by a railroad." Another act put all owners and operators of railroads, whether natural persons, companies or corporations, on an equal footing, by making the term railroad corporation to include them. Though directed against railroads alone, while no other common carriers are brought within its operation, it was not partial for that reason. And the court thus remarks upon it: "Had the legislature deemed it essential to the protection of human life and private property they would doubtless have extended the statute to carriers by coach and water; but as the class of property and human life protected by this provision of the statute is not exposed to like perils incident to coach and water travel, the occasion and necessity for so extending the statute did not exist. Class legislation is not necessarily obnoxious to the constitution. It is a settled construction of similar constitutional provisions that a legislative act which applies to and embraces all persons who are or who may come into like situation and circumstances is not partial." And a like conclusion was arrived at in respect to an act which gave a justice an exceptional jurisdiction in the particular class of actions just mentioned." 2 An act providing in substance that all cities and towns theretofore incorporated under special acts and charters, and which did not then possess the power to sell personal and real property for taxes, should thereafter have and possess such power, was held general and constitutional. Though it did not apply to all cities and towns in the state, it was not therefore unconstitutional; other cities and towns possessed that power, and the act in question brought the class to which it applied into harmony with them. As the act applied to all cities and towns in the state falling within the class specified, not to make an exceptional rule, but to remove an exception, it was not local or special, but of uniform operation.* 1 Humes v. Mo. Pac. R'y Co. 82 Mo. 221. 2 Humes v. Missouri, etc. R'y Co. 82 Mo. 221; Snyder v. Warford, 11 Mo. 513; Merritt v. Knife Falls B. Corp. 34 Minn. 245; Central Trust Co. v. Sloan, 65 Iowa, 655; Peoria, etc. R. R. Co. v. Duggan, 109 Ill. 537. 3 Phillips v. Mo. Pac. R'y Co. 86 Mo. 540. 4 Haskel v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 232; Iowa Land Co. v. Soper, 39 id. 112; Bumsted v. Govern, 47 N. J. L. 368; affirmed, 48 id. 612. § 126. Railroad companies have for some purposes constituted a class for general legislation; for other purposes such companies may be divided into sub-classes, and legislation in regard to one of such classes made to differ from that applied to another. An Iowa act divided the railroads of the state into classes according to business in regulating rates of freight. It was held not in conflict with the constitution, requiring laws of a general nature to have a uniform operation throughout the state. Waite, C. J., said: "It operates uniformly on each class, and this is all the constitution requires. It is very clear that a uniform rate of charges for all railroad companies in the state might operate unjustly upon some. It was proper, therefore, to provide in some way for an adaptation of the rates to the circumstances of the different roads; and the general assembly, in the exercise of its legislative discretion, has seen fit to do this by a system of classification." The requirement of general laws, and that they have a uniform operation, is an implied prohibition of special or local laws; so the express prohibition of local or special laws is an implied requirement that legislation shall be general. Individual cases of the enumerated class cannot be provided for. These are converse forms of similar constitutional regulation. The principal discussion, however, has occurred on the varied inhibitions of special or local enactment. § 127. Special and local laws.- Special laws are those made for individual cases, or for less than a class requiring laws appropriate to its peculiar condition and circumstances; local laws are special as to place. When prohibited they are severally objectionable for not extending to the whole subject to which their provisions would be equally applicable, and thus permitting a diversity of laws relating to the same subject. The object of the prohibition of special or local laws is to prevent this diversity. Each subject as to which such laws are prohibited is by such inhibition designated as a subject of only general legislation which shall have a uniform operation. Generality in scope and uniformity of operation are both essential. A law which embraces a whole subject would still be special if not framed to have a uniform operation. 1 C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 2 State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458. U. S. 155. What is an integral subject of legislation? One in regard to which as a whole a law is general, and when of less scope, local or special? There has been much discussion of this subject by the courts of New Jersey. It has there received a very definite and satisfactory solution. The principles there established for classification of subjects for legislation have been generally recognized; they will probably harmonize the well-considered cases in all the states where similar constitutional regulations are in force. In Van Riper v. Parsons' the supreme court declared this principle: that a general law, as contradistinguished from one special or local, is a law which embraces a class of subjects or places, and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. The second time that case passed under judicial examination in the same court the holding was thus expressed: "A law framed in general terms, restricted to no locality, and operating equally upon all of a group of objects which, having regard to the purpose of the legislature, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves, is not a special or local law but a general law, without regard to the consideration that within this state there happens to be but one individual of that class, or one place where it produces effects." The statute which the court in that case gave effect to spent its force entirely in its application to one city. This is a leading case in that state, and has been followed by many others in that state and elsewhere affirming and exemplifying it.2 In Rutgers v. New Brunswick an act came in question. which had the effect to abolish a court at a particular city, 140 N. J. L. 123. 