for the annual levy of an amount sufficient to provide a sinking fund, although the series might so mature as practically to preclude any accumulation of a technical fund and to require the principal to be expended in the retirement of the maturing bonds as fast as it is levied. * of taxes * The phrase "annual levy sufficient to provide * * a sinking fund" is interpreted as requiring that the burden of taxation on account of a debt incurred at a given time shall be evenly distributed during the life of the indebtedness, considered as a unit; and not as requiring the accumulation of a "sinking fund" in the strict and technical sense. A. G. R. 1914, page 1224.

The constitutional amendments effective January 1, 1913, do not affect the validity of city ordinance authorizing bond issue, passed June 17, 1912. Provisions of Section 11, Article 12, constitution (1912) for interest and redemption are mandatory on subsequent taxing officials during term of bonds. Interests and sinking fund charges must be determined by the taxing officials at the time the levy is made: Link v. Karb, Mayor, 89 O. S. 326.

ARTICLE XIII.

CORPORATIONS.

Corporate property subject to taxation.

SEC. 4. The property of corporations, now existing or hereafter created, shall forever be subject to taxation, the same as the property of individuals.

There was no absolute necessity for this section, for without it § 2, Art. XII, would have embraced existing and future corporations. This section, however, was inserted out of abundant caution, that there might be no doubt either as to existing or future corporations, what would be the rule of taxation: Treasurer v. Bank, 47 O. S. 503; see, also, Bank v. Hines, 3 O. S. 1. A corporate franchise, being a mere privilege or grant of authority by the government, is not property of any description, and consequently not subject to taxation: Bank v. Hines, 3 O. S. 1; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11.0. S. 534.

The limitations in § 3, of Art. XII, and this section, of the constitution prohibit double taxation of the property of banks, bankers and corporations: Trust Co. v. Lander, 62 O. S. 266 affirming Trust Co. v. Lander, 19 O. C. C. 271, 10 O. C. D. 452]; Creech v. Railway, 2 O. N. P. 164, 3 O. D. (N.P.) 265; Hynicka v. Insurance Co., 4 O. N. P. (N.S.) 297, 17 0. D. (N.P.) 80 [affirmed in Insurance Co. v. Hynicka, 5 0. N. P. (N.S.) 255, 18 0. D. (N.P.) 1].

The limitation in this section of the constitution, which prohibits double taxation of the property of corporations, applies only to taxation on property, and not to taxation of privileges or franchises. What is said in Trust Co. v. Lander, 62 O. S. 266, as to that limitation, is solely as to property taxation. That section of the constitution plainly shows that it applies to property taxation only, and has no reference to excise or franchise taxes: Gum Co. v. Laylin, 66 O. S. 578.

Cited and referred to: Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U. S. (18 How.) 331; Sanford v. Poe, 69 Fed. 546, 16 C. C. A. 305, 9 O. F. D. 50; Telegraph Co v. Poe, 69 Fed. 557, 16 C. C. A. 683, 9 O. F. D. 63; Bank v. Miller, 19 Fed. 372, 5 0. F. D. 247.

Organization of cities, etc.

SEC. 6. The general assembly shall provide for the organization of cities, and incorporated villages, by general laws, and restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, so as to prevent the abuse of such power.

The power vested in the general assembly under this section, to restrict the powers of taxation and assessment by municipal corporations, is subject to the limitations imposed by § 10, Art. I, of the constitution of the United States, which declares, that "no state shall pass any law impairing the obligations of contracts," and of § 28, Art. II, of the state constitution: Goodale v. Fennell, 27 O. S. 426.

The authority and duty to prevent an abuse of the powers of taxation and assessment by municipal corporations is intrusted by this section of the constitution to the general assembly, and not to the courts of the state. And the power of the legislature to authorize local taxation can not be judicially denied on the ground that the purpose for which it is exercised is not local, unless the absence of all special local interest is clearly apparent : Walker v. Cincinnati,

21 O. S. 14.

The power of levying local assessments is well settled in Ohio: Cleveland v. Wick, 18 O. S. 303. The constitution so limits the power of assessments as to prevent its abuse: Cincinnati v. Oliver, 31 O. S. 371. The general assembly is empowered by this section to restrict the use of assessments by cities and villages, so as to prevent the abuse of the power: Alder v. Whitbeck, O. S. 539. The power to authorize assessments for the construction of free turnpike roads, and the opening of drains, as well as for the improvement of streets and sidewalks, exists to the same extent under the present constitution as under that of 1802: Reeves v. Treasurer, 8 O. S. 333. The assessment, whether by the front foot or upon the value assessed for taxation, must be uniform, operating alike upon all the lots or lands abutting upon the improvement, and the fact that one or more of the tracts may not have been benefited by the improvement, will not render such assessment invalid: Railroad v. Connelly, 10 O. S. 159.

