stumbling or slipping or falling, is not by violent and accidental means. It might be otherwise if, in jumping, the insured should lose his balance and fall, or strike against some unforeseen object, or in running should stumble or slip": Southard v. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. 574. 2 Paul v. Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472; 8 Am. St. Rep. 758. 3 Prov. Life Ins. Co. v. Fennell, 49 Ill. 180; Prov. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 32 Md. 310. death or injury in certain specified ways does not enlarge the scope of the general clause so as to include cases happening otherwise than by violent and accidental means.1 A sprain of the muscles of the back caused by lifting heavy weights in the course of business is injury by accident or violence "occasioned by external or material causes operating on the person of the insured." Death by drowning is death by "accident or violence";" and so, it seems, is death by being killed by robbers. A death caused from escaping gas in a sleeping apartment is caused by "external, violent, and accidental means."5 An insurance against death from bodily injury may include death from apoplexy caused by bodily injury. Any accident arising in the course of traveling on a railroad is a "railroad accident." An accident to the railroad, or machinery connected with it, is not essential.' But death Southard v. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. 574. ? Martin v. Ins. Co., 1 Fost. & F. 505. Mallory v. Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52; 7 Am. Rep. 410. In Trew v. Ass. Co., 5 Hurl. & N. 211, the deceased went to bathe in the sea, and was not afterwards seen alive, his clothes being found on the shore, and his body in the sea. The court held the company liable, Cockburn, C. J., saying: "The counsel for the defendant contended, in effect, that where the cause of death produces immediate death without the intervention of any external injury, the policy does not apply; and whereas from the action of the water there is no external injury, death by the action of the water is not within the meaning of this policy. That argument, if carried to its extreme length, would apply to every case where death was immediate. If a man fell from the top of a house, or overboard from a ship, and was killed, or if a man was suffocated by the smoke of a house on fire, such cases would be excluded from the policy, and the effect would be that policies of this kind in many cases where death resulted from accident would afford no protection whatever to the assured. We ought not to give to those policies a construction which will defeat the protection of the assured in a large class of cases. We are therefore of opinion that if there was evidence for the jury that the deceased died by drowning, that was a death by accident within the terms of this policy.' In Winspear v. Ins. Co., 43 L. T., N. S., 459, it was held that where a man in an epileptic fit fell into the water and was drowned, the death was accidental, and by an injury caused by some "outward and visible sign." And see Reynolds v. Ins. Co., 22 L. T., N. S., 820. In Mallory v. Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52, 7 Am. Rep. 410, where the deceased was found in a creek, dead, with a cut on his head, it was held that the question of the cause of his death was properly left to the jury. See Ripley v. Ins. Co., Big. L. & Acc. Ins. Cas. 738; 16 Wall. 336; 1 Dill. 403. Paul v. Travelers Ins. Co., 45 Hun, 313; 112 N. Y. 472; 8 Am. St. Rep. 758; U. S. Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Newman, 84 Va. 52. 6 National Benefit Ass'n v. Grauman, 107 Ind. 288. Hence it has been ruled that a passenger who in alighting from a train slipped from the car-step and was injured suffered a "railroad accident" within a policy of insurance: Theobald v. Ass. Co., 10 Ex. 44. by sunstroke is not death by accident.' Suicide cannot be regarded as a death by accident or from accidental causes from the fact that it was committed while the assured was insane, and the insanity was produced or accelerated by an accidental fall or injury. The mere fact that one was injured in an "affray " does not, without more, show culpability on his part, or show that his injury was not the result of an "accident." 3 ILLUSTRATIONS.-The insured was pitching hay. The handle of the pitchfork slipped through his hands and struck him on the bowels, inflicting an injury which produced peritoneal inflammation, in consequence of which he died. Held, an accidental death: North American Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. St. 43; 8 Am. Rep. 212. An accident policy insured against death from bodily injuries effected through external, accidental, and violent means, and provided that it should not extend to death caused "wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease, or to death caused by suicide." The assured, while insane, hanged himself. Held, that an action on the policy was maintainable: Crandal v. Accident Ins. Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 40; 120 U. S. 527. An accident policy insured against death from external, violent, and accidental means. There was a proviso excepting death by suicide, whether the assured should be sane or insane. Held, that death from external violence was shown by proof that death ensued from a pistol-shot through the heart; that the presumption was against suicide; that from the mere fact of death it was not to be presumed that the assured was murdered; and that the question of suicide or murder was for the jury: Travelers Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661. The assured was found dead in a hot plunge-bath, in an almost standing position. There were two slight bruises on his head, insufficient to cause death, which resulted probably from an epileptic attack. Held, that he came to his death from other causes than "external, violent, and accidental means," within the meaning of that phrase as used in the policy: Tennant v. Travelers Ins. Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 322. 1 Sinclair v. Ins. Co., 3 El. & E. 478, the court saying: "We cannot think disease produced by the action of a known cause can be considered as accidental. Thus disease or death engendered by exposure to heat, cold, damp, the vicissitudes of climate or atmospheric influences, cannot, we think, properly be said to be accidental, unless at all events the expos ure is brought about by circumstances which may give it the character of accident." 2 Sheeter v. West. Ins. Co., 65 Mich. 199; 8 Am. St. Rep. 882. But see Crandall v. Ins. Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 40; 120 U. S. 527. 3 Chosen Friends Sup. Council v. Garrigus, 104 Ind. 133; 54 Am. Rep. 298. § 2141. Traveling-Alighting-Etc.-A person may be traveling in a carriage while alighting therefrom, until he has completely disconnected himself and landed. And an accident happening to the insured after the train has stopped at the station, by slipping off the step of the car, is a railroad accident "in a carriage on a line of railroad." And so one is "traveling in a conveyance provided for the transportation of passengers," if, while in the prosecution of the journey had in view when the insurance was procured, he elects to go on foot, this being a usual mode of making the transit from the steamboat wharf to the railroad station, although a conveyance by means of public hack may be had for hire by travelers so desiring to make the transit, which he might have taken. A railroad passengers' insurance company which insures against "any accident while traveling by public or private conveyance" is liable for the death of an engineer actually engaged in running trains, by an accident occurring on the railroad upon which he is employed.3 ILLUSTRATIONS. The policy provided that the insurers should be liable for injuries "when accidentally received by the assured while actually traveling in a public conveyance provided by common carriers for the transportation of passengers." The assured took passage from Chicago, having purchased a ticket for Kankakee. The train stopped at that place, and he alighted, standing in the door of the depot while the engine took water, until the train started, moving slowly to the coal-house for the purpose of taking fuel, when he walked rapidly or ran to the train, and reaching the forward platform of the rear car, threw out his hand as if attempting to get on board, when he fell between the cars. Held, that the loss was within the policy: Tooley v. Pass. Ass. Co., 3 Biss. 399. The insured attempted to jump on a public omnibus while it 1 Theobald v. Ins. Co., 10 Ex. 44. 2 Northup". Ass. Co., 43 N. Y. 516; 3 Am. Rep. 724. In another case, where the plaintiff had completed the greater part of his journey by steamer, and, there being no public conveyance, he was proceeding from the port to his home on foot, a distance of several miles, it was held that this was not traveling by private conveyance within the meaning of a policy insuring against accidents while "traveling by public or private conveyance": Ripley v. Ass. Co., 1 Dill. 403; 16 Wall. 336. This ruling is criticised by Mr. May: See May on Insurance, sec. 529. 3 Brown v. Rail. Pass. Ass. Co., 45 Mo, 221. |