sion that they shall be preferred without regard to their standing on any list means the relaxation of discipline, the loss of faith on the part of other employees that they will be fairly dealt with, the loss of respect for the service by the men who are called upon to do the work of the government, and the lowering of the morale of those who have hitherto rendered honorable service.

Makes for Official Irresponsibility

Considering the matter, therefore, from the point of view of justice to the public interest, and to those who have spent their lives in the civil service of the state, the provision is equally indefensible. The federal government has already provided liberally for the soldier and sailor in recognition of their honorable services. For similar reasons the state looks after their declining years by maintaining homes for them. If the state has further obligations to those who have been retired from the military service, it would be better for the military service and for the civil administration if the government should frankly grant to such soldiers and sailors pensions to equal the salaries they draw, than to continue the policy of preference wholly unrelated to fitness or quality of work done. There can be no doubt that such a preference makes for official irresponsibility and for individual incompetency by setting up conditions that are incompatible with the efficient handling of public business.

METHODS OF REMOVAL

No argument is necessary to show that the system of removals from office has as much influence upon the efficiency of the personnel as the system of appointment (see Chart II, p. 38a). An examination of the present provisions for removals shows the same confusion and lack of reasoned purpose which were found in the case of methods of appointment. The various methods of removal now employed in the state government are as follows:

1. The general power of removal by impeachment is vested in the assembly on conviction by the constituted court of trial in such cases.

The expense and unwieldy character

of this process of removal make it useless except in cases of charges against high officers.

2. The governor may suspend but not remove the treasurer for

violation of his duty.

3. The governor may remove the superintendent of public works and the superintendent of prisons and some statutory officers, without the consent of the senate.

4. The governor may remove a great majority of the important statutory officers only with the consent of the senate.

5. Appointing officers, such as the superintendent of public works and of prisons, are frequently given the power of removing important subordinates summarily.

6. In some cases, the officer making removals is limited to removals for specified causes, and in other cases by general provisions, such as the requirements of the public interest or the unfitness of the incumbents, and in still other cases by no restrictions susceptible of precise definition.

7. In some cases an officer making removals must show specific causes and give the person whose removal is sought an opportunity to be heard; in other cases a statement of the reasons for the removal of an officer must be filed somewhere as a matter of record only, without affording the person removed an opportunity to be heard.

Not Consistent with Provisions Governing Appointments

In order to illustrate graphically the system of appointments and removals, so far as the definition and enforcement of responsibility are concerned, a third chart has been prepared which is designed to show both these relations (p. 42). On this chart the methods of removal are shown at the bottom of the lines running to symbols showing sixteen different methods of appointment. To show these in combination, by a more general grouping, Chart IV, p. 44a, has also been prepared. Reference is made to the same list of departments and offices as far as the methods of removals could be ascertained within the time available.

PROVISIONS RELATIVE TO THE TENURE OF PUBLIC AGENTS

In seeking to secure responsiveness, responsibility and efficiency in government, the matter of the tenure of public agents becomes of prime importance, and calls for consideration with reference to constructive standards rather than the idea of preventing usurpation on the part of a hereditary monarch.

Responsiveness required that the government should accurately reflect popular opinion on all fundamental matters. Changes in that opinion will have no necessary relation to the rotation of the earth on its axis or around the sun, and to secure responsiveness, therefore, it is not imperative that elections should be held every year or every two years. If a government truly represents the electorate, there is no theoretical reason why it should be subjected to the interruption incident to a campaign or the course of industry and business should be disturbed by an election which leaves the same party in power.

MENT AND REMOVAL PRESCRIBED BY LAW.

CHART III.-SHOWING LACK OF CORRESPONDENCE OF METHODS OF APPOINT

KEY TO CHART III.-SHOWING LACK OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN APPOINT

CHART ABOVE.
MENT AND REMOVAL.

THE HEAVY FACED NUMBERS REFER TO LINES ON

1-Removed as appointed

APPTD. BY SUB. ORG. UNITS OR HEADS

1-Sing Sing Prison

2-Auburn Prison

3-Clinton Prison

1-Dept. Efficiency and Economy
APPTD. GOV. W. ADV. & CONS. SEN.
2-Removed p't by r'p'l act apptg. p't as apptd.

4-Dept. Excise

3-Insurance Dept.

5-State Dept. Health

2-Banking Dept.

6-Health Officer Port of N. Y.

7-Dept. Labor

8-Dept. State Fire Marshal

Frequent Elections

The practical objection, however, is that it is difficult to discover when any particular government accurately represents public opinion and that if some authority were vested with the power of deciding when an election should be held it could readily enter into ways of usurpation. Indeed, it was this practical objection which led the founders of American governments to adopt the principle of "frequent elections." Previous to the Revolution, the tenure of the governors in the royal colonies was at the king's pleasure and those governors had the power of dissolving the assemblies and calling new elections. When the royal element was eliminated and elected governors were created, the fear of the royal executive which formerly entertained was carried over to the elected executive, and the power of appealing to the voters to ascertain popular will at any one time was taken away altogether. Lest usurpation might occur, it was thought better to risk the waste of frequent elections which resulted in no material changes rather than to invite the dangers incident to long possession of power.

Longer Tenure and Provision for Reference of Issues to Electorate

As confidence in democracy advanced, however, it was seen that the fear of the executive which had been entertained when he was a royal officer was unfounded when he was elected by popular vote. Accordingly, the term of the governor was quite generally increased from one year to two and in many instances to four years, although in New York it has been reduced from three to two. It would seem that by this time confidence of democracy in its own capacity for self government had advanced far enough to grant to elected officers and agents of the government four year terms, particularly if a method is provided for getting issues on which there is a deadlock before the people by call of the executive or other means of "recall." (See below, p. 79.)

Present Tenures Not Consistent with Requirements of Responsive,

Responsible and Efficient Government

At all events, from the point of view of responsiveness, the present constitution which gives to the senators and the governor a two years' term and to the assembly a term of a single year is indefensible. It was not devised for the purpose of making the government responsive but to prevent it from being immediately responsive. The senate was originally a class body representing the landed class of the state, and it was given a longer term in order to endow it with greater weight against the more popular house, the assembly. When, however, the two houses. were placed on the same basis as to the suffrage (see above, p. 18), this reason disappeared, but the longer term was preserved in order to prevent