Assessments made on the principle of special benefits, without reference to frontage, are not unconstitutional: Chamberlain v. Cleveland, 34 O. S. 551.

The power to authorize assessments as distinguished from taxes proper, is comprehended in the general grant of legislative power to the general assembly. Reeves v. Treasurer, 8 O. S. 333; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 O. S. 534.

SEC. 1. The word “oath" includes affirmation. When an oath is required or authorized by law, an affirmation in lieu thereof may be taken by a person having conscientious scruples to taking an oath. An affirmation has the same force and effect as an oath. (R. S. Sec. 1.) Statutory authority necessary to administer oath: Lessee of Harmon v. Stockwell, 9 O. 93. Courts have inherent power to administer oaths: State v. Towney, 67 O. S. 21. If the statute prescribes the form of the oath, an oath in compliance with such statutory form is sufficient: Lessee of Winder v. Starling, 7 O. (2nd. pt.) 190.

If oath required such fact must appear of record: Skinner v. Brown, 17 O. S. 33. Return of tax collector, required by law to be under oath is insufficient if it does not on its face purport to be made under oath: Skinner v. Brown, 17 O. S. 33.

Such oath will be presumed, by force of statute, if necessary to validity of tax deed: Lessee of Winder v. Starling, 7 O. (2nd. pt.) 190.

Signature of affiant not necessary if officer certifies to fact of making oath: Gambrinus Stock Co. v. Weber, 41 O. S. 689.

Signature of officer to certificate that oath was taken is essential: 58 O. S. 527.

Interpretation of certain words.

Benedict v. Peters,

SEC. 27. In the interpretation of parts first and second, unless the context shows that another sense was intended, the word "bond" includes an "undertaking", and the word "undertaking" includes a "bond"; "and" may be read "or", and "or" read "and", if the sense requires it; words of the present include a future tense, in the masculine, include the feminine and neuter genders, and in the plural include the singular and in the singular include the plural number; but this enumeration shall not be construed to require a strict construction of other words in such parts, or in this code. (R. S. Sec. 23.)

Meaning of word "person."

SEC. 5320. The word "person" as used in this title, includes firms, companies, associations and corporations; words in the singular number include the plural number, and words in the plural number include the singular number; and words in the masculine gender include the feminine and neuter genders. (R. S. Sec. 2730.)

Cited on the proposition that "person" includes corporations:

59 O. S. 248.

"Personal tax."

Insurance Co. v. Hard,

SEC. 5321. The terms "personal tax" and "tax on personal property" as so used, include all taxes, excepting only the tax upon real estate specifically as such. (R. S. Sec. 2860.)

SEC. 5322. The terms "real property" and "land" as so used, include not only land itself, whether laid out in town lots or otherwise, withall things contained therein but also, unless otherwise specified, all buildings, structures, improvements, and fixtures of whatever kind thereon, and all rights and privilege belonging, or appertaining thereto. (R. S. Sec. 2730.)

Cited:

Lewis v. State, 69 O. S. 473; First National Bank v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205, 12 O. F. D. 446; Telegraph Co. v. Poe, 61 Fed. 449, 8 O. F. D. 158. An estate for years in real property which is renewable forever and is granted for a gross

sum, is real property within the meaning of the statutes upon the subject of taxation: Cincinnati College v. Yeatman, 30 O. S. 276.

If a perpetual lease has been granted, and the lessee has made improvements upon the land by reason whereof the taxes are increased, the lessee must pay such increased taxes, although there is no covenant in the lease whereby the lessee is bound to pay the taxes generally: Joslyn v. Spellman, 9 Dec. Rec. 258, 12 Bull. 7.

