the question at once arises, whether persons not ordinarily entitled to vote under the general laws of the State, non-residents, minors, women, and idiots, are thereby authorized to participate in the special election. The authorities are not uniform upon this point. In Louisiana it is held that where the question is submitted to the "tax-payers," only those tax-payers may vote who are entitled to the franchise under the general election laws of the State. In Wisconsin, under a statute providing for the acceptance through a petition of the tax-payers of a municipality of the proposition of a railroad company for a subscription to its stock, the persons resident in the municipality on the day when the petition may first be presented, and whose property was assessed for taxation on the last assessment roll, except idiots, insane persons and minors, are entitled to sign the petition.* In New York it has been held in an early case, that when a majority of tax-payers is required, non-resident tax-payers are to be counted in estimating the number requisite to constitute the majority. And in that State, if a petition signed by a majority of the "tax-payers" be required, there must be a majority exclusive of those taxed only for dogs and highway tax.

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1 People v. Cline, 63 Ill. 594.

2 Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S. 683, 693, 694.

3 McKenzie v. Wooley (1887), 39 La. An. 944.

4 State v. Blackstone, 63 Wis. 362.

5 People v. Oliver, 1 Thomp. & C. 570.

6 Town of Mentz v. Cook (1888), 108 N. Y. 504; Wilson v. Caneadea, 15 Hun, 218; Angel v. Hume, 17 Hun, 374.

§ 209. The same subject continued -Partners, trustees and agents as

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tax-payers."—Joint ten

ants, partners, and persons holding property in common, are each entitled to vote and to be counted separately. It is not requisite that the signers of a petition should be the beneficial owners of the property upon which they pay taxes; but a mere agent is not entitled to be a petitioner. The last assessment roll made before the election is to be used in determining what persons are the taxpayers of the municipality; but an assessment roll made before the assessors have taken the oath of office cannot be used in determining the vote on the question of subscription.5

1 People v. Franklin, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 129; People v. Huggbitt, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 89.

2 People v. Hulbert, 59 Barb. 446.

3 People v. Smith, 45 N. Y. 772. Cf. People v. Peck, 62 Barb. 545.

4 People v. Hulbert, 59 Barb. 446.

5 People v. Suffern, 68 N. Y. 321.

§ 210. Whether a voter may withdraw his consent.-A tax-payer who has given his consent to a subscription to a railway may by a writing duly signed and executed revoke his consent at any time before action has been taken thereupon; 1 although there can be no revocation after steps have been taken towards making the subscription and issuing the bonds. If there be not a majority exclusive of those who have revoked their consent, there is no legal authority for the subscription nor the issue of bonds in payment thereof, and bonds so issued be canceled in any may action brought for that purpose. Where a county judge, upon a petition of a majority of the tax-payers of a town, granted an order for the issue of bonds, appointing commissioners to execute the order, and subsequently re

fused to allow certain of the petitioners to cancel their signatures, by which the number of signers would have been reduced to less than a majority; and pending an appeal in certiorari proceedings, to which the commissioners had not been made parties, they proceeded to issue the bonds, it was held that the action of the judge, in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the signatures, not having been sustained by the court of appeals, did not prevent recovery upon the bonds in an action against the town by a bona-fide holder.1

1 Springport v. Teutonia Savings Bank, 84 N. Y. 403; People v. Wagner, 1 Thomp. & C. 221; People v. Devoe, 1 Thomp. & C. 142.

2 First National Bank v. Dorset, 16 Blatchf. 62; People v. Hatch, 1 Tho.np. & C. 113; Noble v. Vincennes, 42 Ind. 125.

3 Seringport v. Teutonic Savings Bank, 84 N. Y. 403. As to the right of a voter or the signer of a petition to revoke his consent, see, further, Monadnock R. R. Co. v. Peterboro, 45 N. H. 281; Hannibal v. Fountleroy, 105 U. S. 408.

