petition; the other was a provision that no town shall be vacated, nor any town with an area of thirty-six sections or less be divided or have any part stricken therefrom, without first submitting the question to the electors of the town. It was held that they could stand together; the former conferred a power in general terms and the latter imposed a limitation.1 § 151. Three successive acts of limitation were passed; each provided a bar to an action of assumpsit if not commenced within six years after the cause of action accrued. The second in terms repealed the first. The third was put in force without any repealing clause. A right of action run three years under the first, and three years under the second, and the action was brought after the third had been enacted; it was held that the action was barred. There was no repeal, for the acts were not inconsistent. It is deemed that there is less probability that repugnant acts will be passed at the same session than at different sessions of the legislature.3 At the same session of the legislature two acts were passed relative to the place where actions against corporations might be brought. The act first passed provided that such actions might be brought in any county where the cause of action or a part thereof accrued, or in any county where the corporation had an agency or representative or in which was its principal of fice. The second act gave a right in terms to bring an action in any county in which the cause of action or a part thereof arose-it contained no repealing clause. It was held not to repeal the former." Before the new constitution of Ohio took effect, the legislature of that state passed a law authorizing towns and counties, the people assenting, to subscribe for stock in railroad corporations. A clause in the constitution declares that "the general assembly shall never authorize any county, town or township by vote of its citizens or otherwise to become a stockholder in any joint-stock company or corporation." It was held that this clause did not repeal the previous law. A 1 Supervisors v. Board of Commissioners, 12 Minn. 403. 31. 2 McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Oregon, 4 Houston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ford, 53 Tex. 364. 5 Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; 'State ex rel. v. Dudley, 1 Ohio St. 3 Houston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ford, 53 437; Van Hagan, Ex parte, 25 id. Tex. 364. 426; Elizabethtown, etc. R. R. Co. v statute which does not take away any right, or impose any substantially new duty, but regulates with additional requirements a duty imposed by a previous statute, is not to be deemed inconsistent with the previous act. A subsequent statute which institutes new methods of proceeding does not, without negative words, repeal a former statute relative to procedure. The statute authorizing a proceeding to contest the validity of a will "by petition to the court of common pleas" does not repeal the provisions of the former statute authorizing a proceeding by bill in chancery. A statute which authorizes a certain oath to be taken before a particular officer is not repealed by a statute which extends the power to administer oaths to a class of officers. If two statutes can be read together without contradiction, or repugnancy, or absurdity or unreasonableness, they should be read together, and both will have effect." § 152. It is not enough to justify the inference of repeal that the later law is different; it must be contrary to the prior law. It is not sufficient that the subsequent statute covers some or even all the cases provided for by the former, for it may be merely affirmative, accumulative or auxiliary; there must be positive repugnancy; and even then the old law is repealed by implication only to the extent of the repugnancy. If, by fair and reasonable interpretation, acts which are seemingly incompatible or contradictory may be enforced and made to operate in harmony and without absurdity, both will be upheld, and the later one will not be regarded as repealing the others by construction or intendment. As laws are pre Elizabethtown, 12 Bush, 233; Coats v. Hill, 41 Ark. 149; Stephens v. Ballou, 27 Kan. 594. 1 Staats v. Hudson River R. R. Co. 4 Abb. App. Dec. 287. 2 Sharp v. Warren, 6 Price, 131; Mitchell v. Duncan, 7 Fla. 13. 