The term "land" Includes whatever interest a lot owner may have from the curb line to the center of the street: Railway v. Pouchot, 4 O. C. C. 187, 2 O. C. D. 492.

If the fee in the soil is in one person and the right to the minerals thereof in another, such rights must be taxed separately: Jones v. Wood, 1 O. N. P. 155, 2 O. D. (N.P.) 75. For the separate taxation of mineral rights in lands, see G. C. §§ 5560, 5562 and 5563.

"Investment in bonds."

SEC. 5323. The term "investment in bonds" as so used, includes all moneys in bonds, certificates of indebtedness, or other evidences of indebtedness of whatever kind, whether issued by incorporated or unincorporated companies, towns, cities, villages, townships, counties, states, or other incorporations, or by the United States, held by persons residing in this state, whether for themselves or others. (R. S. Sec. 2730.)

Cited: Bank v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205, 12 O. F. D. 446; Telegraph Co. v. Poe, 61 Fed. 449, 8 O. F. D. 158.

The owner of bonds is not entitled to deduct his debts therefrom and to return only the excess for taxation; the term investment in bonds, as used in this section, being regarded as excluding bonds from the term "credits" as used in G. C. § 5327; Payne v. Waterson, 37 O. S. 121. Bonds which are in possession of a resident executor are subject to taxation. Tafel v. Lewis, 75 O. S. 182.

"Investment in stocks."

SEC. 5324. The term "investment in stocks" as so used, includes all moneys invested in the capital or stock of a bank whether incorporated under the laws of this state or the United States, or an association, corporation, joint stock company, or other company, the capital or stock of which is or may be divided into shares, which are transferable by each owner without the consent of the other partners or stockholders, for the taxation of which no special provision is made by law, held by persons residing within this state, either for themselves or others. (R. S. Sec. 2730.)

Cited: Bank v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205, 12 O. F. D. 446; Telegraph Co. v. Poe, 61 Fed 449, 8 O. F. D. 158. Shares in a national bank are included in the term "investment in stocks" under this section, and not within the term "credits" as used in G. C. § 5327; and hence the owner thereof cannot deduct debts owing by him from the amount of such stock and return only the excess: Niles v. Shaw, 50 O. S. 370.

Shares of stock which have been pledged as collateral with power of attorney authorizing the transfer thereof to the lender, if the loan is not paid, are taxable in the name of the former owner who has pledged the same: Ratterman v. Ingalls, 48 O. S. 468.

"Personal property."

SEC. 5325. The term "personal property" as so used, includes first, every tangible thing being the subject of ownership, whether animate or inanimate, other than money, and not forming part of a parcel of real property, as hereinbefore defined; second, the capital stock undivided profits, and all other means not forming part of the capital stock of every company, whether incorporated or unincorporated, and every share, portion, or interest in such stocks, profits, or means, by whatsoever name designated, inclusive of every share or portion, right, or interest either legal or equitable, in and to every ship, vessel, or boat, of whatsoever name or description, used or designed to be used either exclusively or partially in navigating any of the waters within or bordering on this state, whether such ship, vessel. or boat is within the jurisdiction of this state or elsewhere, and whether it has been enrolled, registered, or licensed at a collector's office, or within a collection district in this state, or not; third, money loaned on pledge or mortgage of real estate, although a deed or other instrument may have been given for it, if between the parties thereto it is considered as security merely. (R. S. Sec. 2730.)

Cited: Bank v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205, 12 O. F. D. 446; Telegraph Co. v. Poe, 61 Fed. 449, 8 O. F. D. 158. Municipal bonds which are deposited in this state by a foreign insurance company, under the statutes regulating the right of foreign insurance companies to do business in this state, are taxable as personal property: Insurance Co. v. Bowland, 196 U. S. 611, 14 0.

F. D. 543.

The term "personal property" does not include contracts or the good will of a business; Express Co. v. Poe, 61 Fed. 470, 8 O. F. D. 184.

To entitle the auditor to construe as a mortgage a deed absolute with perpetual lease back containing a privilege of purchase at any time after a given date, the relation of debtor and creditor must be shown to have existed or been created between the parties at the time of the transaction, so that the land was considered by them as security merely, not for the rent alone, but to secure the return of the purchase money: Kraay v. Gibson, 2 O. N. P. (N.S.) 537, 15 O. D. (N. P.) 323.

