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COMMITTEE ON PATENTS

WILLIAM I. SIROVICH, New York, Chairman FRITZ G. LANHAM, Texas

RANDOLPH PERKINS, New Jersey BRASWELL D. DEEN, Georgia

CLARENCE J. MCLEOD, Michigan THOMAS O'MALLEY, Wisconsin

FRED A. HARTLEY, JR., New Jersey MATTHEW A. DUNN, Pennsylvania

L. C. ARENDS, Illinois CHARLES J. COLDEN, California

RALPH E. CHURCH, Illinois CHARLES KRAMER, California

CHARLES F. RISK, Rhode Island
J. BURRWOOD DALY, Pennsylvania
J. HARDIN PETERSON, Florida
GRAHAM A. BARDEN, North Carolina
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas
FRANK W. BOYKIN, Alabama
WM. B. BARRY, New York

R. T. BUCKLER, Minnesota
THOS. R. AMLIE, Wisconsin
EDWIN FAIRFAX Naulty, Clerk

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POOLING OF PATENTS

INVENTOR CARROLL'S STATEMENT

NEW YORK CITY, HOUSE PATENTS COMMITTEE,

Washington, D. O. DEAR SIRS : If you are investigating patents, here is something should interest you as showing the Navy's policy of utter hostility to intelligence. I worked for them as a draftsman three times. The first time, over 20 years ago and the second time during the war, and res ned. The third time, in 1931, on the new cruisers, I was discharged for pointing out mistakes in planswhich were proven—and kicking at the inefficiency of the office, which held up work while five shipyards were idle, waiting for plans. This office was abandoned and the work of designing cruisers turned back to private concerns. I was offered rentention if I would promise not to write more letters listing mistakes to the Secretary of the Navy, Adams. The Democrats were coming in and I preferred to force the issue.

The cruisers are hamstrung by cutting holes through the sides, below waterline, and admitting sea water into reserve fuel-oil spaces. This cuts speeds, cuts cruising radius and weakens the ships, and adds hundreds of tons weight, utterly useless weight, to ships where aluminum has been used to conserve weight. This was to correct antirolling. I objected to the General Board. I filed a patent-means for stabilizing ships with fuel oil, serial 584,970, January 6, 1932—showing how the oil should and could be used for the same purpose with no added weight or loss of fuel capacity and no structural changes. This has some claims allowed, but I think the Navy is preventing its issuance. The patent lawyer, Townsend, got a one-third assignment on misrepresentation that it did not allow him to sell separately-I found it does and presume he is in cahoots with the Navy. It was used on the Manhattan and Washington, the Navy denying, and Mr. Bardo admitting, it was by their direction.

The above patent is important as evidence of the sabotage by the Navy itself. It is wholly out of my hands, as I cannot revoke power of attorney, since he holds an interest, and have no funds for lawing. But if you want to know what ails your Navy, it is important to you.

I offered the Navy many other important ideas and improvements. After my discharge, I wrote repeatedly, describing a new-type Diesel I had designed and sold the Russian Government in 1930, the features of which are through scavenging and upper exhaust and welded steel construction. Two-cycle. At the time I invented these, no manufacturer in the United States was at all interested in two-cycle. I had to go to Russia to get rid of it, and on my return, offered these features for a few hundred dollars to the Bendix Re. search Co., of East Orange, N. J., a subsidiary of General Motors. The reason I went to them is, I had sold them an aviation patent in 1928 or 1929. They rejected my offers after I divulged most features, but retained the head, as the design was useless without it.

The Navy was building an "experimental” 4-cycle, high-pressure air-injection Diesel at the Brooklyn Yard in 1930–31. To understand what utter stupidity this implies, think that Bermeister & Wain, who had the greatest success with this type and built more of it than all the world together, abandoned it in 1827 for 2-cycle. Krupp has built no four-cycle, except for American yacht owners, for 10 years, etc. And high-pressure air injection has been abandoned for at least 8 years. I could not credit the Navy with willful stupidity all the way up, or expected Roosevelt to change things. So I sent Roosevelt, before he took office, particulars of my engine designs, also to the Navy.

I was astonished in the summer of 1933 to read of the Winton Diesels "greatest and most revolutionary advance in Diesels in a decade”, being built and

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exhibited at Chicago. A Diesel man told me there were two embodying my features under construction by the Winton Co. for the Navy. I protested to Roosevelt and Swanson of the Navy, the Naval Affairs Committee, and President Roosevelt-also to General Motors. No results except dodgingeven to the point of lying. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt denied to Park Trammell that the Navy was interested in the new-type Winstons. The Navy had previously turned me down on the plea that it had no money for "new and untried features." I offered the correct and full design for $2,000.

This is the engine going into the submarines, into the trains built by Public Works Administration funds, like the Zephyr. Through the permission of the Navy and by Navy aid, the Winton subsidiary of General Motors has been allowed to get patents on features that it in turn collected millions for inventing and will collect hundreds of millions for, if allowed to stand, as this is the ony Diesel applicable for airplane, cruiser, and railway work.

I think that Kettering, of General Motors, or who is named as inventor of these features, should be compelled to prove how he developed them, that he did in fact invent them. My letters are on file in the Navy patent office describing these features. “Uniflow scavenging and welded steel construction" applied to two-cycle. I thought, in my naive innocence, that revealing to the President or Navy was equivalent to a patent.

I offer that Kettering and Sloan of General Motors built yachts in 1929 with Winton old-style four-cycle, and I know positively they were not interested in two-cycle at that time, for I tried to sell the ideas before I went to Russia. They would never adapt these ideas without promise of financial support from the Navy. Now, Bessemer and others are going two-cycle and I have not been jaid a cent by anyone. My Russian experience cost me ten thousand.

