me if I allude to some political opinions and votes of my own, of very little public importance certainly, but which, from the time at which they were given and expressed, may pass for good witnesses on this occasion.

This government, Mr. President, from its origin to the 5 peace of 1815, had been too much engrossed with various other important concerns to be able to turn its thoughts inward, and look to the development of its vast internal resources. In the early part of President Washington's administration, it was fully occupied with 10 completing its own organization, providing for the public debt, defending the frontiers, and maintaining domestic peace. Before the termination of that administration the fires of the French Revolution blazed forth, as from a new-opened volcano, and the whole breadth of the 15 ocean did not secure us from its effects. The smoke and the cinders reached us, though not the burning lava. Difficult and agitating questions, embarrassing to government and dividing public opinion, sprung out of the new state of our foreign relations, and were succeeded by 20 others, and yet again by others, equally embarrassing and equally exciting division and discord, through the long series of twenty years, till they finally issued in the war with England. Down to the close of that war no distinct, marked, and deliberate attention had been given, 25 or could have been given, to the internal condition of the country, its capacities of improvement, or the constitutional power of the government in regard to objects connected with such improvement.

20 The peace, Mr. President, brought about an entirely 30 new and a most interesting state of things; it opened to us other prospects and suggested other duties. We ourselves were changed, and the whole world was changed. The pacification of Europe, after June, 1815, assumed a firm and permanent aspect. The na- 35

tions evidently manifested that they were disposed for peace. Some agitation of the waves might be expected, even after the storm had subsided, but the tendency was, strongly and rapidly, towards settled repose.

5 2 It so happened, Sir, that I was at that time a member of Congress, and, like others, naturally turned my thoughts to the contemplation of the recently altered condition of the country and of the world. It appeared plainly enough to me, as well as to wiser and more. 10 experienced men, that the policy of the government would naturally take a start in a new direction; because new directions would necessarily be given to the pursuits and occupations of the people. We had pushed our commerce far and fast, under the advantage of a 15 neutral flag. But there were now no longer flags, either neutral or belligerent. The harvest of neutrality had been great, but we had gathered it all. With the peace of Europe it was obvious there would spring up in her circle of nations a revived and invigorated spirit of trade, 20 and a new activity in all the business and objects of civilized life. Hereafter, our commercial gains were tc be earned only by success in a close and intense competition. Other nations would produce for themselves, and carry for themselves, and manufacture for themselves, to 25 the full extent of their abilities. The crops of our plains would no longer sustain European armies, nor our ships longer supply those whom war had rendered unable to supply themselves. It was obvious that, under these circumstances, the country would begin to survey itself, 30 and to estimate its own capacity of improvement.

And this improvement — how was it to be accomplished, and who was to accomplish it? We were ten or twelve millions of people, spread over almost half a world. We were more than twenty States, some stretch35 ing along the same seaboard, some along the same line of

inland frontier, and others on opposite banks of the same vast rivers. Two considerations at once presented themselves with great force in looking at this state of things. One was, that that great branch of improvement which consisted in furnishing new facilities of intercourse, 5 necessarily ran into different States in every leading instance, and would benefit the citizens of all such States. No one State, therefore, in such cases, would assume the whole expense, nor was the co-operation of several States to be expected. Take the instance of 10 the Delaware breakwater. It will cost several millions of money. Would Pennsylvania alone ever have constructed it? Certainly never while this Union lasts, because it is not for her sole benefit. Would Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware have united to accom- 15 plish it at their joint expense? Certainly not, for the It could not be done, therefore, but by the general government. The same may be said of the large inland undertakings, except that, in them, government, instead of bearing the whole expense, co-operates 20 with others who bear a part. The other consideration is, that the United States have the means. They enjoy the revenues derived from commerce, and the States have no abundant and easy sources of public income. The custom-houses fill the general treasury, while the States 25 have scanty resources, except by resort to heavy direct taxes.

same reason.

23 Under this view of things, I thought it necessary to settle, at least for myself, some definite notions with respect to the powers of the government in regard to 30 internal affairs. It may not savor too much of self-commendation to remark that, with this object, I considered the Constitution, its judicial construction, its contemporaneous exposition, and the whole history of the legislation of Congress under it; and I arrived at the conclusion 35

that government had power to accomplish sundry objects,

or aid in their accomplishment, — which are now commonly spoken of as internal improvements. That conclusion, Sir, may have been right, or it may have been wrong. I am not about to argue the grounds of it at large. I say only, that it was adopted and acted on even so early as in 1816. Yes, Mr. President, I made up my opinion, and determined on my intended course of political conduct on these subjects, in the Fourteenth Congress, in 1816. 10 And now, Mr. President, I have further to say, that I made up these opinions, and entered on this course of political conduct Teucro duce. Yes, Sir, I pursued in all this a South Carolina track on the doctrines of internal improvement. South Carolina, as she was then repre15 sented in the other House, set forth in 1816, under a fresh and leading breeze, and I was among the followers. But if my leader sees new lights, and turns a sharp corner, unless I see new lights also, I keep straight on in the same path. I repeat that leading gentlemen from 20 South Carolina were first and foremost in behalf of the doctrines of internal improvements, when those doctrines came first to be considered and acted upon in Congress. The debate on the bank question, on the tariff of 1816, and on the direct tax, will show who was who, and what 25 was what, at that time. The tariff of 1816 (one of the plain cases of oppression and usurpation, from which, if the government does not recede, individual States may justly secede from the government) is, Sir, in truth, a South Carolina tariff, supported by South Carolina votes. 30 But for those votes, it could not have passed in the form in which it did pass; whereas, if it had depended on Massachusetts votes, it would have been lost. the honorable gentleman well know all this? certainly those who do full well know it all. 35 say this to reproach South Carolina. I only

Does not There are

I do not state the

fact; and I think it will appear to be true, that among the earliest and boldest advocates of the tariff as a measure of protection, and on the express ground of protec tion, were leading gentlemen of South Carolina in Congress. I did not then, and cannot now, under- 5 stand their language in any other sense. While this tariff of 1816 was under discussion in the House of Representatives, an honorable gentleman from Georgia, now of this House [Mr. Forsyth], moved to reduce the proposed duty on cotton. He failed by four votes, South 10 Carolina giving three votes (enough to have turned the scale) against his motion. The act, Sir, then passed, and received on its passage the support of a majority of the Representatives of South Carolina present and voting. This act is the first in the order of those now denounced 15 as plain usurpations. We see it daily in the list, by the side of those of 1824 and 1828, as a case of manifest oppression, justifying disunion. I put it home to the honorable member from South Carolina, that his own State was not only "art and part" in this measure, but 20 the causa causans. Without her aid this seminal principle of mischief, this root of Upas, could not have been planted. I have already said, and it is true, that this act proceeded on the ground of protection. It interfered directly with existing interests of great value and amount. 25 It cut up the Calcutta cotton trade by the roots; but it passed, nevertheless, and it passed on the principle of protecting manufactures, on the principle against free trade, on the principle opposed to that which lets us alone.

30

24 Such, Mr. President, were the opinions of important and leading gentlemen from South Carolina on the subject of internal improvement, in 1816. I went out of Congress the next year, and returning again in 1823, thought I found South Carolina where I had left her. 35