2 grant, would be effectual without the writ of injunction prayed for. The circuit court of the United States was therefore deprived of power, by the section just quoted, to protect the rights of the plaintiff, unless the writ of injunction was authorized by the law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy. Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 254; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340. In a timely suit brought by the assignee in bankruptcy, there is no doubt that upon a proper showing the circuit court might have enjoined proceedings in the attachment suits in the state court. This is the express ruling in Chapman v. Brewer, 114 U. S. 158; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 799. But the plaintiff in this case is not the assignee in bankruptcy. Sullivan, the transferee of Sargent, the vendee at the bankruptcy sale, was the real plaintiff, and the only party who, at the final hearing, asked for the injunction. The question, therefore, is, does any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy authorize an injunction, at the instance of a purchaser of property at a bankruptcy sale, or his vendee, to stay proceedings in a state court? There is no act of congress expressly authorizing a circuit court of the United States to restrain by injunction, even at the suit of an assignee in bankruptcy, proceedings in a state court. The case of Chapman v. Brewer, ubi supra, was a bill in equity filed by an assignee in bankruptcy to enjoin the defendant from selling the property of the bankrupt upon execution issued out of the state court. The jurisdiction to issue the writ in that case was placed by the court upon section 5024 of the Revised Statutes, which authorized the district court, sitting in bankruptcy, when a petition in involuntary bankruptcy had been filed, to restrain by injunction all persons from interfering with the debtor's property, and upon section 4979, which gives the circuit court concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts, of all suits at law or in equity brought by an assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming an adverse interest in any property transferable to or vested in him. The court, in the case cited, said: "It must be held that congress, in authorizing a suit in equity in a case like the present, has, in order to make the other relief granted completely effective, authorized an injunction as necessarily incidental and consequent to prevent further proceedings under the levies already made, and new levies under the judgment." The case makes it clear that the injunction to stay proceedings in a state court is only allowed by the statute for the purpose of aiding the assignee in bankruptcy to discharge his duty, and of protecting the property of the bankrupt estate for the equitable distribution among the creditors. But there is no act of congress from which can be inferred authority to a court of the United States to issue an injunction to restrain proceedings of a state court at the instance of a purchaser at a bankruptcy sale, or of his vendee. The right of the assignee in bankruptcy, by section 5057 of the Revised Statutes, to maintain any suit touching any property or rights of property transferable to or vested in him against any person claiming an adverse interest, is cut off by section 5057 of the Revised Statutes by the lapse of two years from the time the cause of action accrued. But the contention of the plaintiff in this case is that the bankruptcy act, without limitation of time, allows a purchaser at a bankruptcy sale, or his vendee, to sue out a writ of injunction from a federal court to restrain proceedings in a state court, while it denies that right to all other persons, except the assignee in bankruptcy, and allows it to him only for two years after his cause of action has accrued. The argument against the jurisdiction in this case is clear. The suit was not brought until long after the lands in controversy had been sold and conveyed by the assignee, and the purchaser had been put in possession. Neither the assignee nor the creditors of the bankrupt estate had any further interest in or concern with them. They had been fully administered, the purchase money had been paid to the assignee, and the lands no longer formed any part of the Assets of the bankrupt estate, and no proceedings in the bankruptcy court could have any reference to them. There is, therefore, no law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy which authorizes the injunction prayed for. The case of Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494, cited by counsel for plaintiff, merely decided that a court of the United States could enforce its own judgment in a replevin suit removed from a state court, by enjoining the defeated party from proceeding on the replevin bond in the court from which the cause had been removed, the condition of the bond having been satisfied by the judgment of the federal court in favor of the obligor. The court further held that the bill filed for the purpose of restraining the defendant was merely ancillary to the replevin suit; its object being to secure to the defendant therein the fruits of his judgment. The authority cited does not tend to sustain the