BURTON J.A. when using it at different times, and therefore when Judgment. we find words used which, in their largest sense, might include every judge who had resigned or retired, we must, looking at these enactments, give them the meaning which best suits the scope and object of the statute, and restricts the meaning to what must be held to have been in the mind of the Legislature when passing it. First, the members of the Bench (other than the ex officio members) are elective, and Mr. Blake when he returned to the Bar was eligible for election, which a judge retired upon an allowance would not be. The Act respecting the Courts of Queen's Bench and Common Pleas provides that a retired judge may at the request of the judge or judges with whom he is so requested to sit, sit in the Superior Courts of Law, and give judgments in all cases before those Courts. The Courts of Assize may be presided over by a retired judge, and in the same way in the County Court Act, a retired judge is authorized to hold a Court either at the request of the judge or on being authorized by the Governor General. These Acts do not say that any person who has at any time filled the position of judge shall be eligible to sit in these Courts, and it would be perhaps unreasonable to expect a gentleman actively engaged in the practice of his profession to respond to a request which might seriously interfere with his practice, and somewhat unseemly for him to occupy the dual position, whilst in the case of a retired judge the country would have something like a moral claim to his services. It appears to me that these considerations ail point in these Acts relating to the Courts, at all events to the intention of the Legislature having been to use the word in the sense of a class known as "retired judges," in the same way as we speak of a retired captain or an admiral on the retired list, and when we find in the Law Society Act similar words used, we ought to adopt what seems to be the natural meaning of the words, and not go afield for a Judgment. construction which might lead to serious difficulties and inconveniences. BURTON As to authority for reading the words "retired judge" in the sense in which (looking at their use in the Judicature Act) I think they should be read-the books are full of cases much stronger than the present. For instance, in Regina v. Pilkington, 2 E. & B. 546, the word "single woman" to be found in the Statute 7 & 8 Vic. ch. 101, was held to extend to a married woman living apart from her husband. In the case of The Lion, L. R. 2 A. & E. 102, under a statute which imposed upon "a ship carrying passengers" the obligation of taking a pilot on board, it was held that persons being carried who had not paid their fare were not passengers within the meaning of the Act. The word "debts," or "just debts," as used in 30 & 31 Vic. ch. 6, held not to include mortgage debts. The word "soil," which prima facie would include everything above or below the surface in an Inclosure Act, was held to mean surface only. So when we find the Legislature in the same section, referring to some officials as persons who have at some time filled a particular office, and departing from that language when referring to a judge, and instead of referring to all persons who have at any time filled the position, using a term which in common parlance is as I have said well understood as referring to a particular class, I think I am violating no canon of construction when I adopt it as meaning what I think almost every layman would understand as a retired judge, and what I feel, looking at the powers and duties cast upon them by the Judicature Act must have been in the mind of the Legislature. I am of opinion, therefore, that by a retired judge was meant a judge whom Her Majesty had allowed to retire or to be placed on the retired list with a retiring allowance, and that the judgment should be reversed, and this appeal allowed. I wish to add that we are not concerned as to the nature of the proceeding, or the fact that the plaintiff might or Judgment. might not have a locus standi if that question had been intended to be contested. The question comes before us as upon a case stated for the sole and express purpose of obtaining our decision upon this one point alone, and it is therefore quite immaterial whether it comes before us in a suit by this plaintiff disputing Mr. Blake's right, or on his application to compel the Society to admit him, or in any other form. Appeal dismissed with costs, BURTON Statement. SHAIRP V. THE LAKEFIELD LUMBER COMPANY. Crown lands-Free grants-Crown timber-Timber license-TrespassPatent Reservation-R. S. O. (1887) ch. 25, secs. 4, 10-R. S. O. (1887) ch. 28. The plaintiff was in March, 1884, located as the purchaser of a lot in Held, that the lot was not "land located or sold within the limits of the The expression "Free Grant Territory" in section 10 does not refer to the whole territory or tract defined in section 4 but only to such portion of that territory or tract as may be actually set apart and appropriated by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council under the Act. Held, further, that there being no actual reservation in the patent the defendants had no right to cut the timber after its issue and were liable in damages. Judgment of MACMAHON, J., affirmed. THIS was an appeal from the judgment of MACMAHON, J. The action was brought to recover damages for trespass in cutting timber on the plaintiff's land, being lot 15 in the 14th concession of the Township of Burleigh. This township was within the geographical limits described in section 4 of the Free Grants and Homesteads Act, R. S. O. (1887) ch. 25, but had not been specifically set aside or appropriated by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council for the purposes of that Act. The plaintiff was located as the purchaser of the lot on the 13th of March, 1884, and a patent was obtained by him therefor on the 24th of November, 1888. The patent was in the usual form of a patent in fee to a purchaser. It recited the agreement for purchase and payment of the purchase money, and contained no reservation of the timber, nor any reference to the Free Grants and Homesteads Act. The defendants, assuming to act under a timber Statement. license, dated the 3rd of May, 1888, giving the right to cut timber on the lot in question, and other lots mentioned therein, entered upon the lot in January, 1889, and cut down certain timber. The plaintiff's lot was referred to in the license as sold and located on the 13th of March, 1884. The action was tried before MACMAHON, J., and a jury at Lindsay, at the Spring Assizes of 1889, when the damages were assessed at $530.50, judgment being reserved upon the legal questions. Judgment was subsequently delivered in favour of the plaintiff for the full amount assessed by the jury. The defendants appealed, and the appeal came on to be heard before this Court (HAGARTY, C. J. O., BURTON, OSLER, and MACLENNAN, JJ A.) on the 19th of March, 1890. Poussette, Q. C., and Aylesworth, for the appellants. The lot in question is within the geographical limits of the Free Grant territory, and is therefore subject to the provisions of the Act, R. S. O. (1887) ch. 25. Under section 10 of that Act, pine trees growing or being upon land located or sold within the limits of the Free Grant territory, are reserved from location and remain the property of Her Majesty; and under section 11, the licensee has the right to cut timber or saw logs on such land. The words "Free Grant territory," in section 10, refer not only to lands actually appropriated as free grants to actual settlers under section 3, but to the whole territory mentioned in section 4. Lands sold as well as located, are expressly mentioned in section 10, while section 3 contemplates the setting apart of lands as free grants, and lots so set apart could not afterwards be sold, so that more is included in section 10 than in section 3. Even if the Free Grants Act does not apply, the defendants are entitled to succeed. At the time the lot in question was sold to the plaintiff, it was included in a timber license of which the license under which the defendants' claim is a renewal. It is true that under the Crown Land Regulations of May, 1869, trees remaining on the land at the time. |