A contracts to sell to no person but B any lime for six months. The covenant is valid: Schwalin v. Holmes, 49 Cal. 665. A agrees to sell to B all ore purchased by him after a certain date. The agreement is valid: Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545; 97 Am. Dec. 355. A binds himself not to write plays for any other than the H. theater. The contract is valid: Morris v. Colman, 18 Ves. 438. A contracts that he will write for a periodical, and will write for no other publication sold at less than a certain price, for one year. The agreement is valid: Stiff v. Cassell, 2 Jur., N. S., 348. A, a publican, in making settlement with his creditors, agrees to buy all beer of them. The agreement is valid: Thornton v. Sherratt, 8 Taunt. 529. A contracts to furnish B with sewing-machines at a discount, and upon credit, provided that B will deal exclusively with him. The contract of B is valid: Brown v. Ronsavell, 78 Ill. 589. A abandons the express business from L. to W., and covenants not to exercise the trade of carrier during his life. B gave him life employment as his assistant. The covenant is valid: Wallis v. Day, 2 Mees. & W. 273; 1 Jur. 73. A, the inventor of a patent, agrees with B that the latter shall become part owner of the patent, and A agrees to conduct exclusively the business of manufacturing the patented machines for part of the profits. The agreement is valid: Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 18 How. 289. B, in selling "Brewer's Lung Restorer," a patent medicine, covenanted "never to use or permit his name to be used on any preparation which could be used for the same purposes" as the medicine in question was used and sold for, or to impart the recipe thereof to any one. The covenant is valid: Brewer v. Lamar, 59 Ga. 756; 47 Am. Rep. 766. In the sale of a process for porcelain teeth, A covenanted not to carry on or be interested in the conduct of the business of manufacturing porcelain teeth or impart the secret to any one. The agreement is valid: Alcock v. Giberton, 5 Duer, 76. B sold out his business to A, agreeing not to engage in business in opposition to A so long as A should continue to do business. Held, valid: Mackinnon Pen Co. v. Fountain Ink Co., 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 442. A dentist agreed to purchase artificial teeth of a manufacturer on condition that the latter would not sell such teeth to any person in the town where the dentist resided. Held, that the condition was valid: Clark v. Crosby, 37 Vt. 188. A sold two village lots adjoining the premises owned and occupied by himself to B, and in part consideration of such sale took from B a contract not to sell any spirituous liquors on the lots in less than a half-barrel. Held, that the contract was not void: Laubenheimer v. Mann, 17 Wis. 542. A leased a portion of a certain warehouse in the city of M. to B, for a specified term, for the storage of wheat, and covenanted that during the term. he would not purchase, store, or handle any wheat in the market of M., except under the direction of B. Held, that this covenant was not void: Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Chand. 133. § 2407. Restraint may be Partially Void and Partially Valid. If the terms of the restraint can be construed divisibly as to the limits, it may be valid as to the limits which are reasonable, although other limits imposed are excessive and unreasonable.' Thus where the restraint was to operate in London, or in any place in England or Scotland, where the employer might have been practising during the employment, the restraint was held good as to London, but void as to the rest, because possibly extending everywhere. So a covenant not to exercise a certain trade within the cities of London or Westminster, or within six hundred miles of the same, was construed divisibly, and held good as to London and Westminster, but void as to the six hundred miles beyond, which was not divisible. So a contract not to engage in a particular trade for a specified time, "in the city of St. Louis, or at any other place," is divisible, and as to the restriction imposed in St. Louis is not void as in restraint of trade. Upon the same principle, a covenant by the articled clerk to a solicitor not to act for any person who had already been or who thereafter should become a client of the solicitor was held to be unreasonably large, but valid as to persons who were clients before and during the clerk's articles. So where A agreed with B not to manufacture ochre in Lehigh County or elsewhere, it was held that he might be enjoined from manufacturing ochre Leake on Contracts, 740; Dean v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480; Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15; 15 Am. Rep. 153. See contra, More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251; 6 Am. Rep. 621. But the rule that contracts in partial restraint of trade are valid does not apply to a contract by a corporation to abandon a part of its duty to the public: Chicago Gas Light Co. v. Gas Light Co., 121 Ill. 530; 2 Am. St. Rep. 124. Mallan v. May, 11 Mees. & W. 653; Chesman v. Nainby, 2 Ld. Raym. 1456. 