234 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

The act interferes with and places a burden upon interstate commerce. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218, 223; Atl. Coast Line v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 334; Bowman v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 125 U. S. 465; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 209; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485; Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259; Un. Pac. Ry. v. Chic., R. I. & Pac. Ry., 163 U. S. 564; Rev. Stat., § 5258; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1.

Congress by its legislation has preëmpted and occupied the field of regulation of the same subject-matter, to the exclusion of state legislation. See acts of March 2, 1893, known as the Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531; March 2, 1903, amending Safety Appliance Act, 32 Stat. 943; May 27, 1908, authorizing investigations for safety of railway operation, 35 Stat. 324, c. 200; April 14, 1910, supplemental of the Safety Appliance Act, 36 Stat. 298, c. 160; May 6, 1910, reports of accidents, 36 Stat. 350, c. 208; May 30, 1908, as to ash pans, 35 Stat. 476; February 17, 1911, see also the statutes relating to boilers and appurtenances, and to the hours of service. See also the Employers' Liability Act, and the act of March 4, 1911, as to investigations, 36 Stat. c. 285, § 1, p. 1397, and the Act to Regulate Commerce, §1; Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Block Signal Board's Final Report to Int. Com. Comm., June 29, 1912, pp. 14–15; Chic., B. & Q. R'y v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513; Chic., St. P., M. & O. Ry. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 519; Chic., R. I. & Pac. R'y v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 426; Chic., R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453, 466; Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 55; Interstate Commerce Commission's Rules, promulgated March 13, 1911; Twentyfourth Ann. Rep. to Congress, December 21, 1910, pp. 44-47, and pp. 173-189; Johnson v. So. Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1; Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

234 U. S.

59; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 632; N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Hudson County, 227 U. S. 248; Nor. Pac. R'y v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370; Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20; Southern R'y Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424; Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid & Beam, 222 U. S. 444; B. & O. R. Co. v. Indiana Railroad Commission, 196 Fed. Rep. 690, 699.

The brief contains a summary of the Headlight Laws in sixteen States.

Mr. Thomas S. Felder, Attorney General of the State of Georgia, for defendant in error:

Statutes of States of the character of the one under consideration, being designed for the protection of the property and lives of the people, are not unconstitutional because they may in a manner affect interstate commerce, nor do they violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution because an expense may be incurred in obeying their regulations. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 622; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co. v. Briston, 151 U. S. 567; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501; Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524; Chic., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251; Chic., M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133; Mo. Pacific Ry. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512; N. C. & St. L. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96.

The act does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it excepts from its operations tram, mill, and lumber roads. This would seem to be a wise and reasonable classification. Chic., R. I. & Pac. R. Co. v. Kansas, 219 U. S. 453; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, supra; People v. New York &c., 56 Hun,

234 U. S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

409; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. State, 121 S. W. Rep. 930 (Ark.); Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Railroad Com'rs, 90 N. E. Rep. 1011.

The contention that the act exempts from its operations railroads operated by receivers is not tenable. The act does not by its terms exempt receivers of railroads. A court would order its officer to comply with the terms of the statute and equip the locomotives with the headlights required.

The statute does not interfere with the right of the railroad company to contract. New York & New England R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 567; McGehee on Due Process of Law, 345.

It is not a taking of property without due process of law, in contemplation of this provision of the Constitution, because the railroad, in order to comply with the statute, would have to discard the headlights used by it, which it considers are good headlights, and to replace the same with the headlights required under the act. All property is held subject to the police regulations of the State. Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628; Bacon v. B. & M. R. Co., 76 Atl. Rep. 128 (Vt.); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512.

The legislature may prescribe in detail the kind of light which should be used, and may also designate the size of the reflector as well as the number of watts that should be used. The intensity of an electric light is measured by the watt, and the reflector increases the breadth and intensity of the light, as was well known to the legislature. Chesapeake &c. v. Manning, 186 U. S. 238; Freund on Police Power, 34; Atchison &c. R. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 102.

This statute is in the interest of the public and its wisdom cannot be questioned by the courts. The public

policy of the Government is to be found in its statutes and when the law-making power speaks upon a particular subject over which it has constitutional power to legislate, public policy in such cases is what the statute enacts. Logan v. Postal Tel. Co., 157 Fed. Rep. 570, 587; United States v. Freight Association, 166 U. S. 340; Chi., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 569.

The subject has not been acted upon in any way by Congress or by the Interstate Commerce Commission, directly or indirectly. The act does not in any way conflict with any act of Congress or any rule or regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and in the absence of such conflict the Federal courts will not declare the act invalid as interfering with interstate commerce. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 612, 623; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 148.

MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court.

The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, the plaintiff in error, was convicted of violating a statute of the State of Georgia known as the 'headlight law.' Pub. Laws (Ga.), 1908, pp. 50, 51; Civil Code, §§ 2697, 2698. In defense it was insisted that the act contravened the commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. On appeal from the judgment of conviction the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia certified the questions thus raised, together with others involving the application of the state constitution, to the Supreme Court of the State. Answering these questions, that court sustained the validity of the statute (135 Georgia, 545), whereupon final judgment was entered and this writ of error was sued out.

The material portions of the statute are as follows:

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Georgia, and it is hereby enacted by authority of the same, That all railroad companies are hereby required to equip and maintain each and every locomotive used by such company to run on its main line after dark with a good and sufficient headlight which shall consume not less than three hundred watts at the arc, and with a reflector not less than twenty-three inches in diameter, and to keep the same in good condition. The word main line as used herein means all portions of the railway line not used solely as yards, spurs and sidetracks.

"Section 2. Be it further enacted, That any railroad company violating this Act in any respect shall be liable to indictment as for a misdemeanor in any county in which the locomotive not so equipped and maintained may run, and on conviction shall be punished by fine as prescribed in Section 1039 of the Code of 1895.

"Section 4. Provided this Act shall not apply to tram roads, mill roads and roads engaged principally in lumber or logging transportation in connection with mills."

The contention is made that this act deprives the company of its liberty of contract, and of its property, without due process of law. It compels the disuse of a material part of the company's present equipment and the substitution of a new appliance. The use of locomotive headlights, however, is directly related to safety in operation. It cannot be denied that the protective power of government, subject to which the carrier conducts its business and manages its property, extends as well to the regulation of this part of the carrier's equipment as to apparatus for heating cars or to automatic couplers. The legislature may require an adequate headlight, and whether the carrier's practise is properly conducive to safety, or a new method affording greater protection should be substituted, is a matter for the legislative judgment. But it is insisted that the legislature has gone beyond the