the result was disappointing to both of us, and Harvard later had the honor of setting its seal of approval upon him. Having in later years become familiar with his luminous work on the Equity Practice in Alabama, and some of the capital articles which he has contributed to the law journals, I am now convinced that the fault was rather with the teacher than the taught and I find myself wondering to what heights he might not have attained, had I been able to lay my hand upon him a little later in my teaching experience.

For the elementary character of my paper, I can only offer the apology that the teacher can never quite get away from the atmosphere of the lecture room. There is some comfort, however, in the thought that an onlooker may sometimes see aspects of the game overlooked, or recall rules forgotten by the active participants.

Prof. Lile then delivered the Annual Address.

SOME VIEWS ON THE RULE OF STARE DECISIS.

The most characteristic feature of the jurisprudence of the English speaking race is the rule of "Stare decisis"or, stated in broadest terms, that courts follow previous decisions. So long and so deeply has this principle been imbedded in the thought and practice of English and American courts and lawyers, that we of the profession have long since ceased to inquire what was its origin, or what is its true significance, or to question its wisdom.

But while we are convinced of the utility of the rule and are ready to defend it against assaults from whatever source, it is a favorite topic for animadversion by lay critics, and we ourselves must concede that in its practical administration it sometimes produces results well calculated to incur the protest of even its most ardent devotees. It may be well therefore briefly to consider some aspects of the rule and its practical administration.

In selecting this almost threadbare topic for discussion before so notable a body of lawyers as compose this As