307. Ala. 276; Enloe v. Reike, 56 id. 500; 6 Nixon v. Piffet, 16 La. Ann. 379; Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. Raudebaugh v. Shelley, 6 Ohio St. 342, 363; Coats v. Hill, 41 Ark. 149; 4 Ruckman v. Ransom, 35 N. J. L. Mich. 168; People v. Supervisors, 67 565. Regina v. Mews, 6 Q. B. Div. 47; S. C. L. R. 8 App. Cas. 339, reversing the ruling below; Smith v. Speed, 50 8 Elizabethtown, etc. R. R. Co. v. Elizabethtown, 12 Bush, 233; Higgins v. State, 64 Md. 419, 423; McCool T sumed to be passed with deliberation and with a full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the legislature, in passing a statute, did not intend to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable. In the endeavor to harmonize statutes, seemingly incompatible, to avoid repeal by implication, a court will reject absurdity as not enacted, and accept with favorable consideration what is reasonable and convenient. In cases of doubt, repeal of a statute or of the common law may be deemed intended in favor of convenience. An argument based on inconvenience is forcible in law; no less so is one to avoid what is unjust or unreasonable. Like considerations of what is convenient, just or reasonable, when they can be invoked against the implication of repeal, will be still more potent. The act being silent as to repeal and affirmative, it will not be held to abrogate any prior law which can reasonably and justly operate without antagonism." § 153. The presumption is stronger against implied repeals where provisions supposed to conflict are in the same act or were passed at nearly the same time. In the first case it would manifestly be an inadvertence, for it is not supposable that the legislature would deliberately pass an act with conflicting intentions; in the other case the presumption rests on the improbability of a change of intention, or, if such change has occurred, that the legislature would express it in a different act without an express repeal of the first. Where a stat v. Smith, 1 Black, 459; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; Howard Association's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 344. 1 Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill, 221, 226. 2 Steward v. Greaves, 10 M. & W. 711; Davison v. Farmer, 6 Ex. 242, 256. 3 Co. Litt. 97a. 4 Rex v. Whiteley, 3 H. & N. 143; Johnson v. Bush, 3 Barb. Ch. 207, 238. See Harris v. Jenns, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 152. 5 Ante, $129; McNeely v. Woodruff, 13 N. J. L. 352, 356, 357; Evergreens, Matter of, 47 N. Y. 216, 221; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 id. 424, 438; State v. Stinson, 17 Me. 154; Smith v. 6 Houston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ford, 53 Tex. 364; S. C. 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 514; Eckloff v. Dist. of Columbia, 4 Mackay, 572; Peyton v. Moseley, 3 T. B. Mon. 77; Gibbons v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232; State ex rel. Kellogg v. Treasurer, 41 Mo. 16; State v. Clark, 54 id. 216; Nazareth L. B. L. v. Commonwealth, 14 B. Mon. 266; State v. Rackley, 2 Blackf. 249; Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330; Dawson v. Horan, 51 Barb. 459; ute expresses first a general intent, and afterwards an inconsistent particular intent, the latter will be taken as an exception from the former and both will stand.1 § 154. Repeal by revision.- Revision of statutes implies a re-examination of them. The word is applied to a restatement of the law in a corrected or improved form. The restatement may be with or without material change. A revision is intended to take the place of the law as previously formulated. By adopting it the legislature say the same thing, in effect, as when a particular section is amended by the words "so as to read as follows." The revision is a substitute; it displaces and repeals the former law as it stood relating to the subjects within its purview. Whatever of the old law is restated in the revision is continued in operation as it may operate in the connection in which it is re-enacted. In Bartlet v. King,2 Dewey, J., said: "A subsequent statute revising the whole subject-matter of a former one, and evidently intended as a substitute for it, although it contains no express words to that effect, must on principles of law, as well as in reason and common sense, operate to repeal the former." 