Mortgage Tax Bureau Audits and supervises accounts of county treasurers in connection with moneys received from recording officers. License Bureau etc. Supervises private bankers, steamship ticket agents, Bureau of Canal Affairs Supervises financial transactions relating to canals. Bureau of Highways Audits accounts of highways department; examines contracts for construction, audits payment of estimate, etc. State Printing Division Supervises expenditures for state printing. Organic Changes Provided for in Recent Bill The foregoing represents the organization of the comptroller's office, as it existed at the time the descriptive report of the government of the state was prepared and as it exists today. What is known as the Hinman Act was signed only a few days since. This act took away from the comptroller certain tax-collecting agencies which had charge of corporation, transfer, franchise and mortgage taxes. It was a step in the right direction, but still the comptroller, through his ex-officio connections and other administrative responsibilities, is far from being an independent auditing officer. Section 179 of the Hinman Act provides specifically that, although the powers and duties formerly conferred upon the comptroller in relation to the assessment, determination, revision, readjustment and imposition of corporation taxes shall be transferred to the new state tax department, "the duties of collecting corporation taxes assessed and the refunding of such taxes as paid" shall continue to be exercised and performed by the state comptroller. It is obvious that the bill does not take out of the comptroller's office all of its discordant functions. It does not provide for its complete independence. Although the work may be followed up on more consistent lines, the office is not protected against future invasions by legislative enactment. This office, which is so essential to the working plan for making the government responsible and for protecting the state from exploitation, can itself only be protected by constitutional enactment. It is essential that the comptroller, as the auditor-general of the State of New York, be set aside and entirely isolated so that pressure may not be brought to bear upon him to permit the office of audit to be used for ends that are inconsistent with its underlying purpose. CHAPTER IX THE GOVERNOR AND THE ADMINISTRATION So far attention has been given to the means provided for determining the public will, and for impressing this on officers charged with the duty of performing services required. What has been said refers to the representative side of the enterprise, viz., to the "electorate," to the "representative" body, and to the relations of the representative body to the administration. Accepting Anson's distinction, which has already been twice mentioned, the report has thus far dealt with the constitutional means of deciding "what to do." It remains to evaluate the means provided for "doing it." What is Meant by "Administration" 66 The word administration" is from a Latin verb, which means to manage, to execute. Management has to do with the preparation, submission, approval and execution of plans. In a representative system the board is a part of management to the extent that its approval is necessary. Otherwise management is primarily an executive function. Problems of Management The problems of management fall into two general classes corresponding to functions or activities of similar character, viz.: (1) those which have to do with the state or other institution acting as a proprietor -activities of a kind that must be carried on no matter how extensive its functions; (2) those functions or activities in the nature of services rendered to the public-things done in carrying out the purposes for which the institution exists. The first of these will be hereinafter referred to as proprietary functions; the second will be called in contradistinction public service functions. Each institution has similar proprietary functions and problems, but the public service functions differ as widely as there are different institutions. Each institution has its own purpose and an organization and technique developed or to be developed suited to its work. Proprietary Functions and Problems Among the common proprietary functions or groups of activities are these: 1. Obtaining and caring for the funds required, whether raised as revenue or by borrowing. 2. The employing and caring for the personnel needed on the enterprise. 3. Acquiring and caring for the supplies and equipment and properties required to make the personnel effective. 4. Paying the debts and current obligations of the government. While there are adaptations within these groups of activities, they constitute only variants of methods for doing the same kind of thing and have in them common consideration for the administrator. Public Service Functions and Problems The public service functions differ with each institution or enterprise. Those which are carried on by the government of the state may be grouped as follows: 1. Military protection. 2. Promotion of public education, art, science and recreation. 3. Construction, operation and maintenance of public works. 4. Promotion of health and safety. 5. Regulation of public service corporations. 6. Regulation of insurance and banking. 7. Promotion of agriculture and industry. 8. Protection and promotion of the interests of labor. Care and education of the dependent, defective and delinquent classes. General Requirements of Organization for Administration As in the case of policy determination, definite expedients and institutional adaptations have been developed for management and mastery of details of administration. The technique varies widely, but each organization when considered broadly may be characterized as belonging to one or another of the following types: 1. A type in which executive control is centralized-one which has at its head a chief executive through whom persons in charge of the several functions are held responsible. 