Such a transaction will not be construed to be a mortgage and taxable as such unless it was predicated upon a loan with the obligation upon the borrower to repay it: Kraay v. Gibson, 2 O. N. P. (N. S.) 537, 15 0. D. (N, P.) 323.

For discussion of question whether a transaction is a sale with option of repurchase or a loan see A. G. R. 1912, p. 636.

"Money" or "moneys."

SEC. 5326. The term "money" or "moneys," as so used, includes any surplus or undivided profits held by societies for savings or banks having no capital stock, gold and silver coin, bank notes of solvent banks, in actual possession, and every deposit which the person owning, holding in trust, or having the beneficial interest therein, is entitled to withdraw in money on demand. (R. S. Sec. 2730.)

Cited: Bank v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205, 12 O. F. D. 446; Telegraph Co. v. Poe, 61 Fed. 470, 8 O. F. D. 158.

Whatever amounts to money when owned by an individual is to be treated as money when owned by a bank: Patton v. Bank, 7 O. N. P. 401, 10 O. D. (N. P.) 321.

Money as defined in G. C. Sec. 5326, when on deposit and subject to legal demand is taxable, whether held by one in his own right or in a representative capacity, and outstanding checks which have not been certified can not be deducted from the balance in the bank in determining the amount to be returned for taxation. Insurance Co. v. Hynicka, 5 O. N. F. (N. S.) 255, 18 O. D. (N. P.) 1. Affirmed without opinion, 78 O. St. 432.

Deposits in savings banks must be listed for taxation by the owners thereof: Collett v. Savings Society, 13 0. C. C. 131; 7 O. C. D. 146. Affirmed without opinion, 56 O. St. 776.

Debts cannot be deducted from money in bank subject to be checked out, although the liabilities of the owner are largely in excess of his deposit in bank: Stewart v. Duerr, 20 O. C. C. 505; 11 O. C. D. 311.

When a savings bank has a rule as follows: "Depositors may be required to give sixty days' notice before withdrawing their deposits, but as a general rule they will be permitted to withdraw at pleasure;" held that evidence of long usage and custom established that such rule is intended as a reservation of a right to pass a rule suspending payment for sixty days, rather than as a rule itself, and that as a matter of fact such deposits are and always have been "withdrawable on demand," will justify the listing of such deposits by a person owning the same, or holding them in trust, or having a beneficial interest in them as moneys under section 5326, General Code, A. G. R. 1912, p. 605.

"Credits."

SEC. 5327. The term "credits" as so used, means the excess of the sum of all legal claims and demands, whether for money or other valuable thing, or for labor or service due or to become due to the person liable to pay taxes thereon, including deposits in banks or with persons in or out of the state, other than such as are held to be money, as hereinbefore defined, when added together, estimating every such claim or demand at its true value in money, over and above the sum of legal bona fide debts owing by such person. In making up the sum of such debts owing, there shall not be taken into account an obligation to a mutual insurance company, nor an unpaid subscription to the capital stock of a joint stock company, nor a subscription for a religious, scientific, literary, or charitable purpose; nor an acknowledgment of indebtedness, unless founded on some consideration actually received, and believed at the time of making such acknowledgment to be a full consideration therefor; nor an acknowledgment made for the purpose of diminishing the amount of credits to be listed for taxation; nor a greater amount or portion of a liability as surety, than the person required to make the statement of such credits believes that such surety is in equity bound, and will be compelled to pay, or to contribute, in case there are no securities. Pensions receivable from the United States shall not be held to be credits; and no person shall be required to take into account in making up the amount of credits, a greater portion of any credits than he believes will be received or can be collected, or a greater portion of an obligation given to secure the payment of rent than the amount that has accrued on any lease and remains unpaid. (R. S. Sec. 2730.)

Cited:

Bank v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205, 12 O. F. D. 446 Telegraph Co. v. Poe, 61 Fed. 449, 8 O. F. D. 158; Brinkerhoff v. Brumfield, 94 Fed. 422, 10 O. F. D. 88; Bank v. Hubbard, 105 Fed. 809, 45 C. C. A. 66, 13 0. F. D. 508.

The term "credits" means the balance after deducting debts from the gross amount of choses in action: Treasurer v. Bank, 47 O. S. 503.

