grows dim when compared with his philanthropic virtues, and it is but justice that these should receive their proper acknowledgment. A man in his station must of necessity bestow much labor on matters of no permanent value, and laws that but mark the transition state to correct action; therefore, the proper estimation to be put upon them, is to be sought in the spirit and aim of their endeavors. Burke, so estimated, presents a noble example of the statesman; he deserves to be classed with Clarkson and Wilberforce, although he was immeasurably in advance of them in intellect, and broader in the sphere of labors. The memory of such men deserves to be cherished, for we live in an age that needs such examples-the example of genius consecrated to the service of humanity in the political arena.

ART. VII.-THE LOGOS OF PHILO JUDÆUS AND THAT OF ST. JOHN.

BY PROFESSOR JOHN A. REUBELT. AFTER THE GERMAN OF DR. DORNER AND OTHERS.

Ir sometimes happens that men of opposite views treat on some particular subject for the purpose of making, not the same, but a diametrically opposite use of it. This is eminently the case with Men whose religious views

the λóyos of Philo and that of St. John. are entirely opposed to each other, agree that the 2óyos of Philo is, if not in every particular, yet in the main features, that of St. John, but for the most opposite ends; the one party, taking it for granted that the Bible is true, have seen in this remarkable coincidence of many expressions used by Philo and the writers of the New Testament, and especially St. John, an additional proof of the truth of the Bible. This party is ably represented by Dr. Adam Clarke, the commentator, who is of opinion that Philo must either have seen the writings of St. John, or if not, he claims for him, at all events, a kind of secondary inspiration. "These testimonies are truly astonishing; and if we allow, as some contend, that Philo was not acquainted either with the disciples of our Lord or the writings of the New Testament, we shall be obliged to grant that there must have been some measure of Divine inspiration in that man's mind who could, in such a variety of cases, write so many words and sentences so exactly corresponding to those of the evangelists and apostles."*

Notes at the close of the first chapter of John.

The other party, the so-called school of Tübingen, headed by Dr. Baur and others, takes it for granted that Philo's λóyos and that of John are identical; but, according to them, John was a Gnostic, who copied Philo. According to this "school," Christianity has little, if anything, to do with the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus himself, and, of course, all his apostles and disciples, were, at best, Ebionites. Paul of Tarsus differed from them only with respect to the validity of the law; and Christianity proper took its origin toward the middle of the second century, out of the logology of Philo and the Hellenists, which had been adopted and developed by the Gnostics. It is in the interest of this school to deny that Christianity has any organic life of its own. Professor Gfröner (das Jahrhunders des Heils, Stuttgart, 1838, part II, page 431) says: "To every doctrine, yea, to almost every sentence of the New Testament, a parallel passage can be found in the Talmud, the Sohar, the Midrashim." Neither the logology nor the incarnation is allowed by this school to be peculiar to Christianity; but both of them were borrowed for it from older religious or philosophic systems. For this reason it may be an interesting, even a necessary task, to examine this subject more closely; and it is probable that even good Dr. Clarke, had he been acquainted with the use that has been made of views that were advanced by him, would have investigated the matter more thoroughly before passing a final judgment. It is true that in the "list of particular terms and doctrines found in Philo, with parallel passages from the New Testament," (and this list might have been considerably increased,) some terms seem to be identical, and, therefore, very apt to mislead. Some of these terms are: vioç Oɛov, son of God; δεύτερος Θεός, second divinity; λόγος πρωτόγονος, firstbegotten of God; εἰκιὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, image of God; ὑπεράνω πάντων τῶν ἀγγέλων, superior to all angels; ὑπεράνω παντός, superior to all; ὁ θεῶς λόγος ταῦτα τὸν κόσμον δε εσκομησεν, the Divine word has made all things-the world; Tερ kaç Tov Θεου, the vicar of God; φῶς κόσμου, light of the world, ήλιος νοητός, ideal sun; μόνῳ ἔξεστε τὸν Θεὸν καθορᾷν, he alone can see God, etc. Now it is unquestionably true, that if these terms, or only some of them, had been taken by Philo in the same sense in which St. John used them, the view taken by Clarke and others would be established beyond the possibility of even a rational doubt; but this is not the case.

It may become apparent, from a thorough examination of Philo's views, that his God, even, is neither the Christian nor the Jewish God, bearing a stronger resemblance to the "Ov of Plato than to the

Jehovah of Moses; but such an examination would require more time than we can, for the present, bestow upon the subject. It is, however, under these circumstances, highly improbable, to say the least, that the Christian Trinity, which is unknown to the Old Testament, certainly not developed in it, should be found in Philo. The two points which are decisive in this question are: 1. Is the λóyos of Philo a personification, or a real hypostasis? 2. Is Philo's λóyos really divine? Should it appear that he is a mere personification, then even the strongest resemblance between Philo and St. John is of no avail; should he, however, appear as a hypostasis, but not as truly Divine, then, at most, an Arian Christ, but by no means the ouoovolov of Athanasius, which is but a logical and consistent development of the teachings of St. John, could have been deduced from him. The reasons for the personality of Philo's λóyoç are summed up by Lücke, as follows: 1. Philo calls his λóyos ȧpxáyyɛλos, archangel. To this it may be replied, that he calls him also ȧoxɩepɛúç, high priest; Tapákλŋtos, advocate; and yet Lücke himself admits that these appellations prove no more than oppayés, image or seal, and Seouós, bond, equally applied by him to the λóyoç. But supposing that ἀρχάγγελος is taken in the same sense as the ἄγγελοι, even these are so identified with the idéai, dvváμeis, that their personality becomes questionable. Yea, since the λóyos is the unity of these dvváμeç or ayyɛλo, instead of saying, the angels are personal, and, therefore, the logos, one can, with equal right, say, either the logos is personal, then the ayyeλo are not, but are impersonal powers, whose union the logos is; or, the angels are personal, and then the logos is no longer their personal unity.