2. A type in which executive control is decentralized-one which has many executives independent of each other. 3. A nondescript type of organization-one whose development seems to have been governed by no principle-in which some of the departmental executives may be held responsible through an officer who is called chief executive, other departmental executives may be independent and still other's may hold such an ill-defined position that they are uncertain as to whom they are responsible. Executive and Departmental Organization of the State The organization provided for and developed under the constitution for the government of the State of New York is of the third or nondescript type. As has been amply proved by more than a century of use, this type has nothing in common experience or human reason to In the management of affairs there are conditions under which decentralization is desirable-at least, in which the principle has worked with fair satisfaction. The circumstances which favor decentralization are those favorable to the location and enforcement of administrative responsibility for carrying on different public service functions through independent executives. Even in this event, it is found desirable to centralize certain proprietary functions. For example, the State of New York has seen fit to incorporate separately the department of education to carry on a class of functions. It has not been found desirable, however, to maintain a separate organization for obtaining funds, either by tax levies or borrowing for public school purposes. The city of Philadelphia likewise has recently set up the department of education as an independent establishment, but makes the controller and the treasurer of the city ex-officio auditor and treasurer of the school district. This is a common arrangement as between counties and cities included within them. The city of New York and the five counties (New York, Bronx, Queens, Kings and Richmond), all use the same machinery for practically all the proprietary functions. They are separately organized for administering public service functions. The state uses the machinery of the city of New York for carrying on the proprietary functions incident to the support of the public service commission for the first district, though there is neither executive nor board control over the public service function. Principles Governing Determination as to Whether Executive Control Should Be Centralized The principles governing determination as to whether executive control should be centralized are these: 1. Executive control should be centralized in every instance where it will make for increased efficiency and economy 2. Executive control should be centralized with respect to all functions whether proprietary or for public service when they are interdependent or decentralization will lead to confusion of responsibility, conflict of authority, and delay 3. Executive control should be decentralized wherever and to the the extent that independence of action in the very nature of things is advantageous, i. e., where there is no interdependence of working relations and no advantage can be gained through subordination to a common executive, though they may be under the same legislative control. Application of General Principles to Functional Groups Before concrete appraisal of the existing organization for administration may be made, these general principles must be applied to the functional groups. When so applied the following conclusions may be drawn with respect to the question as to whether central control makes for efficiency: 1. There should be central executive or administrative control over the functions of money-raising wherever and to the extent that the same revenue-paying or money-lending constituency is to be dealt with Thus it is advantageous for the state to collect the automobile tax, whereas it is advantageous to have the local government collect the real estate tax. In each case one agency collects for all political jurisdictions, and renders an accounting. In Massachusetts, a central state bureau is maintained for administering the law governing city, county and town borrowing, since each must deal in the same market and each gains an advantage from the experience and better facilities offered by a central agency. 2. Central control over employment and improvement of the personnel of the public service should be established whenever and to whatever extent justice to a class of employees and individual efficiency may be promoted through the use of a common agency Whatever the arrangement for executive control over public service functions of the state-whether centralized or decentralized-it is an advantage both to the executive and the public which is served to provide a common agency for determining the fitness and qualification of persons seeking employment, for providing common labor conditions affecting promotions, transfers, discipline, health, compensation, sick leave, vacations, retirement pensions, etc. 3. The purchase and custody of supplies, equipment and properties should be centrally controlled wherever and to whatever extent better trading conditions can be established and equal or better facilities for distribution and use may be obtained Generally speaking, trade conditions may be established better through central executive control than where purchases are left to a great number and variety of related institutions and agencies. The exception is where the using agencies are widely scattered and the market is a nearby local one (as in the case of fresh vegetables); or where the transportation cost is more than the saving through better prices obtained. Quite often, however, the infrequency, the emergency, the irregularity of demand are such as to put the officer in charge of work at a disadvantage if he must |