If land has been sold, the amount due as purchase money is taxable as a credit, although the vendor still retains the legal title: Rheinboldt v. Raine, 52 O. S. 160 [affirming Rheinboldt v. Raine, 6 O. C. C. 544, 3 O. C. D. 5771.

A foreign corporation which does business in Ohio may, in listing its credits, deduct from the debts due to it in Ohio such of its bona fide debts as arise from the same source: Hubbard v. Brush, 61 O. S. 252.

The owner of bonds is not entitled to deduct his debts from his investment in bonds and to return only the excess for taxation: Payne v. Watterson, 37 O. S. 121.

Money which is loaned on mortgage security is a credit, and if the lender is a resident of another state such credit is not subject to taxation in Ohio: Meyers v. Seaberger, 45 O. S. 232.

V.

Outstanding checks cannot be deducted from deposits in banks: Insurance Co. Hynicka, 5 O. Ñ. P. (N.S.) 255, 18 O. D. (N.P.) 1 [affirming Hynicka v. Insurance Co., 4 0. N. P. (N. S.) 297, 17 0. D. (N. P.) 801.. Affirmed without opinion, 78 O. S. 432.] A judgment is a credit and must be listed for taxation at its actual value, although proceedings in error are pending to reverse it: Cameron v. Cappeller, 41 O. S. 533.

A judgment should be listed at its true value in money and not at its nominal value: Sherard v. Lindsay, 13 O. C. C. 315, 7 O. C. D. 245.

In the administration of our tax laws the holder of national bank shares has no right under the statutes, state and national, to deduct his legal bona fide debts from the value of

such shares, but he is legally bound to pay tax upon the assessed value of such shares without deduction on account of such debts: Chapman v. Bank, 56 O. S. 310; affirmed in Bank v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205, 12 O. F. D. 446 [overruling Whitbeck v. Bank, 127 U. S. 193, 6 O. F. D. 63]; see, to the same effect, Lander v. Bank, 186 U. S. 458, 14 O. F. D. 497 [reversing Bank v. Lander, 109 Fed. 21, and affirming Bank v. Hubbard, 98 Fed. 465].

A credit is defined in short to be what is owing to a person, over and above his legal bona fide debts, but in making up what is owing to him he cannot include moneys, stocks, nor deposits subject to withdrawal on demand: Chapman v. Bank, 56 O. St. 320. The definition of credits contained in the statute, applies equally to all persons and corporations, foreign or domestic. So that when a duty is enjoined upon either to list for taxation its "credits", the term "credit" implies the balance remaining after all bona fide debts are deducted from its legal claims and demands: Hubbard v. Brush, 61 O. St. 265.

A taxpayer cannot deduct as legal bona fide debts an obligation to a mutual insurance company, nor an unpaid subscription to the capital stock of a joint stock company, nor to any religious, scientific, literary, or charitable purpose, nor any acknowledgment made for the purpose of diminishing the amount of credits to be listed for taxation, nor any greater amount as surety than he is likely to be compelled to pay, nor any indebtedness created in the purchase of non-taxable securities: Chapman v. Bank, 56 O. St. 321.

The interest of the beneficiary under an insurance policy after the death of the insured and under an option to leave the proceeds of the policy with the company during the life of the beneficiary, and to withdraw the whole or any part thereof at any time or at specified periods, the principal sum to bear interest at a stipulated rate or at not less than a stipulated rate, and the balance, if any, remaining at the death of the beneficiary to be paid to his personal representatives, constitutes a credit and is taxable as such to the beneficiary. A. G. R. 1915, p. 202.

Inasmuch as a tax operates in invitum and is not an obligation created by the voluntary act of the obligor, arising out of contract by him entered into, it may be considered a debt so as to be deducible from credits, under section 5327, General Code. A. G. R. 1913, p. 1235.

Debts of insurance companies.

SEC. 9357. This section defines the reserve of life insurance companies organized under the laws of Ohio as "being the amount of debts of life insurance companies by reason of their outstanding policies in gross," and provides that such reserves "may be so treated in the returns for taxation made" by such companies.

Credits of building and loan companies.

SEC. 9675. This section provides that shares of stock in building and loan associations, "upon which no loans have been made or money advanced by the company shall be considered and held as credits."