was, perhaps, competent for the law-giver to enact, but which is unreasonable and unjust if left to stand alone.1 § 175. A law is entire where each part has a general influence over the rest, and all are intended to operate together for one purpose. In such case the invalidity of that purpose will affect the whole act. Nevertheless, if only one incidental provision is invalid, that may not render the whole act void. It is not entire in that sense. Where a repeal of prior laws is inserted in an act in order to the unobstructed operation of such act, and it is held unconstitutional, the incidental provision for the repeal of prior laws will fall with it. An act was passed to dissolve municipal corporations and provided the manner in which they might re-incorporate. The latter was the object of the enactment, and that being held unconstitutional the former was also invalid. In such cases the object of the legislature is frustrated; when the void part is eliminated, there is not a complete act remaining expressive of the intent of the legislature and sufficient to carry it into effect." § 176. Where the void part is inducement to or consideration of residue of act.-A leading case on this subject is Warren v. Mayor, etc. In that case was involved the validity of a statute for the annexation of the city of Charlestown to the city of Boston. There were provisions intended to secure to the inhabitants of Charlestown certain constitutional rights of representation in the legislature until the time when they could enjoy them within the city of Boston. Some years must elapse before that time. The provisions to secure such rights during the interval were held unconstitutional, and therefore that the whole act was void. Shaw, C. J., said: "If [the parts of the act] are so mutually connected with and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue 1 Fant v. Gibbs, 54 Miss. 396, 411. 2 Second Municipality v. Morgan, 1 La. Ann. 111; Powell v. State, 69 Ala. 10; Towles, Ex parte, 48 Tex. 413; Neely v. State, 4 Baxt. 174. 3 Ante, § 179. 4 Quinlon v. Rogers, 12 Mich. 168; State v. Commissioners, 38 N. J. L. 320; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261. See ante, §§ 135, 146. 5 State v. Stark, 18 Fla. 255; Quinlon v. Rogers, 12 Mich. 168. 6 Towles, Ex parte, 48 Tex. 413. 72 Gray, 84 independently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional and connected must fall with them." "The object of the act is the annexation; the merger of one municipality, and the enlargement of the other. This must necessarily affect the municipal and political rights of the inhabitants of both, guarantied as they are by the constitution. The legislature manifestly felt it to be their duty, in accomplishing this object, to make provision for the preservation of these constitutional rights; if this object is not effectually accomplished, we have no ground on which to infer that the legislature would have sanctioned such annexation and its consequences. The various provisions of the act, therefore, all providing for the consequences of such annexation, more or less immediate or remote, are connected and dependent; the different provisions of the act look to one object and its incidents, and are so connected with each other that, if its essential provisions are repugnant to the constitution, the entire act must be deemed unconstitutional and void." The doctrine of this case has been generally approved and acted upon.1 § 177. An act created an office and defined the powers and duties as well as fixed the compensation of the incumbent. The part which defined the powers and duties violated a constitutional rule of uniformity and was held void; this part being inducement to the residue fixing the compensation, the latter was held void also. So where a statute annexed to a city certain lands lying outside of its limits, but contained a proviso that the lands so annexed should be taxed at a different and less rate than other lands in the city, and this proviso was unconstitutional, the principle under consideration was held applicable, and the act was inoperative. Where, however, a statute gave authority to municipalities competitively to make proposals to procure the location therein of a normal Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 gar, 49 Cal. 117; State v. Stark, 18 Gray, 482; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, Fla. 255; Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 329, 339; State ex rel. v. Commission- 116 Mass. 315, 320; People v. Cooper, ers, etc. 5 Ohio St. 497; State v. Sinks, 83 Ill. 585; Hinze v. People, 92 Ill 42 Ohio St. 345; Central Branch 406. Union P. R. Co. v. Atchison, etc. R. R. Co. 28 Kan. 453; S. C. 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 528; Rood v. McCar 2 State ex rel. v. Dousman, 28 Wis. 541. 3 Slauson v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398. school, and gave power of local taxation to carry accepted proposals into effect, the latter provision was not affected by the unconstitutionality of the appropriation made in the act, for support of such schools. The court held that by establishing the schools and inducing contributions from others, the legislature assumed the duty of supporting them; the particular provision which it has attempted to make for that purpose being objectionable, it must be assumed that the legislature will regard it as their duty to provide a substitute.1 § 178. The valid part must be complete and accord with legislative intent.