lomats of 11 other nations signed "The Boxer Protocol," which marked the official end of the Boxer Rebellion.* The Spanish-American War required a sizeable recruiting effort. On 1 April 1898 the Regular Army was composed of 28,183 officers and enlisted men who were assigned to 42 regiments on 80 posts within the eight geographical departments. It was a small Army, but when the units assembled in camps at Mobile, Tampa, New Orleans, and Chickamauga, they were individually well-trained, fairly well-equipped, and disciplined. There was no Federal Volunteer army, and the degree of training in the Militia and National Guard units, like the amount and quality of their equipment, varied considerably and was generally lacking. Four months later, 274,717 officers and men were in the United States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines; 56,688 were Regulars, and 216,029 were Volunteers.5 The lack of preparedness and the hasty mobilization created numerous supply, equipment, training, and transportation problems that might have been disastrous "if it had not been for the even greater weakness of the enemy, the effectiveness of the Cuban Rebellion, and the naval victories at Manila and Santiago." Fortunately, the Army was only in combat from 22 June to 17 July in Cuba and from 31 July to 13 August in the Philippines. Equally fortunate, combat casualties were relatively low.R Once the armistice was signed on 12 August, demobilization began, and Volunteers were rapidly mustered out, except for those in the Philippines who were required to supplement the Regulars against Aguinaldo's insurgents. The authorized strength of the Regular Army remained at 65,000 men until 2 February 1901, when Congress increased it to 100,000. During the period of the Insurrection, the combined Regular and Volunteer strength fluctuated between 80,670 and 85,557, except in 1900 when it peaked to 101,713.7 United States troops found the Filipino rebels a more formidable foe than the Spanish. After they crushed a large force of insurrectos who attacked Manila on 4 February 1899 and captured the Caloocan rail center on 10 February, it appeared that insurgent opposition would be short lived, especially to Aguinaldo. He realized that the insurrection would collapse if his forces continued to engage the Americans in conventional warfare. Eventually, therefore, he fragmented his troops, and they disappeared into the jungles from where they destroyed railroads, conducted surprise attacks on American camps, stole supplies, and in flicted many casualties. The conflict with Aguinaldo's rebels was not “a splendid little war." 8 AMERICAN CHURCHES AND THE CONFLICTS With a few notable exceptions, American churches, including the Catholic Church, encouraged an aggressive foreign policy against Spain in Cuba, and when diplomacy failed, they supported the declaration of war. Their endorsements of intervention, diplomatic and military, may have influenced public opinion as much as the jingo and yellow press, if not more so; at the very least, they sanctified the intervention in their pulpits, publications, and assemblies. Though they reflected the American consensus, they avoided preaching vengeance-"Remember the Maine!" Instead they based their support on the humanitarian motives of spreading "civil liberty" and "spiritual Christianity." Americans began to clamor for action on behalf of the Cubans when the revolution started in 1895. Many immediately sympathized with the insurgents; some expansionists urged intervention against Spain. Both Presidents Cleveland and McKinley, however, attempted to follow a policy of neutrality; neither believed that the United States was threatened by the revolution or that sympathy for the Cubans was cause enough to start a war. But the jingo press continually reported stories of atrocities against the Cubans and stirred public opinion against the Spanish, particularly against colonial governor Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau for his policy of reconcentration.10 Feeling increased public pressure and hoping to ameliorate the situation, President McKinley persuaded Spain to grant Cuba limited selfgovernment, but his efforts were in vain. The Cubans wanted only independence and continued to fight; pro-Spanish mobs in Havana rioted in protest against self-government. To protect Americans in Cuba from the rioters, the Battleship Maine arrived in Havana Harbor on 25 January 1898; on 15 February an explosion destroyed the ship and killed 260 persons. Though the cause of the blast was never definitely determined, the enraged American public immediately blamed Spain; it was also convinced that the United States must avenge the sinking of the Maine as a matter of national honor and establish Cuban independence as a duty to humanity. Whatever doubt existed in American minds regarding the moral grounds for aggressive measures against Spain was shattered in the Havana Harbor explosion. In the following weeks the demands for such measures became a crusade. On 11 April President McKinley asked Congress for authority to intervene in Cuba. Congress responded by declaring Cuba free and independent and demanding Spanish withdrawal; moreover, it granted McKinley authority to secure both objectives. On 25 April Congress declared that war had existed since 21 April, the day Spain broke off diplomatic relations with the United States." Many devout Americans saw Providence in the ease and quickness of victory over Spain, and even though some opposed the acquisition of the Philippines, a sizeable number also saw the hand of God in that, including President McKinley, who told some of his fellow Methodists on 21 November 1898: I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my Considering