terius. Thus, if an action founded upon a statute be directed to be brought before the justices of Glamorgan in sessions, it cannot be brought before any other person or in any other place. If a thing is limited to be done in a particular form or manner it excludes every other mode, and affirmative expressions introducing a new rule imply a negative. Affirmative words which are imperative, and therefore mandatory, imply a negative of anything contrary or alternative to the direction so given. Where an act requires that a juror shall have twenty pounds a year, and a later act that he shall have twenty marks, the latter implies an abrogation of the former, otherwise it would have no effect. There is an implied negative in statutes which are intended to prescribe the only rule to be observed; they repeal all acts which provide a different rule." Where a statute creates a right, and also provides the remedy, the latter is exclusive; it implies a negation of any other. So

1 Sedgw. Const. St. & Const. L. 30. 2 District Township, etc. v. Dubuque, Iowa, 262; Smith v. Stevens, 10 Wall. 321; Uncas National Bank v. Rith, 23 Wis. 339; New Haven v. Whitney, 36 Conn. 373; Wallace v. Holmes, 9 Blatchf. 65; Burgoyne v. Supervisors, 5 Cal. 22; Watkins v. Wassell, 20 Ark. 410; Perkins v. Thornburgh, 10 Cal. 189.

Smith v. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 209; Almy v. Harris, 5 John. 175; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 Comst. 9; Thurston v. Prentiss, 1 Mich. 193; State v. Corwin, 4 Mo. 609; Bailey v. Bryan, 3 Jones (N. C.), 357; Ham v. Steamboat Hamburg, 2 Iowa, 460; Conwell v. Hagerstown Canal, 2 Ind. 588; Victory v. Fitzpatrick, 8 Ind. 281; McCormack v. Terre Haute, etc. R. R.

3 Davison v. Gill, 1 East, 64; Bryan 9 id. 283; Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch. v. Sundberg, 5 Tex. 418.

4 Rex v. Worcestershire, 5 M. & S. 457; Curtis v. Gill, 34 Conn. 49; Gorham v. Luckett, 6 B. Mon. 146; 1 Black. Com. 89.

People v. Burt, 43 Cal. 561; Daviess v. Fairbairn, 3 How. 636; Industrial School Dist. v. Whitehead, 13 N. J. Eq. 290; Roche v. Mayor, etc. 40 N. J. L. 257; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Riggs v. Brewer, 64 Ala. 282; Daw v. Metropolitan Board, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 161; Re Spring Street, 112 Pa. St. 258; Re Alley in Kutztown, 2 Woodw. Dec. (Pa.) 373; Sacramento v. Bird, 15 Cal. 294; State v. Conkling, 19 id. 501.

6 Lang v. Scott, 1 Blackf. 405;

398; West v. Downman, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 111; Colley v. London, etc. Co. L. R. 5 Ex. Div. 277; Brain v. Thomas, 50 L. J. Q. B. Div. 663; Bonham v. Bd. of Education, 4 Dill. 156. There are three classes of cases in which statutes deal with liabilities: 1. Where a liability existed at common law, and was only re-enacted by the statute with a special form of remedy; in such cases the plaintiff has his election unless the statute contains words necessarily excluding the commonlaw remedy. 2. Where a statute has created a liability but given no remedy, there a party may adopt an action of debt or other remedy at common law to enforce it. Wood v. Bank, 9

where the same statute creates an offense, prescribes the penalty and mode of procedure, only what the statute thus ordains is permissible.1

§ 205. Preceptive, prohibitive and permissive statutes.— When a statute commands certain actions, and regulates the forms and acts which ought to accompany them, it is called a preceptive statute. A prohibitive statute is one that forbids. all actions which disturb the public repose, and injury to the rights of others, or crimes and misdemeanors, or when it forbids certain acts in relation to the transmission of estates or the capacity of persons or other objects. A permissive statute is one which allows certain actions or things to be done without commanding them; as, for example, when it allows persons of a certain description, or, indeed, any person, to make a will, to pre-empt lands, to vote, or to form corporations. Of this nature is a statute which permits a candidate at an election at the polling place or canvass, or that a clergyman accused of an ecclesiastical offense may attend the proceedings of the commission appointed to inquire into the accusation. Such statutes confer a privilege or license which the donee may exercise or not at pleasure, having only his own convenience or interest to consult."