3 Price v. Green, 16 Mees. & W. 346. Peltz v. Eichele, 62 Mo. 171. in Lehigh County. But an action will not lie on a promise made for one entire consideration, a part of which is unlawful as being in restraint of trade, if there has been no apportionment made or means of apportionment furnished by the parties themselves.2 § 2408. What is Breach of Contract. A contract by S. & C., in selling out a bakery "that they will not, or either of them, hereafter engage in the business of bakers in the town of F., and will not, directly or indirectly, engage in any business or do any act that shall interfere with the business thus purchased, for the sale of bread on the bread routes heretofore connected with said business" for five years, is broken if S. drove a bread-cart in F. on his former routes, and supplied his former customers with bread, though acting as the hired servant of a baker in another town. A contract by a hotel-keeper to buy no ice except of B is violated by purchasing for his hotel a small quantity from another than B. A contract not to manufacture nor put up a patented article during the existence of the patent prohibits the party from putting up the article covered by the patent, and also from putting up articles resembling those described in the patent, and liable to compete therewith in market. A covenant not to again carry on a retail butcher business on the covenantor's own account, or to operate any butcher business, except a wholesale business, is broken by taking charge of a retail butcher business for another. An agreement not to "have a marble shop" within a certain territory is broken by soliciting and filling orders within. that territory, the workshop being outside. An agreement of a stage proprietor not to be concerned, "direct or indirect," in any opposition line, is violated by his lending money to proprietors of a rival line, for the purpose of enabling them to sustain it. A stipulation that A will not run, or suffer to be run or employed, any steamer in which he is now or may be interested, on certain waters, is broken if a steamer owned by the covenantor at the time of the covenant is run on those waters by purchasers from him. An agreement not at any time to send or ship to New York any poultry coming from certain districts is broken by engaging in New York in the sale of poultry on commission, ordering all his supplies to be shipped from those districts, sometimes in advance of his sales, sometimes to fill contracts of sale previously made. On a covenant not to engage in or carry on the same business, within certain limits, it is not necessary to show that the covenantor had solicited custom within the prescribed limits, if he, having established himself in the same business outside of the district, systematically, , and for profit, to an extent to constitute the carrying on of a business, did send to the houses of customers within the district, and receive orders, and deliver goods, although it was done at the request of the customers, and without his solicitation; but if, occasionally, to oblige an old customer, he sold to him goods, this is not a breach.' 5 An agreement not to sell milk within a certain town is. not broken by selling milk outside the town to a party not an inhabitant of the town, with knowledge that such purchaser himself intends to sell within the town. A contract by an expressman to withdraw from that business on his own account on a certain railroad, and not to do any express business over any other road running between certain points, is not broken by his working as 1 Davis v. Barney, 2 Gill & J. 382. 2 California Steam Navigation Co. v. Wright, 8 Cal. 585. Richardson v. Peacock, 33 N. J. Eq. 597. 248. Sander v. Hoffman, 64 N. Y. Smith v. Martin, 80 Ind. 260; 41 Am. Rep. 806. messenger for another expressman on another road between the same points. One who agrees not to practice as a physician in a certain city "and vicinity" is prevented from practicing within ten miles of the city limits. An obligation of a physician that he would not locate himself and practice in his profession within certain limits, and if he should so locate himself or practice, that he would pay a stipulated sum for every month that he should so practice, is forfeited if he practice within those limits, though he resides without them. A contract not to practice dentistry on one's own account, or by any agent, within certain limits, is not violated by working for another. Where, by a written contract, defendant, a physician, sold his medical practice to plaintiff and agreed not to "resettle" in the same town, it was held that he was bound thereby not to again take up his residence in such town for the practice of his profession, but that he might practice in that locality while residing elsewhere." Where a physician sold out his business, reserving the right to practice in "special cases," and he afterwards attended a few chronic cases on which he had been employed, and also some relatives, in the neighborhood, this was held no breach of his agreement not to practice except as aforesaid. An agreement by A with B that he will not for himself open, or cause to be opened, a billiard or eating saloon in W., is not violated when A opens and manages such a saloon as the agent and servant of C.7 § 2409. Combinations of Workmen.- Combinations. of workmen for the purpose of restricting and controlling the freedom of labor, as by supporting strikes, are illegal |