- One part of a statute may be distinct in the text and literally separable from the rest, and yet be indissolubly connected with it in the legislative intent. The mere fact that the one part standing alone would be within the scope of the legislative power does not necessarily prove that it can be upheld when coupled with other matter. The court in Meshmeier v. State2 uttered sound logic and sound law: "It would seem that the provisions of the statute held to be constitutional, should be substantially the same when considered by themselves as when taken in connection with the other parts of the statute held to be unconstitutional; or, in other words, where that part of a statute which is unconstitutional so limits and qualifies the remaining portion that the latter, when stripped of such unconstitutional provisions, is essentially different, in its effect and operation, from what it would be were the whole law valid, it would seem that the whole law should fall. The remaining portion of the statute, when thus stripped of its limitations and qualifications, cannot have the force of law, because it is not an expression of the legislative will. The legislature pass an entire statute, on the supposition, of course, that it is all valid and to take effect. The courts find some of its essential elements in conflict with the constitution; strip it of those elements, and leave the remaining portion mutilated and transformed into a different thing from what it was when it left the hands of the legislature. The statute thus emasculated is not the creature of the legislature; and it would be an act of legislation on the part of the court to put it in force." Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608. 211 Ind. 482, 485. § 179. If, by striking out a void exception, proviso or other restrictive clause, the remainder, by reason of its generality, will have a broader scope as to subject or territory, its operation is not in accord with the legislative intent, and the whole would be affected and made void by the invalidity of such part. An act of a general nature which the constitution required to have a uniform operation throughout the state excepted certain counties from its operation. This rendered the whole act void. After striking out the exception, if the general words gave the act operation in the excepted counties, such effect would be directly contrary to the expressed intent of the lawmaker. A like principle is declared in the case of Sprague v. Thompson. The states were authorized by an act of congress to make regulations relative to pilots in bays, inlets, rivers, harbors and ports of the United States, but they were expressly prohibited from making any discriminations in the . rate of pilotage between vessels sailing between the ports of different states, and existing regulations making such discriminations were annulled and abrogated. A statute of Georgia excepted coasters in that state and coasters between the ports of that state and those of South Carolina and Florida. The exception was held a discrimination within the prohibition, and the court said if the exception only is affected the legislature of Georgia is made to enact what confessedly it never meant, by giving the statute an operation beyond the limits specified by the legislature. The exception, therefore, could not be rejected and the remainder held valid; the whole was treated as annulled and abrogated. § 180. A provision which states a contingency on which the act is or is not to take effect, whether it be the result of a popular vote or some other, is not independent and separable; for the intent of the law-maker is therein expressly declared, and the statute cannot on principle take effect contrary to that intent though it be expressed in a section wholly unconstitutional.' 1 Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St. 269; State ex rel. v. Supervisors, 62 Wis. 376, 379. See State v. Hanger, 5 Ark. 412. 2 118 U. S. 90. Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483; Copeland, 3 R. L. 33. If the parts of a statute are so connected as to warrant the conclusion that the legislature intended them as a whole, and would not have enacted the part held valid alone, when a part is unconstitutional, they are not separable; if one part is void the whole is void. This conclusion should be based upon a consideration of the act and a comparison of its effects with and without the void part, by considering the connection and relative operation of the valid and invalid provisions. Where two provisions of a statute are so dependent upon one another that one cannot stand alone without a manifest perversion of the legislative intent, and the other is void, the whole act is void. 1 Eckhart v. State, 5 W. Va. 515; Warren v. Mayor, etc. 2 Gray, 84; State v. Sinks, 42 Ohio St. 345; People ex rel. v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 595; Hinze v. People, 92 id. 406, 424; State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98; Rader v. Township of Union, 39 N. J. L. 509; Flanagan v. Plainfield, 44 id. 118, 124; State v. Commissioners, 38 id. 320; Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 62 Tex. 630; S. C. 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. C. 396; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; La- 2 Robinson v. Bidwell, supra; Sumter Co. v. Gainsville Nat. Bank, 62 Ala. 464. 3 Burkholtz v. State, 16 Lea, 71. |