The FederalistBarnes & Noble Publishing, 1996 - 572 страница "At the height of the debates over the adoption of the Constitution in 1787-88, a series of articles began to appear in a New York journal. Their author, calling himself "Publius," urged the ratification of the new constitution, offering- in Thomas Jefferson's words- "the best commentary on the principles of government which ever was written." These eighty-five articles, commonly known as "The Federalist Papers," were, in reality, the work of three men: Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. Their purpose was to persuade convention voters-and ultimately the general public-that the old government, as it existed under the Articles of Confederation, was defective and that the proposed constitution, with its three branches of government, was the best means of realizing the ideals of justice and individual right. These papers were soon collected and printed in book form in 1788 by John and Archibald McLean under the title The Federalist. ". |
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Садржај
Introduction by Benjamin Fletcher Wright | 1 |
1 | 43 |
Fundamental Law and the Judicial Guardians | 67 |
The Rational Appeal to SelfInterest | 77 |
Introduction | 89 |
Union as a Requisite for National Safety | 97 |
Separate Confederacies and Foreign Powers | 105 |
Causes of Wars Among the States if Disunited | 113 |
Powers and Continuing Advantages of the States | 324 |
State and Federal Powers Compared | 329 |
I | 336 |
II | 343 |
Appeal to the People in Cases of Disagreement | 347 |
Periodical Appeals to the People | 352 |
Checks and Balances | 355 |
The House of Representatives | 359 |
Consequences of Wars Between States | 119 |
The Size and Variety of the Union as a Check on Faction | 129 |
The Value of Union to Commerce and the Advantages of a Navy | 136 |
Union and the National Revenue | 142 |
Representative Republics and Direct Democracies | 150 |
Defects of the Confederation | 157 |
Inability of the Confederation to Enforce Its Laws | 162 |
The Future Balance of State and National Powers | 167 |
The Greek Confederacies | 171 |
Medieval and Modern Confederacies | 176 |
The Netherlands Confederacy | 182 |
Defects of the Present Confederation | 186 |
Lack of Powers and of Proper Ratification | 191 |
The Necessity of an Energetic and Active National Government | 199 |
To Provide for the Common Defense | 203 |
The States and the Common Defense | 208 |
The Powers of Congress and the Common Defense | 213 |
The Enforcement of the Supreme Law of the Land | 219 |
A National Army and Internal Security | 222 |
The Regulation of the Militia | 226 |
A General Power of Taxation | 231 |
The Necessity of a National Power of Taxation | 236 |
Exclusive and Concurrent Powers of Taxation | 240 |
The Constitutionality of National Tax Laws | 244 |
Concurrent Authority in Taxation | 248 |
Further Reasons for an Indefinite Power of Taxation | 253 |
Direct and Indirect | 259 |
Problems Confronting the Federal Convention | 265 |
Inconsistencies of Opponents of Ratification | 272 |
Republicanism Nationalism Federalism | 280 |
The Authority of the Convention | 286 |
I | 293 |
II | 302 |
III | 309 |
Restrictions on Powers of the States | 317 |
Annual and Biennial Elections | 364 |
The Apportionment of Representatives and of Taxes | 369 |
The House and Knowledge of Local Circumstances | 374 |
Adequacy of Representation in the House | 379 |
The Popular Basis of the House | 383 |
The Future Size of the House | 388 |
National Regulation of Congressional Elections | 393 |
Safety in National Control of Elections | 398 |
Uniformity in the National Control of Elections to the House | 403 |
The Nature and the Stabilizing Influence of the Senate | 407 |
The Necessity of a Senate | 413 |
The Senate and the Treaty Power | 420 |
Appointments and Impeachments | 426 |
Further Consideration of the Impeachment Power | 431 |
The Executive | 436 |
The Method of Electing the President | 440 |
Comparison of the President with Other Executives | 444 |
Advantages of a Single Executive | 451 |
The Presidential Term of Office | 458 |
Reeligibility of the President | 462 |
The Presidential Salary and Veto | 467 |
The Military and Pardoning Powers of the President | 473 |
The President and the Treaty Power | 475 |
The President and the Appointing Power | 480 |
The Powers of the President Concluded | 484 |
The Judges as Guardians of the Constitution | 489 |
The Position of the Judiciary | 497 |
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts | 499 |
Distribution of the Judicial Power | 505 |
The State and the Federal Courts | 514 |
Trial by Jury | 518 |
The Lack of a Bill of Rights | 531 |
Conclusion | 541 |
549 | |
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