The Winton engines are defective as they are like a lot of kids and depend on ballyhoo and don't know or care what they are doing. I omitted reveaiing my type head which requires no valves, and they substituted four poppet valves for exhaust in the head. These are impossible to cool and warp and gave trouble even in the administration building at the fair, they have caused the Zephyr to be towed in by a steam engine, and I have repeatedly warned the Navy that they will give trouble in the subs.

The Macon and Akron and Chicago disasters, all under Roosevelt, are only the high spots that become public. There are a thousand minor mishaps that are covered up to the one the public knows of. The Navy is far below any (ther great power in efficiency per ton of ship. It is sure to be knocked over if it has to fight soon. I thought for a long time that this was just stupidity, due to the insularity of our naval men, lack of pressure on them, etc., and never having lost a war, overconfidence. But some things point to deliberateness.

The Navy is hostile to anyone of overaverage intelligence, in their ranks as officers as well as civilian employees. I have known several naval constructors forced to resign and draftsmen forced out. All were the best brains. I never knew the Navy to discharge anyone for stupidity. If you cover them they will cover you.

I know nothing of your committee, and my experiences with the House and Senate Naval Affairs Committees leaves me very skeptical of the power or desire of Congress to influence or reform the Navy. But I think that task will shortly be efficiently performed by outsiders, and I expect that Congress will cease to exist. If so, blame yourselves.

You would learn a lot by putting Mr, Kettering on the stand and asking the president of General Motors Research and the National Research Council to tell, under oath, just how he invented the Diesels he is so fortunate as to sell the Public Works Administration and the Navy. You might also be surprised if you put Admirals Land or Rock on the stand, and asked them a list of questions which I would be delighted to furnish you. I think you might learn about navies from them,

If I wanted an efficient Navy, I would make it a felony to be the head of a bureau under whose authority a major disaster took place. I would make the head primarily responsible, not the immediate commander on the ship or fleet.

But the Navy boys know their stuff. They get by. Go along for years and years, surviving all disasters and retiring on pension and all by keeping pesky fellows with brains out. They know that Congressmen are sans who wilt at "technicalities"—though anyone who can drive a car can understand a battle

Get Kettering and show him one of the two-page spread ads he is running in the Saturday Evening Post and ask him if every single statement in those ads is not a bare lie.

It is a lie that General Motors Research invented uniflow scavenging or welded steel applied to Diesels.

It is a lie that they were the first to build Diesels giving a horsepower for 30 pounds of weight or less. The M. A. N. Diesels in the German pocket battleships, dating back to 1927 are 17 pounds per horsepower. Junkers airplane Diesel is 3-4 pounds per horsepower. The Danish state railways had Bermeister & Wain Diesel locomotives "with through or uniflow scavenging back in 1928", these exhausted through the head, though I improved on it. I admit, and always did admit, it was from them I got the ideas of uniflow scavenging and upper exhaust. My invention is making these practical for ships by doing away with the upper cross head and connecting rods. Krupp had a good Diesel locomotive here in the United States in 1930 and in 1929, I telieve. It was better than Wintons.

Orer radio, in newspapers, and trade papers, and at the fair, Mr. Kettering has broadcasted his "inventions." The theft is of no moment except as an added cost to us in Diesel designs; if it were a good design, if Kettering actually knew what he was about. He knows absolutely nothing about Diesels; the Winton organization does not know what it is doing. The result will be crippled submarines when we need them. But do Admiral Robinson or Mr. Kettering lose sleep over it? Will they lose money over it? Will they go to jail if the subs limp, or get shot if we lose a war? What is going to be done to the chaps who built the Macon? Sincerely,

E. R. CARROLL.

NEW YORK, N. Y., February 15, 1935. Chairman SIROVICH,

House Patents Committee, Washington, D. C. DEAR SIB: I gather from newspaper reports that your committee is in charge of the inquiry concerning the Macon disaster. For this reason I wish to call your attention to the fact that in 1931, Mr. Glenn Wasson Parrish, registered architect, informed me that the present-day design of dirigibles was structurally weak. His prediction of structural weakness was confirmed by the Aloron in 1833, and now by the Macon.

Since 1931, he has sought to inform the Goodyear Zeppelin Corporation of his deductions and calculations. The corporation would not send an engineer to New York to interview Mr. Parrish, nor would they pay expenses for him to come to Akron.

Mr. Parrish has invented a rigid type dirigible in which the present structural weaknesses are eliminated. The story of Mr. Parrish is contained on page 2 of Invention and Finance, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

Mr. Parrish has requested me to inform you that he is willing to go to
Washington to testify before your committee.
Very truly yours,

INVENTION AND FINANCE MAGAZINETTE.
EDWARD GOTTLIEB, Publisher.

DIRIGIBLE PIONEERING AND FALLACIES

(By Glenn Wasson Parrish)

(An article of constructive criticism. Upon request, permission may be obtained

for reprinting) The Shenandoah had been broken in two in mid-air as if struck by a giant hammer. The shriek of the tortured metal girders as they were torn asunder by the merciless savage forces of the maddened elements had echoed in the saddened hearts of millions of patriotic Americans. “It must not be again” was the cry that arose everywhere. The huge bulk of the first American-built lighter-than-air rigid airship lay like a fallen giant upon the Ohio countryside. It was almost 8 years later when the second American-built airship, the famous Akron, pronounced by Admiral Moffet, "the safest airship ever built",

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