Russia will apply herself with more energy than ever to the realization of the aims proclaimed before you on the day when you reassembled, especially to the positive and general collaboration which constitutes the only sure means of arriving at the end which we all have at heart-namely, the crushing of the enemy. The Russian Government repudiates with indignation the mere idea of suspending the struggle and thereby permitting Germany to take advantage of the last chance she will have of subjecting Europe to her hegemony. All the innumerable sacrifices already made would be in vain if a premature peace were concluded with an enemy whose forces have been shaken, but not broken, an enemy who is seeking a breathing space by making deceitful offers of a permanent peace. In this inflexible decision, Russia is in complete agreement with all her valiant Allies. We are all equally convinced of the vital necessity of carrying on the war to a victorious end, and no subterfuge by our enemies will prevent us from following this path.

Resolution of the Russian Duma against acceptance of the German Peace Proposals, December 15, 19161

The Duma having heard the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs is unanimously in favour of a categorical refusal by the Allied Governments to enter under present conditions into any peace negotiations whatever. It considers that the German proposals are nothing more than a fresh proof of the weakness of the enemy, and are a hypocritical act from which the enemy expects no real success, but by which he seeks to throw upon others the responsibility for the war and for what has happened during it, and to exculpate itself before public opinion in Germany.

The Duma considers that a premature peace would not only be a brief period of calm, but would involve the danger of another bloody war and renewed deplorable sacrifices on the part of the people.

It considers that a lasting peace will be possible only after a decisive victory over the military power of the enemy, and after the definite renunciation by Germany of the aspirations which render her responsible for the world war and for the horrors by which it is accompanied.

1The Times, London, December 16, 1916.

Speech of Arthur Henderson, unofficial Member of the British Cabinet, London, December 16, 19161

The British people, with their national love of peace, were anxious that the real meaning of the German proposals should be appreciated. But the Government knew nothing concerning the text of the proposals, and Germany's motives must for the present remain a matter of speculation. But, judging from past and from recent events, we might anticipate, without over-assumption, that any proposals Germany might put forward would not err on the side of magnanimity.

Any proposals put forward must be examined with the greatest possible care. We of all people must not forget that Germany was prepared for peace with this country as late as August, 1914. But on what conditions? That we were prepared to betray France and acquiesce in the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, which Germany, like ourselves, had on oath sworn to maintain. The lesson to be learned from her present desire for peace was that any proposal received must be scrutinized in the light of our obligations to our Allies, to whom we were pledged to make no separate peace. However convenient it might be for Germany to ignore her responsibility in this great war, however far she might ignore her responsibilities to small nationalities, it was loyalty on our part to our brave and loyal comrades that must bind us to the end.

Subject to these considerations, the people of this country were prepared to-day, as in August, 1914, to accept peace, provided that that peace was both just and permanent. But there was one supreme condition-namely, that the principles governing any decision must be those on which we entered, and on which we were continuing, the war. We entered the war in defence of small nationalities, to defend France from wanton aggression, and to preserve our own security. Indemnity for the past was not enough unless we had guarantees for the future; and guarantees for the future were not enough without ample reparation for all that Belgium, France, Serbia and Poland had suffered. The peace into which we entered must contain guarantees for its own duration. Germany might have such a peace if she furnished us with proof of her good intentions.

But, he concluded, if her present overtures are merely a pretence; if it is shown that she is merely arranging an armistice, to enable her to obtain a breathing-space that will furnish her with the opportunity to lay fresh plans of aggression, then I say, whatever may be the temp

1The Times, London, December 16, 1916.

tation to the people of these islands, we must set our faces like the steel you work upon against her proposals.

Extract from the Speech of Baron Sonnino, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Chamber of Deputies, December 18, 19161

The Government knows absolutely nothing regarding the specific conditions of the enemy's peace proposals and regards as an enemy manœuvre the rumours secretly spread about them. We must remember that none of the Allies could in any way take into consideration any condition offered to it separately. The reply of the Allies will be published as soon as it has been agreed upon.

We all desire a lasting peace, but we consider as such an ordered settlement of which the duration does not depend upon the strength of the chains binding one people to another, but on a just equilibrium between States and respect for the principle of nationality, the rights of nations, and reasons of humanity and civilization. While intensifying our efforts to beat the enemy, we do not aim at an international settlement by servitude and predominance implying the annihilation of peoples and nations. If a serious proposal was made on a solid basis for negotiations satisfying the general demands of justice and civilization, no one would oppose an a priori refusal to treat, but many things indicate that that is not the case now. The tone of boasting and insincerity characterizing the preamble to the enemy notes inspires no confidence in the proposals of the Central Empires. The Governments of the Allies must avoid. the creation for their populations by a false mirage of vain negotiations of an enormous deception, followed by cruel disappointment.

1The Times, London, December 19, 1916.

President Wilson's Peace Note, December 18, 19161

The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page2

[TELEGRAM]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, December 18, 1916.

The President directs me to send you the following communication to be presented immediately to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government to which you are accredited:

"The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest to His Majesty's Government a course of action with regard to the present war which he hopes that the British Government will take under consideration as suggested in the most friendly spirit and as coming not only from a friend but also as coming from the representative of a neutral nation whose interests have been most seriously affected by the war and whose concern for its early conclusion arises out of a manifest necessity to determine how best to safeguard those interests if the war is to continue.

"The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It is in fact in no way associated with them in its origin and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances.3

1Official prints of the Department of State.

2Same mutatis mutandis to the American Diplomatic Representatives accredited to all the belligerent Governments and to all neutral Governments for their information.

In the note addressed to the Representatives of the Central Powers, this paragraph reads as follows:

"The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by a desire to play a part in connection with the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It has in fact been in no way suggested by them in its origin and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been independently answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances."

"The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible frankly to compare them. He is indifferent as to the means taken to accomplish this. He would be happy himself to serve or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment in any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. One way will be as acceptable to him as another if only the great object he has in mind be attained.

"He takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful States now at war. Each wishes itself to be made. secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this and against aggression of selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amidst multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world. Before that final step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary first to settle the issues of the present war upon terms which will certainly safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity, and the political and commercial freedom of the nations involved.

"In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to coöperate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command. But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its con