LIBEL in rem in admiralty to recover dam- Jenkins, J., delivered the opinion of the court: arising out of the wrong is complete upon navigable waters. The Plymouth, supra. It is insisted for the libelant that because this injury happened in the midst of, or in space above, the water, it must be held to have occurred upon the water, and the bridge must be held to be personal property on navigable waters. This contention cannot be upheld. In legal The libelant, a municipal corporation, law- signification land includes not only the surface fully constructed and maintained a bridge of the earth, but all under it or over it. It is spanning the navigable waters of the Milwau- otherwise with respect to the sea. A suspenkee River. The structure was a swing bridge, sion bridge is not upon the water, because susits center resting upon a stone pier constructed tained in space above the water. Nor in any upon the bed of the river. On the 18th of Oc-juster sense is a bridge upon the water, because tober, 1888, the bridge was damaged by the al- supported upon masonry resting upon the bed leged negligent conduct of the vessels, respond- of a river. Bridges are only prolongations ents, then navigating the river. The libel is in over waters of highways upon land. They are rem to recover the damages incurred. It is ob- not afloat. Like wharves and piers, they are jected for the respondents that the court is connected with the shore. Unlike wharves and without jurisdiction of the subject matter. piers, they are obstructions, not aids, to navigation. They concern commerce upon land, not upon the sea. Within the intendment of the maritime law they are--equally with wharves and piers-structures upon or connected with the shore. They pertain to the land not to the sea; and so are without the cognizance of the admiralty jurisdiction. An injury thereto cannot be said to have occurred upon wa ter. The cause of the injury was a movable thing navigating the waters; but the consummation of the wrong was upon an immovable structure above the waters, attached to the land, and not afloat. The absence of admiralty jurisWithin this settled principle a tort is mari- diction over injuries to such structures is sustain time, and within the jurisdiction of the admired by an overwhelming weight of authority. alty, when the injury is to a vessel afloat, although the negligence causing the injury originated on land. Rock Island Bridge, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 213 [18 L. ed. 753]; Leonard v. Decker, 22 Fed. Rep. 741. In cases of tort locality is the test of jurisdiction in the admiralty. The ultimate judicial authority has determined the principle that the true meaning of the rule of locality is that, although the origin of the wrong is on the water, yet, if the consummation and substance of the injury are on the land, a court of admiralty has not jurisdiction; that the place or locality of the injury is the place or locality of the thing injured, and not of the agent causing the injury. The Plymouth, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 20 [18 L. ed. 125]; Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co. 118 U. S. 610 [30 L. ed. 274]. In the former case it was ruled that an action in personam would lie against the owners of the bridge, because the injury was consummate upon navigable waters, being inflicted upon a movable thing engaged in navigation; but that a proceeding in rem against the bridge was not maintainable, because a maritime lien can only exist upon movable things engaged in navigation, or upon things which are the subjects of commerce on the high seas or navigable waters. And so an injury happening through default of the master to one upon a vessel discharging cargo at a wharf to which she was securely moored, is within the admiralty jurisdiction (Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U. S. 626, 26 L. ed. 1192); but otherwise, if the injury occurred to one upon the wharf. The Mary Stewart, 10 Fed. Rep. 137. In the latter case there is an inadvertent remark to the effect that both the wrong and the injury must occur upon the water-a proposition not sustained by authority. It suffices if the damage the substantial cause of action mouth, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 33 (18 L. ed. 127); Wells, Jur. of Courts, 275. To be within the admiralty jurisdiction it is not sufficient that the wrong originated on the high seas or on navigable waters (Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 9; Steele v. Thacher, 1 Ware, 93; The Commerce, 66 U. S. 1 Black, 579 (17 L. ed. 109); but that the act was consummated upon such waters. U. S. As to a bridge: The Neil Cochran, 1 Brown, Adm. 162; The Savannah, (U. S. D. C. Pa. Cadwallader, J., not reported, but referred to in 1 Parsons, Shipp. & Adm. 532). As to a wharf: The Plymouth, 70 C. S. 3 Wall. 20 [18 L. ed. 125]: The Ottawa, 1 Brown, Adm. 356; The C. Accame, 20 