Third phase of judgment: Distinction between kinds of things. Fourth phase of judgment: Relating kinds of experiences. Fifth phase of judgment: Relating organized experiences.

42. TYPES OF JUDGMENT.-There are three distinct types into which a judgment may fall, viz., categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. When expressed in propositional form they are illustrated as follows: categorical, Deer are cloven-hoofed quadrupeds; hypothetical, If a mammal chews its cud it has a compound stomach; disjunctive, This specimen is either a moth or a butterfly. A brief examination of these types of judgment will show us that they are adapted to somewhat different purposes and represent rather different mental attitudes. The categorical judgment is essentially a classificatory one. When the mind is absolutely certain of a changeless relation between two concepts—or when it deludes itself into believing that this certainty has been reached -the categorical judgment is adapted to its needs. Now absolute certainty of knowledge results either from ignorance or from old-fogyism. A larger interpretation of experience requires us to allow for constant development in our concepts, in the relations established between them, and indeed in all the several forms of judgment. Hence in strictness only the child and the old man can use the categorical judgment with its full weight. Most of us use it with a real or implied mental reservation to the effect that the truth we assert in it is only relative, and is hence subject to correction from larger experience.

The hypothetical judgment is peculiarly adapted to stating the conditions under which an occurrence may take place. Hence it is the form for recording causal

conditions; and naturally it represents the various aspects of experience as mechanically related. It is, in consequence, the natural form for scientific judgments. We might almost say that all exact science is really an assertion of "ifs." For back of our science lies the fundamental metaphysical hypothesis as to the real being or nature of the world. The actual reasoning of science is perhaps a little dubious from the logical standpoint. When we lend the assent of reason to a great scientific hypothesis, such, let us say, as the nebular hypothesis, we argue as follows: If the nebular hypothesis were true, the solar system would behave as it does. Then we proceed to argue back to the truth of the nebular hypothesis as though we had proved it the sole condition of the solar system's moving as it does. In other words, the hypothetical judgment in which science must state its claims is not final.

Last of all comes the judgment of true metaphysical ground or reason, the disjunctive judgment. It assumes that a situation has been worked out until representable in contradictory alternatives. To one of these the mind assents on account of the nature of the subject under judgment, and this involves the rejection of the other alternative. This is in the strictest sense the judgment of rationality. For it implies that the ground has been thoroughly traversed, that the problem has been viewed in all its relations, and that the basis of explanation bearing upon its solution has been reduced to contradictory alternatives, with one of which we identify the problem in question, and from the other of which we thereby reject it.

The three types of judgment here referred to develop, roughly speaking, in the order set down. The child's judgments tend to be categorical, the judgments of the practical scientist hypothetical, while those of the philosopher who tries to explain the world on a rational ground are thrown into the disjunctive form. And in a general way all minds pass through phases of development that may be roughly analyzed as naïvely dogmatic, as scientific, and finally as philosophical.

43. THE TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE JUDGING FUNCTION BY LOGIC.-If one were to consult the older text-books of logic he would notice that the view of the judgment there taken narrows it down very greatly in comparison with that just given. This is to be accounted for by the fact that the science used to be approached more from the language stand-point than at present. Hence the judgment was not regarded so much as a psychological product, but rather as a language form. In this way it was erroneously identified with the proposition or was at least limited to such mental activity as might take propositional form. This narrow view was further justified by the old faculty notion of the mind, according to which the mind was made of isolated powers, each definitely limited to its own distinctive work. This traditional interpretation has had to give way, like many another good and hoary superstition, before the evolutionary conception of mental functions. The view explained above and subscribed to in this book regards judgment as the unit of thoughtactivity, having manifold forms and applied to innumerable uses, but always as a mental function the same.

From babyhood to maturity it develops mightily; but never does it cease to be judgment and become some new phenomenon. The first awareness of the infant is a judgment-form; the final word of the philosopher is one also, only more elaborate and complex. In fact, it may be said that the knowing aspect of the mind's activity is always some form of judging. Intellect, understanding, classification, perception, conception, judgment (in the old, narrow sense), reasoning-these are all but so many names for forms of judging. And since our logical interests centre entirely in making these manifold intellectual acts of judging true and fruitful instead of false and abortive, we are correct in pronouncing logic to be the science of valid judging.

44. IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT JUDGMENT.-We have just said that judging is represented in all forms, from the naïve perceptions of the "baby new to earth and sky" to the profound and complex theses of the philosopher. Hence one useful distinction is that between naïve and reflective judgments. The former characterize the inexperience of child life, and likewise the inexperience of the sophisticated man when he deals with a novel problem. The naïve judgment issues out of our inexperience. Lacking an apperceptive ground of organized knowledge by which to interpret the novel challenge to the attention, the child and the adult who has strayed away from the accustomed haunts of his intellect alike assert a judgment which may be quite foreign to the real nature of the fact. The reflective judgment, as the name indicates, refers the matter awaiting judgment to a rich content of organized experi

ence, and is so much the surer to reach the truth. There is another useful distinction, that between the implicit and the explicit judgment. By far the larger number of our judgments never get conscious languageform. We may unconsciously think them in silent words after we have a vocabulary at our command; but we rarely speak them aloud unless we wish them to secure the assent of others. Infants who cannot as yet speak make implicit judgments of a vague kind. Our explicit judgments assume various forms, the most common of which are the name, the logical sentence or proposition, and the several forms of syllogistic reasoning.

45. THE PROPOSITION.-So far as the interests of logic are concerned, the proposition or logical sentence is one of the most important of the several forms of explicit judgment. This is the case because it is the vehicle through which we give expression to our inductively generalized experience, throwing it open to acceptance or challenge. The importance of this parade of the judgment before others is great. It enables us to supplement our experience by that of others, and in this way we may correct our individual errors and strengthen our feeling of certitude or our cognitive faith. Indeed, knowledge is far more a social product than we suspect. Until a judgment meets approval it is little more than a guess at the truth. Let it be approved by others and it becomes the truth for many, as is shown by false doctrines and beliefs that gain popular currency by mere numbers. The proposition is therefore of vast help in developing bodies of truth. It allows your judgment