tion, and in Grant's administration (1869) it was modified. Finally, in 1886, the law was swept away entirely, experience under the act clearly demonstrating its evil effects upon efficient administration and party responsibility.

The fear of highly centralized power and the desire of parties to control patronage have likewise been responsible for attempts to fix the terms of many high officers, but here also we find the same confusion and absence of principle as in other branches of administrative law. The term of the superintendent of public works, for example, is merely to the end of the term of the governor by whom he is nominated and that of the superintendent of prisons is for five years unless sooner removed. The term of the civil service commission is six years, that of the superintendent of insurance, three years, that of the health officer of the port, four years, and so on. It would baffle the skill of the best casuist to discover any reason for such differences in terms.

Of course, it is commonly recognized that those officers who are required to have technical and professional skill should enjoy longer fixed terms than those whose functions are purely political. Indeed, organizations representing the various professions, knowing the relation between permanence and efficiency in private business, have sought to establish it in public business by recommending long terms for technical officers. Such recommendations, however, overlook two fundamental facts, namely, that no business corporation, except in rare cases, would for a moment agree to keep a technical expert for a term of ten years, no matter how inefficient he might prove after a trial or what impairment of faculties might set in within six months, and that the technical experts who have rendered the most acceptable service to the federal government are not protected by long terms of service requiring an extraordinary process for removal. This should lead us to inquire. whether the highly desirable permanence of tenure for technical experts cannot be secured by some other means than a fixed term guarded against removal, which fails to protect the public against an evil of equal magnitude, the long continuance of inefficient persons in office.

Such an inquiry reveals at the outset the fact that we have attempted to secure responsible and efficient government without utilizing the means which are known to be effective for locating and enforcing responsibility, and have adopted methods for obtaining efficiency which are repudiated in institutions, both public and private, where efficiency obtains. We have sacrificed, perhaps unwittingly, honest and efficient government to our fear of vesting power in the hands of our public officers. No business, public as well as private, can be successful if those who are in charge of it are not given powers commensurate with their responsibilities. It may be that political expediency makes it desir

able to create such a confusion of offices, terms and authorities as to prevent any person or group from doing much harm (except when a party organization controls all of them unofficially). If so, then the quest for honesty and efficiency all through the government is futile. Efficiency depends upon responsiveness and responsibility and these depend upon the possession of adequate authority with means adapted to its effective exercise.

Defects in Departmental Organization

The foregoing is a general statement setting forth the basis for considering what defects there are in the organization of the state government for purposes of administration and an appraisal of provisions for the chief executive. The part of this report which follows deals with the organization of the administrative departments, commissions and offices, and the conclusions drawn in nearly every case would be equally applicable whatever be the overhead or central executive machinery of control. In fact, if there were no provision for a single chief executive, if the governor were only a part of the legislature and each head of department or other administrative agency were required to deal directly with the legislature, the organization would be defective in nearly every particular noted below.

CHAPTER X

ORGANIZATION FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE'S PROPRIETARY AND OTHER GENERAL FUNCTIONS

Before discussing the administrative organization for rendering service to the public-i. e., for doing the things which contribute to the welfare of citizens—it seems desirable to consider those functions which have to do with the state equipping itself for service. There is a whole group of official activities that constitute what is sometimes called the business side of public enterprise or the relation of the government to the state acting as a proprietor-administrative acts associated with : 1. State financing or procuring funds such as:

a. Assessing and equalizing the valuation of property for. purposes of direct taxation

b. Fixing indirect revenue charges

c. Collecting revenues levied or charged according to law Selling bonds and issuing other evidences of debt for

d.

e.

funds, or refunding

Caring for funds and securities acquired

f. Disbursing funds in liquidation of debt and obligation

incurred in making purchases

2. Contracting for personal services

3. Purchasing services other than personal, such as printing, advertising, transportation, materials, supplies and equipment and other properties

4. Providing for the custody, the preservation and disposition of property of the state while not in use, and a method for determining whether properties are cared for while the users are to be held responsible

5.

