cision of action; hence no stability of moral character. Two-thirds of the world's liars and thieves are as they are because they have learned neither to think nor to talk straight. As for definition, it is admittedly one of the most important phases of education. Young children cannot be expected to define with any high degree of accuracy. Yet they may in a certain sense render their experiences clearer by grouping them according to their common properties. Such groupings, involving rough classifying, are the indispensable conditions of defining. The first crude definitions made, the rest of the process is a matter of refining upon the earlier attempts, and of finding language that is precise enough to render the idea in the definer's mind. The upshot of the whole matter is that things and ideas must be presented before the definitions can be obtained, and that all fruitful defining must be the product of the pupil's self-activity under the guidance and suggestion of the teacher. Let the things, ideas, or what not, requiring definition, be first presented; let them next be classified so as to make clear the essential agreements and differences; let a statement of these essential agreements and differences be made in the pupil's own words; and let the refinements and abridgments proceed under the teacher's skilful guidance and suggestion. Almost before it is expected a good working definition will be forthcoming, and it will have been got through an enlistment of the child's own initiative and interest. Thus the pupil will know the joy of discovery, in coming to a clear knowledge of what a phase of his own experience really is and means, not for another, and in the language of another, but for himself and in the language of himself. REFERENCES Creighton, An Introductory Logic, Ch. V, § 18. Hyslop, Elements of Logic, Ch. VI, pp. 82-94, 100–104. Welton, Manual of Logic, Vol. I, Bk. I, Chs. III and V. Welton, The Logical Bases of Education, Ch. XVI, §§ 2–6. Minto, Logic, Inductive and Deductive, Bk. I, Pt. II, Ch. I, pp. 99-104, Ch. II. Hibben, Logic, Deductive and Inductive, Pt. I, Ch. IV, p. 38 f., Ch. V. Aikins, The Principles of Logic, Ch. II, p. 30 f. Venn, Empirical Logic, Ch. XI. Mill, System of Logic, Bk. I, Ch. VIII; Bk. IV, Ch. III. Jevons-Hill, Elements of Logic, Ch. VI, § II, 1, 4, 7. REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Why is naming harder than it seems on first consideration? 2. How do languages differ as to their serviceability for naming new things? 3. To what languages do we go in the main for our technical terms? 4. What is meant by the statement that names convey meaning? 5. What other functions have they? 6. Name the qualities of a good name. 7. Define definition. 8. What is the logical method of abbreviating a definition? 9. How is definition related to connotation? 10. How do dictionaries usually define? 11. Be prepared to discuss each of the suggestions to be observed in defining. Do you think of any others? 12. How should the predicables be understood? 13. How should naming be treated in early education? 14. What suggestions can you make as to the kind of names that should enter into the child's early vocabulary? 15. How should a vocabulary be developed? 16. What is the proper order of introducing definition into early school work? EXERCISES ON CHAPTER VI 1. Divide the following genera into species, noting the difference, a property, and an accident of each species: building, church, population of your home city, teacher, pupil, minister. 2. Take any five general terms you choose and define them logically (consult the dictionary if you cannot otherwise determine the proximate genus and the difference). Point out typical examples of each class defined. 3. Select from the dictionary ten definitions; point out the proximate genus, the difference, the examples. Criticise them from the logical point of view. 4. Examine the following definitions critically, determine wherein they conform to the suggestions for defining, wherein they violate them, and then correct the definitions: (a) An instinct is a propensity prior to experience and independent of instruction. (Paley.) (b) Thought is the act or product of the Understanding or Reason as distinct from the various processes of simple Apprehension or Cognition. (Hyslop.) (c) Logic is "the Art of Thinking." (Watts.) (d) Truth is "that part of human thought which is proved true." (Welton.) (e) Thinking may be defined in one of its aspects at least as the process of interpreting the special by the general, or the new experience by the old. (Hibben.) (f) Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation. (Spencer.) (g) Nature-study is that branch of elementary science which comprehends the study of natural phenomena. (h) Psychology is the Science of Mental Life. (James.) (i) Psychology is the science of the processes whereby an individual becomes aware of a world of objects and adjusts his actions accordingly. (Stout.) (j) Psychology is the science of the phenomena of consciousness. (Baldwin.) (k) Psychology is the science of consciousness. (Angell.) (1) Education is "a gradual adjustment to the spiritual possessions of the race." (Butler.) (m) Education is the eternal process of superior adjustment of the physically and mentally developed, free, conscious, human being to God, as manifested in the intellectual, emotional, and volitional environment of man. (Horne.) (n) Education is conscious or voluntary evolution. (Davidson.) (0) Education consists in leading man, as a thinking, intelligent being, growing into self-consciousness, to a pure and unsullied, conscious and free representation of the inner law of divine Unity. (Froebel.) (p) Self-activity is activity determined by one's own motives, arising out of one's own interests, sustained by one's own power. (Monroe.) (q) Self-activity is that phase of activity which arises from the native propensities and develops the conscious needs of the self. PART III.—JUDGMENTS AND PROPO SITIONS CHAPTER VII.-JUDGMENT AS THE LOGICAL UNIT 40. PSYCHOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF JUDGMENT.We have now to recur to a subject that has already occupied our attention in the introductory chapter, viz., the judging process. It is necessary to take it up in more detail, for an understanding of it conditions the whole subject of logic. Indeed, so true is this last statement that one would not go amiss to define logic as the science of valid judging. The germ of judgment appears in the very beginning of mental life. The child's first sense of a world around him implies numerous acts of judgment. The awakening out of the lethargy of the prenatal vegetative existence to the vague consciousness of environment constitutes a series of crude judging acts. The reference of the source of infantile pains and pleasures to an outer order of changes contains implicit judgment. Again, the process of concept-forming can scarcely be explained in any other way than by supposing that each repetition of an experience masses with the memory-images of like past experiences, through the agency of naïve judgments of similarity. It is thus that a concept gradually acquires its generality with continued repetitions of like |