4 Orleans v. Platt, 99 U. S. 676. As to constructive notice from lis pendens, see Warren County v. Marcy, 96 U. S. 96.

§ 211. What constitutes "a majority." "_Provisions in statutes authorizing municipal subscriptions upon the assent of a majority or of a certain proportion of the legal voters of a place, are usually c nstrued to refer to such proportion of the voters as actually exercise the franchise on that occasion, and not to require a majority of the total number of qualified voters in the municipality; those failing to vote against the subscription being presumed to approve of it. In North Carolina, however, a statute submitting the question of railway aid to a majority of the qualified voters, is construed to require a majority of all the registered qualified voters in the municipality, and not merely a majority of the votes actually cast. And in Illinois a statute

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requiring a majority of the qualified voters, "taking as a standard the number of votes thrown at the last general election previous to the vote had upon the question of subscription under this act, for county officers, is held to require a majority equal to a majority of the total number of votes at the previous election referred to."

1 Mobile Savings Bank v. Oktibbeha County, 22 Fed. Rep. 580, upon the authority of Carroll County v. Smith, 11 U. S. 556, overruling Hawkins v. Carroll County, 50 Miss. 735; County of Cass v. Johnson, 95 U. S. 360; County of Cass v. Jordan, 95 U. S. 373; St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644; Milner v. Pensacola, 2 Woods, 632; Springport v. Teutonia Savings Bank, 84 N. Y. 403; Cagwin v. Hancock, 84 N. Y. 532; Webb v. La Fayette County, 67 Mo. 353; Woodson v. Brassfield, 67 Mo. 331; Reiger v Beaufort, 70 N. C. 319; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 8 Heisk. 663; Hawkins v. Carroll County, 50 Miss. 735; People v. Hoop, 67 Ill. 63; People v. Chapman, 66 Ill. 137; Harrington v. Plainfield, 37 Minn. 224. Contra, Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U. S. 596, overruled by County of Cass v. Johnson, 95 U. S. 360, 370; Miller and Bradley J. J., however, dissenting, q. v.

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2 McDowell v. Rutherford R'y Construction Co. (1887) 96 N. C. 514. 3 Onstott v. People (1883), 123 Ill. 489, construing Ill. Pub. Laws, 1849-51, p. 28.

§ 212. Of bribery and fraudulent misrepresentations to influence the election.-Where the question of extending municipal aid to a railway is submitted to the popular vote, the result of the election may be vitiated by the introduction of evidence showing that illegal means have been employed to influence the voters in the exercise of their discretion. Thus where it appeared that a meinber of a town committee had been employed by the railway seeking the aid of the municipality, to procure votes in its favor, and that he had done so by offering to buy the tax certificates to be issued when the aid-tax should have been paid, it was held to render the election null.' But false representations to voters, inducing them to vote to extend municipal aid to a railway, does not render the election illegal.'

1 Chicago etc. R'y Co. v. Shea, 67 Iowa, 728.

2 State v. Lake City, 25 Minn, 404; Plattville v. Galena etc. R. R. Co. 43 Wis. 493; Cedar Rapids etc. R. R. Co. v. Boone County, 34 Iowa, 45.

(C). Change in Status of Municipality or Railway.

§ 213. Division of municipality— Repeal and grant of new charter.-When there has been a division of the municipality after a subscription has been made and one of the divisions chartered as new corporated, or annexed to another already existing, each division remains liable for its proportion of the subscription;' according to the valuation of the property of the undivided municipality at the time the vote to subscribe was taken. It has been held in Minnesota that where a new. municipality has been erected by the legislature out of the territory of a town, without making any provision for the payment of its proportional part of the existing liabilities, the original town remains liable for the whole indebtedness, provided its ability to pay, although largely diminished, is not thereby destroyed. But it is submitted to the learned reader that this decision is of doubtful authority. Where a portion of one municipality has been cut off and consolidated with another, the original municipality may proceed by mandamus against the clerk of the new consolidated municipality to compel him to set apart from the taxes raised from the property of the detached territory the amount necessary to pay its share of the indebtedness. A change in the charter of a municipal corporation by amendment, or the substitution of a new charter repealing the old and creating a new corporation under a new name, with different

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