jurisdiction of the court in this case. Decree affirmed. (115 U. S. 413) STATE OF ALABAMA v. BURR and others. RAILROAD BONDS-ALABAMA ACTS OF FEBRUARY 19, 1867, AND FEBRUARY 11, 1870--DEC- Declaration on action by the state of Alabama against certain defendants to recover for losses sustained by the state by reason of the fraudulent misrepresentations of defendants in obtaining the issue and indorsement to them of certain bonds under the acts of February 19, 1867, and February 11, 1870, held not to state a cause of action, and demurrer sustained. H. C. Tompkins, S. F. Rice, and E. S. Mansfield, for plaintiff. W. G. Nichols and B. F. Brooks, for Isaac F. Burr. J. C. Coombs, for Samuel A. Carlton. W. H. Phillips, for John De Merritt and John C. and Daniel N., Stanton. WAITE, C. J. *This is a suit at law, brought in this court by the state of Alabama against Isaac T. Burr, Samuel A. Carlton, John De Merritt, citizens of Massachusetts, John C. Stanton, a citizen of New York, and Daniel N. Stanton, a citizen of New Jersey. The declaration states, in substance, that under the operation of certain statutes of Alabama the governor was authorized and required to indorse, on the part of the state, the first mortgage bonds of the Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Company, a corporation having power to construct a railroad from Meridian, in the state of Mississippi, through the states of Alabama and Georgia, to Chattanooga, in the state of Tennessee, a distance of 295 miles, to the extent of $16,000 per mile on the whole length of its road, as fast as sections of 20 continuous miles each were "finished, completed, and equipped." The bonds, when issued and indorsed, were to have "priority in favor of the state over any and all other liens whatever." Sections 5 and 6 of an act of February 19, 1867, on which the liability of the defendants to a large extent depends, are as follows: "Sec. 5. Be it further enacted, that the bonds before specified shall not be used by said company for any other purpose than the construction and equipment of said road; and the governor shall not indorse the same unless on the affidavit of the president of said company, and a resolution of a majority of its directory for the time being, that said bonds shall not be used for any other purpose than the construction and equipment of said road, or sold or disposed of for a less sum than ninety cents in the dollar; nor shall said bonds be indorsed until the president and chief engineer of said company shall, upon oath, show that the conditions of this act have been complied with in all respects. "Sec. 6. Be it further enacted, that it shall be the duty of the governor, from time to time, when there shall be reliable information given to him that any railroad company shall have fraudulently obtained the indorsement of its bonds by the governor on the part of the state, or shall have obtained the inv.6s.c.-6 416 dorsement contrary to the provisions of this act, or shall have sold or disposed of the bonds indorsed by the governor for a less sum than ninety cents in the dollar, he shall notify the attorney general of the state, whose duty it shall be forthwith to institute, in the name of the state, a suit in the circuit or chancery court of the county of the place of business of the company, setting forth the facts; and when the fact shall satisfactorily appear to the court that the indorsement of any of said bonds shall have been fraudulently obtained, or obtained contrary to the true intent, meaning, and provisions of this act, or that said bonds shall have been sold or disposed of for a less sum than ninety cents in the dollar, then, and in such case, the court shall order, adjudge, and decree that said road,*lying in the state, with all the property and assets of said company, or a sufficiency thereof, shall be sold, and the proceeds thereof shall be paid into the treasury of the state; and it shall be the duty of the comptroller immediately to invest the same in state bonds, or the bonds indorsed by the governor under the provisions of this act, creating a sinking fund as provided for in the eleventh section of this act; and said company shall forfeit all rights and privileges under the provisions of this act. And the stockholders thereof shall be individually liable for the payment of the bonds, the indorsement of which was so fraudulently obtained by such company, or which were sold or disposed of for less than ninety cents in the dollar, and for all other losses that may fall upon the state in consequence of the commission of any other fraud by such company, excepting such stockholders as may show to the said court that they were ignorant of or opposed the perpetration of such fraud by the company." By another statute passed February 11, 1870, the governor was authorized to issue state bonds to the amount of $2,000,000, and exchange them with the same company for an equal amount of its own bonds, secured by a first mortgage on lands granted to the company by the United States, and certain other specified property, including, if the governor should deem it necessary, a second mortgage on the railroad. The bonds were only to be issued in such sums as it should be shown by sufficient evidence had been expended by the company in the