2. Philo calls the logos deúтepoç vɛós, second divinity, but immediately adds that he says so catachrestically, since a second divinity, strictly speaking, would be for Philo a contradictio in adjecto. It is true, the passage in question refers to something divine that is less perfect than God, and can come into contact with the world, while God cannot. But it is by no means clear that this divine something, which is less perfect than God, is a personality, or only a personification of the revealing nature in God.

3. The logos is the image of God; but God being personal, the logos must be so also. But the body is also the image of the spirit, and a mirror reflects any object. The logos is, indeed, alive; but impersonal powers may be so too. And if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that nature is also personal, because it is the image of the logos.

The second point is the real divinity of the logos of Philo, the question about his personality being settled. Here the question,

already alluded to, arises, whether Philo's conceptions of his God are really divine, or rather physical. If his conceptions are only physical, the incompatibility of his system with Christianity is apparent at once, since, in the kingdom of the categories of nature, neither the differences nor unity can have their full force. If Philo, then, has no correct views of the Deity, his logos can, of course, not be that of John, who is truly Divine. But even the really divine of Philo's system cannot be predicated of his logos; for what is, according to him, the best and innermost, is incommunicable. Yet, after these proleptical remarks, it is high time to resume the proper thread of the subject, in order to treat it more fully and thoroughly.

Philo was a cotemporary of Christ, and while Palestine saw the Redeemer, Philo was the most remarkable representative of the Hellenistic Jews; and his system is the most direct counterpart of Christianity, so much so that many have been deceived by it. An acquaintance with the apostles or their writings, on the part of Philo, is out of the question. In Philo, Judaism, tinctured with Hellenism, makes the bold attempt to accomplish, by force of thought, what the Messianic idea has proposed to itself, but also to supersede, by this attempt, the Messiah. This ideal mixture of Hellenism and Judaism in Philo, accounts both for the fact that Philo has been, by rather superficial observers, mistaken for a Christian, and for his approximating to two opposite stand-points that cannot possibly be reconciled with each other.

The two opposites of his system, which continually flee from and seek each other, are not correctly represented by any effort to deduce the one from the other, in order to save the unity of the whole; yea, Philo himself did not effect this union; but this is his historical importance, that by him the old Hebrew view of the Deity is blended with a pagan view of the world, so that he starts a kind of theogony, and his abstract views of the Deity become, to a certain extent, concrete by the addition of another element, namely, that of emanation. On the other hand, his abstract monotheistical consciousness suppresses again each and every more concrete phenomenon that would emanate from his simple and absolute being.

Philo's monotheism drops what is the highest in the Hebrew monotheism, namely, the ethical energy of Jehovah, which flows from his justice and holiness. From the Hebrew ethics he falls back into Pagan physics, from which it follows that he both has and has not the difference between God and the world; his theogony becomes, at the same time, a cosmogony, and thus he corrupts his idea of God by that of the world, and that of the world again by that of the Deity.

It has been urged by some scholars, that Philo's God is absolutely

simple in his pure absoluteness, and therefore immutable. This divine attribute, it has been contended, makes an intermediate being necessary, namely, the λóyoç of Philo, who, therefore, cannot be God himself, as in this way God would come into contact with the world, but must be rather an hypostasis, although of an inferior nature. It must be admitted that Philo treats in many passages of God, as being exalted above everything. "That there is a God," says Philo, (De monarch, § 3,) "we can learn from the world; for a great city, a work of so great art, can neither have made itself nor have come into existence by chance. But how God is, is impossible to find. It is, indeed, highly praiseworthy to search after the attributes of God, since this very searching has infinite charms; but nothing in the world can teach us how God is. Show thyself unto me,' said Moses. In the whole world I find no one that can tell me what thou art; thou must show thyself to me. I pray thee, yield to the prayers of thy humble friend, for thou alone canst do it. For as light, without being illuminated by something else, reveals itself, thus only thou canst show thyself.""

Since Philo praises thus the desire to know God as noble and divine, one should think that he stands here at the threshold of wisdom, praying for the knowledge of God to be imparted by God himself, by revelation. But what answer does his God return to Moses, his representative of the pious portion of the human race?

indeed, praiseworthy, what thou askest for; but thy prayer becomes no finite being. It would be, indeed, easy for me to grant it, but impossible for thee to receive it. I give to each, that is worthy of grace, what he can bear; but the heavens and the earth cannot comprehend me, how much less a human being!" Thus he denies, unqualifiedly, that God can be known by man. But this is not all; he describes his infinitude after the fashion of the apophatic theology, in such a manner that he is denied, objectively, each and every attribute, as goodness and beauty, and nothing is left to him but undeterminableness. (Τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν ψυχῆς, οἱ δὲ σώματος γεγόνασι φίλου. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς ἑταῖροι νοηταῖς καὶ ἀσωμάτοις φύσεσιν ἐνομιλεῖν δυνάμενοι, οὐδεμίᾳ τῶν γεγονότων ἰδέᾳ παραβάλλουσι τὸ ὄν· ἀλλ' ἐμβιβάσαντες αὐτὸ πάσης ποιότητος—τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶναι μόνον φαντασίαν ἐνεδέξαντο, μὴ μορφώσαντες αὐτόSome men are friends of the mind, others of the body. The friends of the mind, now being able to contemplate on ideal and bodiless natures, ascribe to the Supreme Being (rò "Ov) no similitude with any creature; but, having divested it of every quality or attribute, they have adopted the idea of his merely existing, ascribing to him neither form nor shape, (Quod Deus sit Immutabilis, § ii.) It is the very