that the United States at the time controlled only ManilaAguinaldo's forces or the Spanish friars of the Catholic Church controlled most of the remainder-and that most Filipinos were already at least nominal Christians, the answer to the President's prayer was remarkable. It did, however, provide moral grounds for the annexation, the war that resulted, and the sending of missionaries. A short time later, a number of Protestant churches-Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian, United Brethren, and Congregational-began to establish themselves in the archipelago; some were as concerned with proselytizing Catholics as they were with converting non-Christians.13 CHAPLAINS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONFLICTS Army chaplains were caught up in the excitement for the war against Spain, and for the same reasons as their fellow countrymen, including revenge. When war was declared and the 24th Infantry Regiment at Fort Douglas, Utah, received order to proceed toward Cuba, the "blacks in blue" marched from their barracks into a formation near the regimental commnader's quarters to hear an address by Chaplain Allensworth. Sitting upon his horse, Allensworth spoke to the troops, one company at a time: Soldiers and Comrades: Fate has turned the war dogs loose and you Allensworth's biographer reported that the men were filled with enthusiasm by the speech and "marched away with cheerful step, inspired for the service before them." 15 Nine days after the peace treaty was signed in Paris, Chaplain Theophilus G. Steward applied to the Adjutant General of the Army for detached service so that he could research and write the history of the "valorous conduct" of the four black regiments in the Cuban campaign; he was granted three months leave for the project. The result of his efforts was titled The Colored Regulars in the United States Army. In it he revealed his view toward the war in his discussion of American motives for entering it; his attitude differed from that of Allensworth. He said that there was "no power . . . sufficient to curb the rapidly swelling tide of popular hate, which manifested itself in the un-Christian but truly significant mottoes: 'Remember the Maine,' 'Avenge the Maine,' and 'To hell with Spain.'" He believed that the slogans were "outbreathings of popular fury" and represented "a spirit quite like that of a mob." He praised President McKinley for opposing Spain with diplomacy and arms, "not in the spirit of revenge, but in the interest of humanity, and upon principles sanctioned even by our holy religion." He believed-as did "all lovers of freedom, . . . true patriots, and . . . the Christian and philanthropist❞—that the purpose of the war was to relieve the "starving reconcentrados" and the “noble Cuban patriot" from "an inhumane warfare with their mother country," and to establish a "stable government in harmony with the ideas of liberty and justice." 16 Other chaplains also rejected the "eye for an eye" philosophy embodied in "Remember the Maine!" Writing that he marched with his regiment down the streets of San Francisco to board the transports with that slogan ringing in his ears, a member of the First California Volunteers said that his chaplain, William D. McKinnon, countered it by explaining that the enemy was human and deserved compassion. The same man also said that McKinnon's "influence was deeply felt amongst us." 99 17 Though Steward and Allensworth differed regarding vengeance as a motive for entering the war, they agreed that the conflict presented another opportunity to the black soldier to demonstrate his powers, and he was especially careful to answer the question Allensworth asked, “Will the Negro fight?" He described the black soldiers' bravery in detail. Moreover, by citing examples of black soldiers who fired heavy artillery pieces and led troops into battle after white artillerymen and officers became casualties, he challenged the myth that blacks were not bright enough to serve in the artillery arm and to be commissioned and command troops. 18 99 19 Chaplain Steward also used his book to express his conviction about preparedness. Discussing the United States casualties of the Cuban campaign, he took issue with those Americans who blamed the casualties on "military incompetency." He blamed the casualties on those who had "constantly resisted the establishment of an adequate standing army" but with "inconsistent vehemence, had urged the nation into a war, regardless of its military equipment." At least one other chaplain agreed with him; Leslie R. Groves said that the war was characterized by unpreparedness: Those who know the horrors, the cost, the unnecessary loss of life caused by unpreparedness dread the recurring time when the people demand war as they did in 1898. . . . A million men untrained are like a flock of sheep for defense, and the boy orators fail to notice that in the condition of unpreparedness ideal to the pacifist there are no arms to spring to . . . What lovely dreams can be had if one is detached from realities.20 If any chaplain was ever enthusiastic about the declaration of war, that enthusiasm was soon tempered by the war itself. On the eve of the attack upon Manila, Chaplain McKinnon feared that many in his regiment would be killed or wounded; consequently, he went throughout the camp to offer encouragement, hear confessions, hold services, and give Holy Communion to Catholic men. After breakfast on the day of the attack, when the regiment gathered to listen to its commander and its chaplain, McKinnon clearly and forcefully described the dangers of combat and explained the meaning of death. In no uncertain terms he declared it very possible that many would die and face the judgment of God within |