Fed. Rep. 642. As to a derrick resting on the soil at the bottom, and in the midst of the water: The Maud Webster, 8 Ben. 547. As to a marine railway: The Professor Morse, 23 Fed. Rep. 803. As to a boom of logs, anchored or fastened to the shore: The City of Erie v. Canfield, 27 Mich. 479. The latter is perhaps an extreme case, and seems opposed upon principle to the case of The Ceres (E. D. Pa.), 7 W. N. C. 576, to the effect that the admiralty has jurisdiction of an injury by a tug boat to a dry dock floating on a navigable river and moored to a wharf. To deny jurisdiction for injuries to such structures by vessels, while asserting it with respect to injuries to vessels by such structures— as in The Rock Island Bridge, supra; Etheridge v. Philadelphia, 26 Fed. Rep. 43: Alle v. Northwestern Union Packet Co.88 U. S. 21 Wall. 389 [22 L. ed. 619]—may seem a narrow con v. Magill, 1 Wash. C. Ct. 463; U. S. v. Davis, 2 Suma. 482; 1 Leach, C. C. 432; 2 Hale, P. C. 17; 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 37, § 17. So the admiralty jurisdiction of United States courts does not extend to seizures made upon land. U. S. v. Winchester, 99 U. S. 372 (25 L. ed. 479). See, as to admiralty jurisdiction generally, Allen v. Newberry, 62 U. S. 21 How. 244 (16 L. ed. 110). 1889. FERRIS V. VANIER. struction of the admiralty jurisdiction. It is lik- | 511, 515, speaking obiter, approved the obiter If it be expedient to clothe the admiralty with The distinction grows out of the peculiar and jurisdiction of all torts committed by vessels, restricted nature of the admiralty jurisdiction whether the resulting damage occur upon land or water, as now it hath jurisdiction over damas_touching things "pertaining to the sea." In The Arkansas, 17 Fed. Rep. 383, 386, it age to vessels whether the wrongful act causing is asserted that an injury to a bridge would be damage originate on land or water, the object a marine tort, and that a proceeding in rem must be promoted-as it has come to pass in would lie against a boat causing the injury. England-through the legislative, not the judiNo authority is cited in support, and I find cial, power. Courts sit dicere et non dare legem. none justifying the statement; probably be- Settled principles of jurisdiction may not be cause the case in the language of the court in changed to meet individual notions of right. The Plymouth, in answer to similar argument Nor can the jurisdiction be aided by the statrespecting wharves, "is outside the acknowl-ute of the State creating a lien for all injuries edged limit of admiralty cognizance over marine torts, among which it has been sought to be classed." The statement by Judge Love is obiter dictum, and is difficult to be reconciled with his argument elsewhere in his opinion (page 389) in support of the cases denying jurisdiction. Notwithstanding my learned predecessor in the case of The F. & P. M. No. 2, 33 Fed. Rep. done by vessels to persons or property. Rev. Stat. Wis. § 3348, subd. 4. A state statute cannot, confer jurisdiction upon courts of admiralty. It is only when the subject is maritime, and so within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, that a lien granted by local law will be recognized. The libel will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. DAKOTA SUPREME COURT. John A. FERRIS, Appt., v. Charles H. VANIER, County Treasurer, Respt. under protest and alleged to have been illegally The facts fully appear in the opinions. Section 2 of the Act of 1885 is void because it authorizes taxation of a community for pur1. The Dakota Act of March 12, 1885, poses not public and local to such community. When the legislative body imposes a charge to amend Political Code, chap. 28, §, 17, providing that personal property in any unorganized in the name of a tax, upon the property of a county shall be subject to taxation in the near-citizen, it is essential to the validity of such imest organized county, is, so far as concerns taxation for local purposes, invalid as an attempt to tax one community for the benefit of another. 2. Under the Organic Act of Dakota Territory, United States Revised Statutes, § 1925, providing that no law shall be passed making "any discrimination in taxing different kinds of property, but all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value," it is not an unlawful discrimination to tax the personal property within unorganized counties, and leave untaxed the real property therein. (Thomas, J., dissents.) 3. A statute relating to unorganized counties, as distinguished from those which are organized, is not local or special. (February 19, 1889.) position that its purpose be public with respect to such individual. If not public, the charge cannot be supported as a tax, but becomes a taking for private purposes, and is hence in excess of legislative power. Cooley, Taxn. 2d ed. chaps. 