construction and equipment of its road, "in addition to and besides the proceeds of the bonds indorsed by the state which the said railroad company shall have received under the laws of the said state now in force." The act also provided that these bonds should not be sold at less than 90 cents on the dollar, and “that the directors or other officers and incorporators and stockholders of said railroad company, who shall knowingly violate, or permit the violation without objection, any provision of this act, or of the act under which said company is now receiving the indorsement of the state upon its bonds of $16,000 per mile, shall be held personally liable to the state for any loss incurred thereby." "The declaration, after setting forth the various statutes relied on, proceeds as follows: "The defendants were at the time last mentioned, and from thence continuously, until and at and after the time of the occurrence of the several and respective wrongs and injuries and losses to the plaintiff hereinafter stated, the majority and controlling incorporators, officers, directors, and stockholders, as well as the actual managers and controllers, of the said Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Company;" and, after stating that the company issued $1,250,000 of its first mortgage bonds in excess of that authorized by the statutes, avers that such overissue was made "with the intent fraudulently to procure the indorsement of each of its said bonds by the governor of plaintiff as if the indorsement of each of them by said governor was authorized by said acts, and with intent to deceive the governor of the plaintiff, and to defraud the plaintiff to the extent of an amount equal to so many of said bonds and indorsements thereof as were not authorized by said acts to be indorsed by the governor of plaintiff; and said last-named company, with such fraudulent intent, did, by false and fraudulent representations and pretenses, some of which were to the effect that said company was presenting to the governor of plaintiff, for indorsement by him, only so many of its bonds as said acts authorized him to indorse, and was claiming of him indorsement of only so many of its bonds as said acts authorized him to indorse, fraudulently procure from said governor his indorsement of each and all of its bonds issued as aforesaid, and the redelivery to that company of all its said bonds indorsed as aforesaid. In procuring said indorsement by said governor of Alabama of each and of all the said bonds of said last-mentioned company, that company made to said governor the following, among other, false and fraudulent pretenses: That this last-mentioned company, at the time it applied for and procured said indorsements, had twenty continuous miles of its railroad finished, equipped, and completed, outside of the state of Alabama, and in the state of Mississippi, and extending in a north-easterly direction towards Alabama; that said last-mentioned company, at the time it applied for and procured said indorsements, had twenty continuous miles of its railroad finished, equipped, and completed from Chattanooga, in the state of Tennessee, in a south-westerly direction towards Alabama, but outside of Alabama. The governor of plaintiff was induced to make said indorsements by believing and acting upon said several false and fraudulent representations and pretenses; and otherwise would not have made any of said indorsements. "The said representations and pretenses were false in the following, among other, respects and particulars: First. That said twenty miles of road, situate in the state of Mississippi, for which the first indorsement was procured, had not been finished and completed by said company, but was an old road purchased by said company, and which had been built several years prior to the passage of said acts by said Northeast & Southwest Railroad Company. Second. That said road was not equipped. Third. That said company had not finished, completed, and equipped twenty continuous miles of said road from said city of Chattanooga, extending towards the state of Alabama, for which it procured the indorsement by the said state of the second batch of three hundred and twenty of said bonds; but, on the contrary, said company estimated, as a part of said twenty miles, a part, to-wit, five miles, of the road of another corporation, situated in the state of Tennessee, which was used by it for the running of its train, under an agreement with said other corporation, and which said road has been continuously ever since, and is still, the property of said other corporation, and for the use of which the said Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Company was then paying, and continued to pay so long as it controlled and managed its own road, a large rental, amounting to many thousand dollars, which was paid out of the proceeds of the sale of said indorsed bonds. Fourth. That said twenty miles of road claimed to have been finished and completed by said Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Company, from said city of Chattanooga, as aforesaid, at the time it procured said indorsements, had not at that time been equipped." It is then averred that the two millions of dollars of state bonds were issued to the company