§ 206. Prospective and retrospective statutes.- A prospective statute is one which regulates the future.' It operates upon acts done and transactions occurring after it takes effect.

A retrospective statute, on the other hand, operates upon a subject already existing or an act done. Certain statutes of this nature are unjust, and, says Chancellor Kent, "are very

Cow. 194; Cole v. Thayer, 8 Cow. 249; Gallatian v. Cunningham, 8 Cow. 364; Judson v. Leach, 7 Cow. 152. 3. When the statute creates a liability not existing at common law and gives a particular remedy; here the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute. Vallance v. Falle, L. R. 13 Q. B. Div. 109; Bailey v. Bailey, L. R. 13 Q. B. Div. 859; O'Flaherty v. McDowell, 6 H. L. Cas. 142; Steward v. Greaves, 10 M. & W. 711.

1 Bashaw v. State, 1 Yerg. 177, 185;

Stradling v. Morgan, 1 Plowd. 206;
Slade v. Drake, Hobart, 295; Bish.
W. L. § 250.

21 Bouv. Inst. 48.
31 Bouv. Inst. 48.
4 Potter's Dwar. 74.

5 Endl. on St. Int. § 310.

6 Id. See Nicholl v. Allen, 1 B. & S. 934; Brockbank v. Whitehaven R. Co. 7 H. & N. 834; Rockwell v. Clark, 44 Conn. 534.

7 Bouv. Inst. 49.

generally considered as founded on unconstitutional principles, and consequently inoperative and void." Of this obnoxious character are those affecting and changing vested rights; one which takes away or impairs any vested right under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. This restriction, as already shown, is applicable to interpretation and declaratory laws.4

Ex post facto laws, and those impairing the obligation of contracts, are expressly forbidden by the federal and by state constitutions. The constitutions of some states expressly prohibit retrospective laws generally. To avoid injustice and unconstitutionality, it is always laid down as a rule of construction that a statute is to be taken or construed as prospective, unless its language is inconsistent with that interpretation."

11 Kent's Com. 455.

2 Id.; Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cr. 272; Brunswick v. Litchfield, 2 Greenl. 28; Osborne v. Huger, 1 Bay, 179; Bedford v. Shilling, 4 S. & R. 401; Eakin v. Raub, 12 id. 363; Society for Propagating the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 493; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657.

3 Society v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105; Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 199; Lewis v. Brackenridge, 1 Blackf. 220; Boyce v. Holmes, 2 Ala. 54; Jones v. Wootten, 1 Harr. (Del.) 77; Williamson v. Field, 2 Sandf. Ch. 533; Forsyth v. Marbury, R. M. Charlt. 333; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 John. 477; People v. Platt, 17 id. 195; Houston v. Boyle, 10 Ired. 496; Cook v. Mutual Ins. Co. 53 Ala. 37; Dubois v. McLean, 4 McLean, 486; State v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504; Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Biss. 327; Hoagland v. Sacramento, 52 Cal. 142; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610; Ahl v. Rhoads, 84 Pa. St. 319; Hart v. State, 40 Ala. 32; Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Pa. St. 22; Douglass v. Pike, 101 U. S. 677; Strong v. Dennis, 13 Ind. 514; Logan v. Wal

ton, 12 id. 639; Strong v. Clem, id. 37; Dequindre v. Williams, 31 id. 444; Finn v. Haynes, 37 Mich. 63; Jordan v. Wimer, 45 Iowa, 65.

4 Ante, § 200; 2 Kent's Com. 23, 24; McManning v. Farrar, 46 Mo. 376.

5 Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; De Cordova v. Galveston, 4 Tex. 470; Goshorn v. Purcell, 11 Ohio St. 641.

61 Kent's Com. 455, note; Bartruff v. Remey, 15 Iowa, 257; McEwen v. Den, 24 How. 242; Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128; S. C. 3 Denio, 594; Van Fleet v. Van Fleet, 49 Mich. 610; 1 N. Y. 129; Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. 111; North Bridgewater Bank v. Copeland, 7 Allen, 139; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328, 347; Richardson v. Cook, 37 Vt. 599; Plumb v. Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Taylor v. Keeler, 30 Conn. 324; Torrey v. Corliss, 33 Me. 333; Hopkins v. Jones, 22 Ind. 310; Seamans v. Carter, 15 Wis. 548; Boston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Cilley, 44 N. H. 578; Hannum v. Bank of Tennessee, 1 Cold. 398; Saunders v. Carroll, 12 La. Ann. 793; State v. Brad