4, 5; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. chap. 14; 1 Desty, Taxn. chap. 2; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1 (28 L. ed. 896); Washington Ave. 69 Pa. 352); Hammett v. Phila. 65 Pa. 146; Re Sawmill Run Bridge, 85 Pa. 163; Clark v. Rochester, 13 How. Pr. 204; Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91; People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128; Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 446; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454; Allen v. Jay, 60 Maine, 124; Perry v. Keene, 56 N. H. 514; Bennington v. Park, ; 50 Vt. 178; Coster v. Tide Water Co. 18 N. J. APPEAL by plaintiff, from a judgment of Eq. 54; State v. Jackson, 31 N. J. L. 189; the District Court of Morton County, in favor of defendant, to recover back taxes paid State v. Demarest, 32 N. J. L. 528; Talbot Co. v. Queen Anne's Co. 50 Md. 245; Taylor v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. 349; Stein v. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37; Sleight v. People, 74 Ill. 47; People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 474; State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458; Central Branch Union Pac. R. Co. v. Smith, 23 Kan. 745; Stockton & V. R. Co. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 147; Davidson v. Ramsey Co. 18 Minn. 482; Deiman v. Fort Madison, 30 Iowa, 542; Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; State v Tappan, 29 Wis. 664; Whiting v. Sheboygan & F. du L. R. Co. 25 Wis. 167. the operation of the Act is sufficient to make that act invalid. Dundee Mortgage etc. Co. v. School District No. 1, 21 Fed. Rep. 151, 157. The Act is unconstitutional because it denies to persons within the Territory the equal protection of the laws. See U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1891; Cooley, Taxn. 2d ed. 5; Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 385; Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. Rep. 722; Northern Pac. R. Co. v Car If a tax is imposed upon a county for a pur-land, 5 Mont. 146. pose which is not local to such county, it is void for all the reasons which make it invalid if its purpose were confessedly private from any point of view. Sharpless v. Phila. 21 Pa. 147, 59 Am. Dec. 759; Washington Ave., Hammett v. Phila., and Re Sawmill Run Bridge, supra; Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 384; Livingston Co. v. Weider, 64 Ill. 428; Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. 491; Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Butler v. Muscatine, 11 Iowa, 433; Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112; Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660; Talbot Co. v. Queen Anne's Co. 50 Md. 245; Cooley, Taxn. 2d ed. 141, chap. 5. The limitation of the taxing power of the States of the Union also extends to the taxing power of the Legislature of the Territory. First Nat. Bank v. Yankton Co. 101 U. S. 132 (25 L. ed. 1047). The Act discriminates in the taxation of different kinds of property in violation of Organic Act. The provision, in section 6 of that Act, "Nor shall any discrimination be made in taxing different kinds of property; but all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value," deprives the Territorial Legislature of all power to make exemption from taxation. The Legislature cannot declare what property shall be subject to taxation; and it has no authority to select certain classes of property and declare them "subject to taxation," but must tax exery description of property not exempted in the Organic Act "in proportion to its value." There can be no doubt that, if the phrase "subject to taxation" had been omitted, such construction would be correct. The provision then would be that all property should be taxed in proportion to its value, and no question as to its meaning could be raised. People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 433; People v. Whartenby, 38 Cal. 461; Lick v. Austin, 43 Cal. 590; Fields v. Highland Co. 36 Ohio St. 476. The very fact that the Act does not exempt real property is what makes it invalid. Had it in terms provided for the taxation of all property in unorganized counties, and then gone on to exempt real property, it would have been a valid Act, because the exemption would have been void, and the statute would have had effect on all property in such counties. The exempting clause would have been nugatory, and the law would stand with it stricken out. People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432. The effect of the Act is to make an unlawful discrimination, and the fact that it results from Messrs. William Gibson, Dist-Atty., and "The appellant, in common with other citizens of the territory, enjoys the protection and benefit of her laws. And the costs in all criminal prosecutions arising in any unorganized county, when not collected from the defendant, are paid out of the territorial treasury. Sess. Laws 1881, p. 110. This