2 Board of Assessors v. Central R. R. Co. 48 N. J. L. 146; Sutterly v. Camden Common Pleas, 41 id. 495; Field v. Silo, 44 id. 355; Hines v. Freeholders, etc. 45 id. 504; Bucklew v. R. R. Co. 64 Iowa, 603; Central Trust Co. v. Sloan, 65 id. 655; Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 417; Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St. 85; People v. Wallace, 70 Ill. 680; State v. Hoagland, 51 N. J. L. 62; Bingham v. Camden, 40 N. J. L. 156; Pell v. Newark, id. 71, 550; Rutgers v. New Brunswick, 42 id. 51; State ex rel. Richards v. Hammer, id. 435; Tiger v. Morris Pleas, id. 631; Worthley v. Steen, 43 id. 542; Bumstead v. Govern, 47 id. 368; affirmed, 48 id. 612. 3 42 N. J. Law, 51. established under a prior general law. This prior law provided that one district court should be established in every. city in the state of fifteen thousand inhabitants. New Brunswick had a population of sixteen thousand six hundred. By a supplement to this act, the original act was amended by substituting twenty thousand in the place of fifteen thousand. This amendment was held not to be a local or special law, and that it abolished the district court in that city. An act which for the purpose of fixing the compensation of president judges classifies them into separate classes by reference to population of the counties in which they serve was sustained as a general law. The duties of such judges are well known to vary. Those located in populous counties are likely to be called on to perform more onerous duties, and their time will probably be more fully occupied. And so such a distinction, looking at the matter of fixing compensation alone, cannot be said to be in any respect illusive.' A law may be general in its terms, and apply to a class constituted by having characteristics which make it a class, and yet be an illusory classification which will not warrant legislation confined to it, where special or local legislation is prohibited. The grouping must be founded on peculiarities requiring legislation, and legislation which by reason of the absence of such peculiarities is not necessary or applicable outside of that class. In other words, the true principle requires something more than a mere designation by such characteristics as will serve to classify; for the characteristics which will thus serve as a basis of classification must be of such a nature as to mark the objects so designated as peculiarly requiring exclusive legislation. There must be a substantial distinction, having a reference to the subject-matter of the proposed legislation between the objects or places embraced in such legislation and the objects or places excluded. The marks of distinction on which the classification is founded must be such, in the nature of things, as will in some reasonable degree at least account for and justify the restriction of the legislation.2 1 Skinner v. Collector, 42 N. J. L. 407; Hanlon v. Board of Commis sioners, 53 Ind. 123; State v. Reitz, Auditor, 62 id. 159. 2 Hammer v. State, 44 N. J. L. 667. $128. Distinctions which do not arise from substantial differences, so marked as to call for separate legislation, constitute no ground for supporting such legislation as general.' Where local or special legislation to regulate the internal affairs of municipalities is forbidden it must be general and applicable to all alike. No departure from this rule can be justified, except where, by reason of the existence of a substantial difference between municipalities, a general law would be inappropriate to some while it would be appropriate to others. In such case the municipalities in which the peculiarity exists would constitute a class, and the legislation would in fact be general because it would apply to all to which it would be appropriate. An act concerning inns and taverns gave the court of common pleas the power to grant such license, but the act was restricted to cities, towns and counties by population so as to indicate an intention that it should operate in but three small towns in one county. It was objected that it was local and special, as there was no distinction of those towns from other municipalities which would in any reasonable degree account for such restriction. The court held the act unconstitutional. The court said the constitutional provisions against special or local laws regulating the internal affairs of municipal corporations and political divisions of the state was to secure uniformity. "The uniformity that is thus sought can only be broken by classifications of those bodies that are founded on substantial differences, such as are not illusory or fraudulent in their character."4 An act purporting to confer on cities having a population of twenty-five thousand a power of issuing bonds to fund their floating debt was held special, and unconstitutional on account of its operation being restricted to cities of that magnitude. There was deemed to be no connection between the number of !Id.; Hudson v. Buck, 51 N. J. L. 155; Beaver County Indexes, 6 Pa. County Ct. 525; Allen v. Pioneer Press, 40 Minn. 117; Preston v. Louisville, 84 Ky. 118; Cobb v. Bord, 40 Minn. 479; State v. Standley, 76 Iowa, 215; Newman v. Emporia, 41 Kan, 583; Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264; Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo. 543; Atlantic City Water-works Co. v. Con- 3 Zeigler v. Gaddis, 44 N. J. L. 363. Id.; Coutieri v. New Brunswick, 44 N. J. L. 58; Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa. St. 328 |