licensor has permitted, on the faith of it, the licensee to go on and make valuable improvements on his land.1

Some courts hold that after the license has been acted upon, and considerable expenditures made, it should not be revoked without making compensation to the licensee.2 Other cases go still further, and hold that where the licensor has stood by and seen the licensee make large expenditures in reliance upon his license, and which will be wholly or in great part lost to him if the license should be recalled, these facts are sufficient to create an estoppel in pais which will preclude him from revoking. Others, again, enforce the contract, on the ground that it has been taken out of the statute of frauds by part performance.*

1 Wilson v. Chalfant, 15 Ohio, 248; 45 Am. Dec. 574; Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. 154; 93 Am. Dec. 732; Ocean Mfg. Co. v. Sprague Mfg. Co., 34 Conn. 524; Foster v. Browning, 4 R. I. 47; 67 Am. Dec. 505; Ricker v. Kelly, 1 Me. 117; 10 Am. Dec. 43, note; Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267; 16 Am. Dec. 497; Fuhr v. Dean, 26 Mo. 116; 69 Am. Dec. 484; Wynn v. Garland, 19 Ark. 23; 68 Am. Dec. 190; Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 587; 73 Am. Dec. 439; Wickersham v. Orr, 9 Iowa, 253; 74 Am. Dec. 349; Southwestern R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 69 Ga. 114; Texas etc. R. R. Co. v. Jarrell, 60 Tex. 267; Campbell v. R. R. Co., 110 Ind. 490. But the right at law to revoke a license acted upon with expenditure of moneys is fully recognized in a number of cases: Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 375; 27 Am. Dec. 675; Johnson v. Skillman, 29 Minn. 95; 43 Am. Rep. 192; Owen v. Field, 12 Allen, 457; Clute v. Carr, 20 Wis. 559; 91 Am. Dec. 442; Hetfield v. R. R. Co., 29 N. J. L. 571; Druse v. Wheeler, 22 Mich. 439; Selden v. Delaware etc. Canal Co., 29 N. Y. 634; Foster v. Browning, 4 R. I. 47; 67 Am. Dec. 505; Houston v. Laffee, 46 Vt. 505; Carleton v. Redington, 21 N. H. 291; Kamphouse v. Gaffner, 73 Ill. 453; Miller v. Tobie, 41 N. H. 84; Marston v. Gale, 24 N. H. 176; Ruggles v. Lesure, 24 Pick. 187.

2 Addison v. Hack, 2 Gill, 221; 41 Am. Dec. 421; Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala.

578; 73 Am. Dec. 439; Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10; 81 Am. Dec. 370; Woodbury v. Parshley, 7 N. H. 237; 26 Ann. 739; Androscoggin Bridge v. Bragg, 11 N. H. 102; Sampson v. Burnside, 13 N. H. 264; Hall v. Chaffee, 13 Vt. 150; Hazleton v. Putnam, 3 Pinn. 107; 54 Am. Dec. 158; Bush v. Sullivan, 3 G. Greene, 344; 54 Am. Dec. 506.

Swartz v. Swartz, 4 Pa. St. 353; 45 Am. Dec. 697; Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267; 16 Am. Dec. 497; Lacy v. Arnett, 33 Pa. St. 169; Cumberland R. R. Co. v. McLanahan, 59 Pa. St. 23; Huff v. McCauley, 53 Pa. St. 206; 91 Am. Dec. 203; Sheffield v. Collier, 3 Kelly, 82; Cook v. Pridgen, 45 Ga. 331; 12 Am. Rep. 582; Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10; 81 Am. Dec. 370; Lowe v. Miller, 27 Ind. 534; 46 Am. Dec. 188; Wilson v. Chalfant, 15 Ohio, 248; 45 Am. Dec. 574; Ricker v. Kelly, 1 Me. 117; 16 Am. Dec. 497; Russell v. Hubbard, 59 Ill. 335; McKellip v. McIlhenny, 4 Watts, 317; 28 Am. Dec. 711; Davis v. Sonder, 10 Phila. 113. See note to Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267, in 16 Am. Dec. 501, 506.

Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267; 16 Am. Dec. 501; Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10; 81 Am. Dec. 370; Lowe v. Miller, 27 Ind. 534; 46 Am. Dec. 188; Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 4 Serg. & R. 241; 8 Am. Dec. 696; Strickler v. Todd, 10 Serg. & R. 63; 13 Am. Dec. 649; McKellip v. McIlhenny, 4 Watts, 317;

In these cases the license is not treated as a personal privilege merely, but is considered as pertaining to the property, so as to pass with it on a sale, so that the death of the licensor or licensee, or the sale of the servient tenement, or the decay of the thing erected, would not revoke it.' So a license coupled with an interest is not revocable. A railroad which, by consent of the owner, is put in possession of a way over his land, with a covenant from him for further assurance, has a license coupled with an interest, and which is not subject to revocation."

§ 2676. Duties and Liabilities of Licensor and Licensee. The general rule is, that the licensor assumes to the licensee no duty, except to refrain from acts willfully injurious to him, unless he had received a consideration. for the license, or in certain other cases where the law requires care even towards licensees and trespassers.* In acting upon the license, the licensee is bound to use due care, and to do nothing on the land which will be injuriAn express license exempts the licensee from damages for injuries necessarily resulting from doing the act in a careful manner; but not for damages for any. thing beyond that.

§ 2677. Abuse of License.-A license, whether given by the owner or by the law, is lost by abusing it.' But a

Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 Pa. St. 289; 64 Am. Dec. 657; Campbell v. McCoy, 31 Pa. St. 263; Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. 164; 93 Am. Dec. 732; Lacy v. Arnett, 33 Pa. St. 169; Hall v. Chaffee, 13 Vt. 157, note; Wilson v. Chalfant, 15 Ohio, 248; 45 Am. Dec. 574.

Lacy v. Arnett, 33 Pa. St. 169; Thompson v. McElarney, 82 Pa. St. 174; Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & S. 267; 16 Am. Dec. 479; Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10; 81 Am. Dec. 370.

2 United States v. R. R. Co., 1 Hughes, 178; Long v. Buchanan, 27 Md. 502; 92 Am. Dec. 653; Cool v. Lumber Co., 87 Ind. 531; Simons v. Morehouse, 88 Ind. 391; Thompson v. McElarney, 82 Pa. St. 174.

New Jersey etc. R. R. Co. v. Van Syckle, 37 N. J. L. 496.

See Title ante, Negligence; Kay v. R. R. Co., 65 Pa. St. 269; 3 Am. Rep. 628.

Eaton v. Winnie, 20 Mich. 156; 4 Am. Rep. 377.

Woodruff v. Beekman, 43 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 282; McKnight v. Ratcliff, 44 Pa. St. 159.

7 Cushing v. Adams, 18 Pick. 110. If a party having a right of way licenses the owner of the soil to build an arch over the way, but such owner unnecessarily and unreasonably obstructs the way in building the arch, an action on the case will lie for the abuse of the license: Id.

distinction is taken in respect to the consequences of the abuse between a license given by the law and a license given by the owner. If the license was given by the law, an abuse not only terminates it, but revokes it; and it is presumed, from the misbehavior of the licensee, that he entered originally with the intent to do the wrong he has actually committed, and not in good faith under his license. The wrong-doer is thereupon held responsible as a trespasser ab initio; a trespasser in the entry itself, as in everything done afterwards.' But when the license is given by the party himself, the abuse of it has no such retroactive effect. The licensee does not become a trespasser ab initio, but he is liable simply for his abuse or misconduct.2

1 Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Coke, 290; 1 Smith's Lead. Cas.; Dickson v. Parker, 3 How. (Miss.) 219, 34 Am. Dec. 78.

2 Edelman v. Yakel, 27 Pa. St. 26; Dumont v. Smith, 4 Denio, 319; Van Brunt v. Schenck, 13 Johns. 414; Ferrin

v. Symonds, 11 N. H. 363; Jewell v. Mahood, 44 N. H. 474; 84 Am. Dec. 90; Cushing v. Adams, 18 Pick. 110; Ballard v. Noaks, 2 Ark. 45; Stone v. Knapp, 29 Vt. 501; Faulkner v. An. derson, Gilmer, 221.

INDEX.