under the act of 1870, and that, after this was done, and on or about September 15, 1871, a petition in bankruptcy was filed, under which the company was declared a bankrupt, November 6, 1871, and that on the twenty-second of April, 1872, its railroad and property were sold by its assignees to the state, subject to the mortgage given the state to secure the indorsed bonds. Afterwards the mortgage to the state was foreclosed, and the mortgaged property sold at public auction on the twenty-second of January, 1877, to a purchaser other than the state. Then follows this allegation: "The plaintiff says that in the indorsement and delivery to the said Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Company of the said bonds of that corporation, and the coupons thereunto attached as aforesaid, and in the issuance and delivery to that corporation of the said two thousand bonds of the plaintiff, and the coupons thereunto attached as aforesaid, the plaintiff relied on the truthful ness of the several aforesaid false pretenses and statements of said Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Company, as well as on all the provisions of all the said acts of her general assembly, and especially on all the said provisions of said acts relating to the obligation and liability to the plaintiff of the directors, officers, incorporators, and stockholders of said corporation for any loss that should be incurred by the plaintiff by reason of the directors, officers, incorporators, and stockholders of said incorporation knowingly violating, or permitting the violation of, without objection, any provision of the said act approved February 11, 1870, under and by virtue of which the said two thousand bonds of the plaintiff, and the coupons thereunto attached, were issued and delivered to said corporation as aforesaid, or of the said acts under which the plaintiff indorsed and delivered to the said corporation the said bonds of the said corporation as aforesaid." 66 It is then averred that in May, 1869, the company "knowingly, wrongfully, illegally, and fraudulently appropriated to the defendants, and their accomplices in the wrong and fraud," one hundred and sixty thousand dollars of the money accruing from the sale of the indorsed bonds, and that this sum was not used or applied in any way for the benefit of said corporation, or of plaintiff, or for the purpose of constructing or equipping its said railroad, or for any honest or lawful purpose." Also that the company, in or about the month of May, 1869, "wrongfully, illegally, fraudulently, and without any valuable consideration, appropriated and issued to the defendants, and their accomplices in the fraud and wrong, shares of the capital stock of the said corporation of the aggregate par value of four hundred and fifty thousand dollars, which the defendants thereafter pretended to sell to said corporation, and in payment therefor the said corporation fraudulently and illegally paid to the defendants, and the defendants did wrongfully, fraudulently, and illegally receive from the said corporation, a large sum, to-wit, the sum of forty-five thousand dollars, which said sum had accrued to, and been received by, the said corporation from the sales of a portion of said bonds indorsed by the plaintiff and delivered to the said corporation as aforesaid, and which said sum, received by the defendants as aforesaid, they, the defendants, knowingly, wrongfully, illegally, and fraudulently appropriated to their own use and benefit, and which was not used or applied in any way for the benefit of said corporation, or for the purpose of constructing or equipping its said railroad." Also that in the months of November and December, 1869, the company "wrongfully, illegally, fraudulently, and knowingly permitted the defendants to appropriate to their own use and to the use of their accomplices" certain sums amounting in the aggregate to one hundred and eighteen thousand dollars, "which sums had accrued to, and been received by, the said corporation from sales of a portion of said bonds indorsed by the plaintiff and delivered to said corporation as aforesaid, and which were not used or applied in any way for the benefit of said corporation, or for the purpose of constructing or equipping its said road." Also that in the months of January and February, 1870, the company "knowingly, wrongfully, illegally, and fraudulently permitted the defendants to misapply, misappropriate, and convert to improper uses a further large sum, to-wit, four hundred thousand dollars, which had accrued to and*been received from the sales of a portion of said indorsed bonds, * * and which was never used or applied in any way for the benefit of said corporation, or for the purpose of constructing, equipping, or finishing its said railroad, or for any other purpose authorized by said acts of the legislature." Also that the company, 'with the knowledge and participation of the defendants, during the years 1869 and 1870 wrongfully and illegally sold and disposed of" eight hundred and twelve thousand dollars of the indorsed bonds, and seven hundred and seventy-one thousand dollars of the state bonds, at less than 90 cents on the dollar; and that five hundred and eighty thousand dollars of the indorsed 66 * * * * |