All retrospective statutes, however, are not unjust or unconstitutional. A large class of remedial and curative statutes have been enacted with beneficent effect. They are liberally construed to carry out the intention of the legislature, in view of the intrinsic merit of the particular case and on a broad, fostering consideration of the general interest.1 Statutes relating to remedies and forms of procedure generally apply to rights already accrued, to cases ripe for action, and actions, pending; but subject to the principle that the

right is not thereby destroyed or seriously impaired.1 The legislature is not restrained from all legislation which may prejudicially affect private interests not protected by the constitution. In a later chapter this subject will be treated more at length.3

2

§ 207. Remedial statutes.- Remedial statutes are such as the name implies, embracing a great variety in detail; those enacted to afford a remedy, or to improve and facilitate remedies existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of

Goold, 11 id. 281; Van Rensselaer v. Snyder, 13 id. 299; Jacquins v. Commonwealth, 9 Cush. 279; McNamara v. Minn. Cent. R'y Co. 12 Minn. 388; Brock v. Parker, 5 Ind. 538; Indianapolis v. Imberry, 17 id. 175; Commonwealth v. Bradley, 16 Gray, 241; Van Rensselaer v. Ball, 19 N. Y. 100; Horner v. Lyman, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 399.

Case, 5 Gratt. 701; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 552; White v. Hart, 13 id. 646; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 id. 314; Pollard, Ex parte, 40 Ala. 77. See Chaney v. State, 31 Ala. 342; Steamboat Farmer v. McCraw, id. 659; Uwchlan Township Road, 30 Pa. St. 156.

2 See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 539; Commonwealth v. Logan, 12 Gray, 136; Harris v. Glenn, 56 Ga. 94; Regina v. Vine, L. R. 10 Q. B. 195; State v. Scudder, 32 N. J. L. 203; Wilder v. Me. Cent. R. 65 Me. 332; Bank of Toledo v. Bond, 1 Ohio St. 622; Gorman v. Pacific R. R. 26 Mo. 441; Barton v. Morris, 15 Ohio, 408; Hagerstown v. Sehner, 37 Md. 180; Sedgwick v. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498; Tilton v. Swift, 40 Iowa, 78; Hess v. Johnson, 3 W. Va. 645; Stokes v. Rodman, 5 R. I. 405; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153; Kunkle v. Franklin, id. 127; Comer v. Folsom, id. 219; Wilson v. Buckman, id. 441; State v. Newark, 3 Dutch. 185; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Sparks v. Clapper, 30 Ind. 204; Coffin v. State, 7 id. 157; Noel v. Ewing, 9 id. 37; People v. Frisbie, 26 Cal. 135; Rottenberry v. Pipes, 53 Ala. 447; Ware v. Owens, 42 id. 212; Bachman v. Chrisman, 23 Pa. St. 162; Norfolk v. Chamberlaine, 29 Gratt. 534; Languille v. State, 4 Tex. App. 312.

1 Kimbray v. Draper, L. R. 3 Q. B. 160; Wright v. Hale, 6 H. & N. 227; Mann v. McAtee, 37 Cal. 11; State v. Smith, 38 Conn. 397; Doolubdass v. Ramloll, 7 Moore, P. C. 239; Bradford v. Barclay, 42 Ala. 375; Reid v. State, 20 Ga. 681; Templeton v. Horne, 82 Ill. 491; United States v. Gilmore, 8 Wall. 330; Mabry v. Baxter, 11 Heisk. 682; Rutherford v. Greene, 2 Wheat. 196; Green v. Biddle, 8 id. 92; Cambridge v. Boston, 130 Mass. 357; Berley v. Rampacher, 5 Duer, 183; Kelsey v. Kendall, 48 Vt. 24; Dequindre v. Williams, 31 Ind. 444; State v. Berry, 25 Mo. 355; Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Biss. 327; Governor v. Porter, 5 Humph. 165; People v. Supervisors, 16 N. Y. 424; Simco v. State, 8 Tex. App. 406; Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Pa. St. 45; Edwards v. Williamson, 70 Ala. 145; Merwin v. Ballard, 66 N. C. 398; Nelson v. McCrary, 60 Ala. 310; Lee v. Cook, 1 Wyom. Ter. 413; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 id. 608; Ewing's 3 Post, ch. 17.