Keeping the accounts needed to control the administration of funds and properties, and for the preparation of reports on assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses, surplus or deficit 6. Providing for the preservation of official records and documents other than those in use by persons who are to be held responsible

Present Agencies of the State Included in Group

Already the state, as a matter of common sense and common thinking, is making this distinction in its organization for doing things. The activities referred to are now performed by:

Secretary (for the) of state

Treasurer

Comptroller

Tax department

Department of excise

Commissioners of the land office

Conservation department

Sinking fund commission

Canal fund commission

Organizations for care and maintenance

Central purchasing agencies

Civil service commission
Department of elections

Generally speaking, there is a fairly clear recognition of the proprietary as distinct from the public service functions in the organization of all these. The exceptions are noted in the discussion which follows, and in the chapter dealing with the comptroller whose office does not belong in the group for the reasons already discussed, viz.: that the primary function of the comptroller, as independent auditor, makes it incompatible for him to administer funds and properties and to carry on transactions and assume responsibility for conditions and results that are to be made the subject of report by him to the "representative" body and to the "citizenship" of the state whose property is involved. Eliminating, therefore, the office of the comptroller (the subject treated in Chapter VIII), the offices administering functions within the proprietary group and the defects of organization are taken up in the order listed.

Need for Correlation of Official Action and Responsibility Involved in the Handling of Proprietary Activities

Before coming directly to the consideration of the organization for carrying on the proprietary relations of the state, it is of interest to observe that in England, France and Germany, and other great governments in which provision is made for the location and enforcement of executive responsibility," these functions are in general grouped together as a department of treasury, with varying exceptions, such as the administration of rules and regulations governing employment-civil service provisions, etc. In England, for years, not only the great funding and trading relations were carried on and controlled from the treasury, but so were the rules, regulations and conditions governing civil service. The English civil service commission is largely a legislative and judicial body, rather than an administrator of rules governing transfers, promotions, salary increases, etc. In all countries where a cabinet system exists, the budget proposals are prepared in the central department having charge of the finances and the minister over the treasury

is not infrequently the one to represent the executive in submitting and defending requests for appropriations, as well as the budget before parliament. It may be noted, also, that it is on account of the necessary detachment of the executive and administrative officers handling these matters of finance and control over the proprietorship from all persons who are the heads of service departments that the prime minister or chief executive often takes the treasury portfolio so that he may be the leader of the group. For him to take the executive leadership of any of the departments which exist to serve the public, would necessarily be to throw in his lot with officers who are the promoting spirits of government, as distinguished from those who must find money, men, and material with which to carry on the enterprise. Taking the portfolio of the treasury puts the prime minister in a position to consider each proposal coming from a public service department in its perspective. When so organized, the central staff agencies of the government, which are created to keep the chief executive informed, are not infrequently a part of this department. For cogent reasons, however, they may be quite disassociated, and the proprietary functions may be carried on under a head to whom the central staff is not answerable.

Technical Advantages of Grouping

Aside from the better correlation of interrelated functions by grouping the financial and other proprietary functions, there is an advantage which comes from having a single "political" head-a vice-governor, under whom all these activities are carried on. This makes possible using the "political" head to cooperate with the chief executive in making effective his leadership. What is quite important, it makes possible the development and retention of highly "technical" officers to care for the diverse operations having to do with budget-making, financial administration, procedures, and custodianship.

While it is readily accounted for historically, there is nothing in the annals of human affairs that is more unsound than the present organization of the state's business relations and activities. There is in it not a commendatory feature when considered from the viewpoint of requirements for "responsible" administration. The old saying that what is everybody's business is nobody's, would have ample justification if its sole use had been to characterize the constitutional and legal provisions for the management of the estate of that corporation which now spends upwards of $50,000,000 a year, and which is possessed of properties of ten times this value-known as the government of the state of New York. Essential defects in this part of the organization are responsible largely for the high cost of government—defects which will never be overcome so long as the technical requirements of proprietary management are lost sight