would seem to make the territorial tax a matter of public concern. The School Tax, is so much a matter of public concern that the Legislature has made education compulsory in the Territory (Sess. Laws 1883, p. 112), and to provide funds for that purpose a tax of two mills on the dollar upon all taxable property in the county has been levied by law. Sess. Laws 1883, p. 88. The levy of this tax was, therefore, not a matter of discretion in the officers of Stark County, but the act of the sovereign expressed by legislative enactment. See Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78 (26 L. ed. 658). It could not have been intended to require the unorganized territory to escape burdens which were necessary for its welfare merely be cause the whole expenditure was not made inside of its bounds. Midland Twp. v. Roscommon Twp. 39 Mich. 424. See also Cooley, Taxn. p. 478. The construction and maintenance of roads and highways has always been a matter of great public importance. See Cooley, Taxn. p. 94; People v. Richmond Co. 20 N. Y. 255. Unless restrained by a constitutional prohibition of some sort, the Legislature of a State may properly authorize a county to aid by issuing its bonds and giving them as a donation to a railroad company for the construction of a road outside of the county, and even outside of the State, if the purposes of the road be to give to the county a connection which is desirable with some other region. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Otoe Co. 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 667 (21 L. ed. 375). In the light of the authorities, it seems to us the bridge and road tax is a matter of public concern. Billings County constituted a part of the second subdivision of the sixth judicial district. Sess. Laws 1885, p. 149. The civil and criminal jurisdiction of the justices of the peace of Stark County extended over Billings County, and the sheriff and constables of Stark County were authorized to serve or execute the process issued by said court. 1889. FERRIS V. VANIER. Sess. Laws 1881, p. 110. The district court for that subdivision held at Mandan, in the County of Morton, was open to the residents of Billings County. Sess. Laws 1881, p. 109. A portion of the fund arising from this tax bas in this way been expended for the benefit of the residents of Billings County. "When the nature of the case does not conclusively fix it the power to determine what shall be the taxing district for any particular burden is purely a legislative power and not to be interfered with or controlled, except as it may be limited by constitutional provisions. Cooley, Taxn. 110; People v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y. 141; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123; Malchus v. Highlands Dist. 4 Bush, 547; Salem Turnp. & C. Bridge Corp. v. Essex Co. 100 Mass. 282; Laramie Co. v. Albany Co. 92 U. S. 307 (23 L. ed. 552). The legislative power extends to all rightful subjects of legislation. Rev. Stat. U. S. § 1851. Congress in this grant of power left it to the wisdom and discretion of the Legislature to say what property in the Territory shall be subject to taxation, providing, however, that all property so made subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value and that no discrimination shall be made in taxing different kinds of property. Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Deuel Co. 3 Dak.1. The power to determine what property is subject to taxation necessarily implies the power to exempt property from taxation. See Wis. Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor Co. 52 Wis. 37; Francis v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 19 Kan. 303. The court sustained the tax upon railroad property in three unorganized counties, notwithstanding there was other property there to the amount of several hundred thousand dollars belonging to other persons which was not taxed. See Wis. Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor Co. 52 Wis. 78. The right to collect taxes in unorganized townships was considered and sustained in Midland Twp. v. Roscommon Twp. 39 Mich. 424; Llano Cattle Co. v. Faught, 69 Tex. 402. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the court: erty shall be assessed and taxed in that organ- That pursuant to said Act, in the year of 1885, the officers of said Stark County, authorized by the laws of this Territory to assess property in said Stark County for the purposes of taxation, and to levy taxes thereon, claimed to have the right and pretended to assess all the personal property of the plaintiff situate in said Billings County, for the purpose of taxation, and to levy certain taxes thereon, to wit, territorial, general school, bridge and road, and general county taxes, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $29.40. That the assessment, levy and collection of said taxes were illegal because: first, said