3 Though a subsequent statute be not repugnant in all its provisions to a former, yet if it was clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern, it repeals the former statute. Without express words of repeal a previous statute will Sanders v. State, 77 Ind. 227; Beals v. Hale, 4 How. 37; Supervisors v. Board of Commissioners, 12 Minn. 403. Tex. 418; Mulligan v. Cavanagh, 46 N. J. L. 45, 49; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 617; State v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 425; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 1 Stockett v. Bird, 18 Md. 484; De 88: Board of Commissioners v. Potts, Winton v. Mayor, 26 Beav. 533. 2 12 Mass. 545. 3 Rogers v. Watrous, 8 Tex. 62; King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395; Excelsior Petroleum Co. v. Embury, 67 Barb. 261; Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. 45; Berkshire v. Miss. etc. R'y Co. 28 Mo. App. 225; Lyon v. Smith, 11 Barb. 124; Smith v. Nobles Co. 37 Minn. 535. 4 Rogers v. Watrous, supra; Industrial School District v. Whitehead, 13 N. J. Eq. 290; Bryan v. Sundberg, 5 10 Ind. 286; State v. Wilson, 43 N. H. 419; Water Works Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364; Farr v. Brackett, 30 Vt. 344; Tracy v. Tuffly, 134 U. S. 206; Giddings v. Cox, 31 Vt. 607; State v. Kelley, 34 N. J. L. 75; Pingree v. Snell, 42 Me. 53; Fayette County v. Faires, 44 Tex. 514; Sacramento v. Bird, 15 Cal. 294; State v. Conkling, 19 Cal. 501; Dexter & Limerick P. R. Co. v. Allen, 16 Barb. 15; Bracken v. Smith, 39 N. J. Eq. 169; Andrews v. People, 75 Ill. 605; Daviess v. Fair he held to be modified by a subsequent one, if the latter was plainly intended to cover the subject embraced by both, and to prescribe the only rules in respect to that subject that are to govern. Where a provision is amended by the form, "to read as follows," the intention is manifest to make the provision following a substitute for the old provision and to operate exclusively in its place. Does a revision import that it shall displace the last previous form; that it is evidently intended as a substitute for it; that it is intended to prescribe the only rule to govern? In other words, will a revision repeal by implication previous statutes on the same subject, though there be no repugnance? The authorities seem to answer emphatically, Yes. The reasonable inference from a revision is that the legislature cannot be supposed to have intended that there should be two distinct enactments embracing the same subjectmatter in force at the same time, and that the new statute, being the most recent expression of the legislative will, must be deemed a substitute for previous enactments, and the only one which is to be regarded as having the force of law.3 bairn, 3 How. 636; Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 596; People v. Brook:lyn, 69 N. Y. 605; Cook County Nat. Bank v. United States, 107 U. S. 445. Tracy v. Tuffly, 134 U. S. 206. 2 United States v. Barr, 4 Sawy. 254; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 95; Knox v. Baldwin, 80 N. Y. 610; Goodno v. Oshkosh, 31 Wis. 127; State v. Ingersoll, 17 id. 631; State v. Beswick, 13 R. I. 211. 3 Commonwealth v. Kelliher, 12 Allen, 480; Pratt v. Street Commissioners, 139 Mass. 559, 563; Knight v. Aroostook R. R. 67 Me. 291; Towle v. Marrett, 3 Greenlf. 22; Commonwealth v. Cooley, 10 Pick. 37; Ogbourne v. Ogbourne's Adm'r, 60 Ala. 616; Roche v. Jersey City, 40 N. J. L. 257; Scott v. Simons, 70 Ala. 352; Goodenow v. Buttrick, 7 Mass. 140; Stirman v. State, 21 Tex. 734; Ashley, Appellant, 4 Pick. 21, 23; Smith v. Hickman's Hcirs, Cooke (Tenn.), 336; Mayor, etc. v. Groshon, 30 Md. 436; Burlander v. Railway Co. 26 Wis. 76; Simmons v. Bradley, 27 id. 689; Moore v. Railroad Co. 34 id. 173; Gilbank v. Stephenson, 30 id. 157; Oleson v. Railway Co. 36 id. 383; State v. Campbell, 44 id. 529; Davis v. Carew, 1 Rich. 275; Gibbons v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232; Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 529; Cook County Nat. Bank v. United States, id. 445; Commonwealth v. Watts, 84 Ky. 537; Harold v. State, 16 Tex. App. 157; Tafoya v. Garcia, 1 New Mex. 486; Lawson v. De Bolt, 78 Ind. 563; State v. Studt, 31 Kan. 245; Werborn v. Austin, 77 Ala. 381; Sawyers v. Baker, 72 id. 49; Carmichael v. Hays, 66 id. 543; Hatchett v. Billingslea, 65 id. 16; Furman v. Nichol, 3 Cold. 439; Mayor v. Dearmon, 2 Sneed, 120; United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546; Commonwealth v. Cromley, 1 Ashm. 179; Heckmann v. Pinkney, 81 N. Y. 211; State v. Whitworth, 8 Port. 434; Wood v. State, 47 Ark. 488; Stebbins v. State, 22 Tex. App. 32; Smith |