property was never taxable by Stark County; second, that the Act of 1885 is in conflict with the provision of the Organic Act in relation to taxation, and therefore void; third, the tax is for the exclusive use of Stark County, and to be expended therein, with the exception of the territorial tax, and gives to Billings County and the residents thereof no benefit directly or indirectly; fourth, that there was real estate in Billings County owned by plaintiff and others, none of which was assessed or taxed, but under said Act was free therefrom; fifth, that said Stark County issued its warrant to its treasurer, the defendant, to collect said taxes, who demanded the same of plaintiff, which was refused, and thereupon defendant levied upon plaintiff's property, and was about to sell the same, to prevent which plaintiff, under protest, paid said taxes to said defendant, with interest and costs, amounting to $29.40. To this complaint defendant interposed a general demurrer, which was sustained by the district court, pro forma, and judgment was rendered thereon in favor of the defendant, from which said judgment plaintiff appeals to this court. The plaintiff contends that the Act of 1885 is unconstitutional for the following reasons: first, it authorizes taxation of personal property of a community for purposes not public or local to it; second, it discriminates in the taxaiton of different kinds of property in contravention of the Organic Act; third, it denies to persons within the Territory the equal protection of the laws. The material allegations of the complaint are This action was brought by the plaintiff for the recovery of certain taxes paid by him un-admitted by the demurrer. It is therefore a der protest. The complaint alleges, inter alia, that plaintiff was, at the time of the grievances complained of, a resident of the unorganized County of Billings, and owner of real and personal property therein, and had no property in the County of Stark. That on the 12th day of March, 1885, the Legislature of the Territory passed an Act entitled "An Act to Amend Section 17 of Chapter 28 of the Political Code,' and, among other things, provided as follows: "When any personal property is situated and kept in any uunorganized county of this Territory, then such property shall be subject to taxation in the nearest organized county thereto, and shall be listed and assessed by the assessor of said nearest organized county; and when said unorganized county borders upon two or more organized counties, then said prop fact of record that the taxes complained of were imposed and collected for the exclusive use and benefit of Stark County, and the moneys raised thereby were to be expended within said Stark County, except the territorial tax, and the residents of Billings County were not in any legal sense interested in any of the objects of said expenditure. The Organic Act of the Territory, § 1925, declares that the Legislature. "shall not pass any law impairing the rights of private property, nor make any discrimination in taxing different kinds of property; but all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value." The questions presented are important, and of great public interest, and are therefore entitled to, and have received, our most careful consideration. The validity of this tax must be determined from the Organic Act and such | the inhabitants of another separate and disother legal principles as may be applicable. Under the second point above named the appellant contends that the Legislature of this Territory has no power to exempt any property from taxation except that which is expressly exempted in the Organic Act; the Legislature cannot declare what property shall be subject to taxation, but must tax every species of property not exempt by the Organic Act. We do not think that this objection is well taken, or that it is necessarily involved in this case, and, as the Legislature of the Territory has frequently exercised this right, which has been acquiesced in and recognized by all classes as a legitimate exercise of power, we do not feel authorized to call it in question here. It is a doctrine well established by the courts that the right to exempt is incident to the right to tax, and is an ordinary exercise of the power of sovereignty, and this right exists unless prohibited by some constitutional or organic provision. Wis. Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor Co. 52 Wis. 42; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 67 Ü. S. 2 Black, 510 [17 L. ed. 305]; Cooley, Taxn. 145; 1 Desty, Taxn. 124. As said before, the right to exempt has been recognized and acted upon since the organization of this Territory, and we will not now disturb or cast doubt or reproach upon it by discussion which would in any event be mere dictum, as this question is not involved in this case; for the Act in question is not, in our opinion, an attempt to exempt any kind of property from taxation. Under this Act an attempt is made to assess and tax personal property in an unorganized county, leaving the real property untaxed, and to levy this tax for the use and benefit of another organized county, regardless of the question whether the two counties are in the same judicial district, or whether said counties have been attached for judicial, revenue, or other purposes; but it is sought to be done simply upon a question of proximity. This legislation cannot, in our opinion, be properly referable to the exercise of the power of exemption, though it may possibly have this effect when it discriminates between different kinds of property by taxing one and not the other. It is contended by plaintiff that this Act provides for the taxation of a community for purposes not public or local to it. If this proposition be true, this tax can hardly be sustained. Cooley, Taxn. 105; 1 Desty, Taxn. 285. It is a fact admitted of record that this tax was for the exclusive use and benefit of Stark County, and that the money raised by it was to be expended within Stark County, and that the County of Billings did not and will not receive any benefit from said tax, either directly or indirectly, but it was to be expended for objects entirely local to Stark County, and foreign to Billings County. If this be so, how can this tax be sustained? It is a well established doctrine that taxation in order to be valid must be of a public nature, or for a public purpose, and must also be local. "It is the essence of taxation that it should compel the discharge of a burden by those upon whom it rests." An attempt to compel one county or municipality to pay a charge properly resting upon ... tinct district or community would be an arbitrary and unauthorized exercise of power. It would be taking private property for private uses, and in no proper sense could it be regarded as taxation, but rather in the nature of confiscation. Cooley, Taxn. chap. 5, pp. 144, 145; 1 Desty, Taxn. 26, 27; Hammett v. Phila. 65 Pa. 146, 151; Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223; Re Flatbush, 60 N. Y. 398. It is true that it is not necessary that the money raised by taxation should always be expended within the district where it is levied and collected, but it may be expended for objects outside of the district in which the residents of the district have in a legal sense an interest. District interest is the test whether an object is or is not a proper subject of taxation. Cooley and 1 Desty, supra. It seems to us that this law is an attempt on the part of the Legislature to tax one community for the benefit of another, and is therefore void, from the fact that all taxation must be public and local, and for objects in which those who pay the tax have, in a legal sense, some interest, and from which they may receive some benefit. As said before, it is admitted of record in this case that the tax collected of the residents of Billings County was to be used and expended in matters entirely local to the County of Stark; and to sustain such a tax would not only be unjust and inequitable, but would be to hold that the Legislature, under color of exercising the power of taxation, might appropriate private property for private uses. While equal, uniform and just taxation is hardly attainable under any system of human government, yet in this country most of the States have incorporated into their Constitutions express provisions that taxation shall be equal and uniform; and, while this language is not used in our Organic Act, we think that the prohibition contained therein against discrim ation in taxation can hardly be effectually enforced without the adoption of some system that shall be equal and uniform. Can it be said that a system of taxation which taxes one community for the exclusive use and benefit of another, is in any wise equal or uniform as to these communities? There are some fundamental principles which must be observed in every system of taxation. They should not only be for public purposes, but for purposes in which the party taxed has an interest, and from which he can and may receive some benefit. 1 Desty, Taxn, and Cooley, Taxn. supra. It is needless to discuss at length a possibility of Billings County or the plaintiff receiving any benefit from, or being in any manner interested in, the tax collected under this law, when the fact of record here is contrariwise by reason of the allegation in the complaint, and the effect of the demurrer thereon. We are therefore of the opinion that under the record as it appears in this case the county or local tax collected of the plaintiff was for pur poses local to Stark County, and in which the plaintiff had no interest and was therefore wrongfully and illegally collected of him. But, it is contended by the respondent, the plaintiff and Billings County were interested in this tax, and benefited by it, because of the |