maintained. The service, however, was performed subject to the law of the land requiring that the carrier's charges should not be unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory. (See Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 482; Phila., Balt. & Wash. R. R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U. S. 603, 613, 614.) If it became apparent that the shippers were subjected to an arbitrary and unwarranted exaction, they were in no way estopped from bringing the matter before the body created by law to deal with such questions and from securing its order directing the carriers to stop the objectionable practise.

But it is contended that the finding of the Commission is opposed to the admitted physical facts, and reference is made to the transportation to and from industrial plants located from 1-5 of a mile to 7 miles from the main track of the carrier. We find no such fundamental unsoundness in the Commission's conclusions. It appeared, as already stated, that the carrier had designated certain territory as within its switching or yard limits in Los Angeles extending for 6 or 7 miles and 'including numerous tracks, main lines, branch lines, industry tracks, team tracks, freight-shed tracks and various structures.' It does not appear how many industries were within a short distance or to how many the statement as to the greatest distance above-mentioned applied. The carrier did not fix a charge according to the comparative service in the case of these various industrial plants. It made the same switching charge whether the distance was 200 feet or 7 miles, that is, it dealt with the situation upon an average basis making the same charge for all this switching in a given area which constituted its terminal district. It was the service within these switching limits, that the Commission was considering. Manifestly it was permissible to establish such a district, and taking the team-track and freight-shed service in that area, and the average spur-track service, the Commission reached the conclusion set forth. It is said

that the finding of the Commission as to the comparative cost of the service was not affirmative, but was merely a negative statement to the effect that the Commission was unable to find that the cost of spur-track delivery was more expensive to the carrier. While this form of expression was used at one place in the Commission's report, at another the service in question was described as one which involved 'no greater expense than would team-track delivery' and we cannot but regard this as the Commission's finding upon the evidence. It is then insisted that the contrary of this finding is self-evident, but the facts with respect to the movement of freight in a great terminal district are by no means so simple that the deliberate judgment of the Commission can be regarded as contradicting the obvious.

The argument for the petitioners necessarily invites the court to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission upon matters of fact within the Commission's province. This is not the function of the court. We cannot regard the Act to Regulate Commerce as justifying an increased or extra charge for a substantially similar service and upon the case made it cannot be said that the Commission has overstepped its authority in forbidding the charge in question as one which was unjustly discriminatory.

In our opinion the Commerce Court erred in denying the Government's motion to dismiss and in granting the petitioners' motion for injunction. The order of the Commerce Court is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California, southern division, with instructions to dismiss the bill. Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32; Stat. 1913, p. 221.

It is so ordered.

234 U. S.

Opinion of the Court.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE COMMERCE COURT.

No. 98. Argued January 14, 15, 1914. Decided June 8, 1914.

Los Angeles Switching Case, ante, p. 294, followed and applied to similar switching charges made by railway companies in the City of San Francisco.

188 Fed. Rep. 241, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission relative to switching charges within the yard limits of San Francisco, California, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Blackburn Esterline, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom The Solicitor General was on the brief, for the United States.1

Mr. P. J. Farrell for the Interstate Commerce Commission.1

Mr. Fred H. Wood and Mr. Gardiner Lathrop, with whom Mr. Robert Dunlap, Mr. T. J. Norton, Mr. C. W. Durbrow, Mr. W. F. Herrin and Mr. J. P. Blair were on the brief, for appellees.1

MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court.

The Pacific Coast Jobbers' and Manufacturers' Association complained before the Interstate Commerce Commission of a switching charge of $2.50 per car maintained by the respondents for delivering and receiving carload freight to and from industries located upon spurs and sidetracks within the carriers' switching limits in San Fran

1 For abstracts of arguments in this case see abstracts in preceding case which was argued simultaneously herewith.

cisco. The Commission, finding the facts to be similar to those found in the case of the complaint of the Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles with respect to switching charges in the latter city (18 I. C. C. 310), entered a similar order prohibiting the carriers from continuing the charge. This suit was thereupon brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, first division, against the Interstate Commerce Commission to restrain the enforcement of the order. Upon its transfer to the Commerce Court, the United States intervened and moved to dismiss the proceeding. This motion was denied and upon the application of the petitioners an injunction was granted.

The questions presented on the appeal from this order are the same as those which have been considered in the opinion of the court in No. 98, Los Angeles Switching Case, ante, p. 294, decided this day, and for the reasons there set forth the order of the Commerce Court is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California with instructions to dismiss the bill.

It is so ordered.

PORT RICHMOND AND BERGEN POINT FERRY COMPANY v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF HUDSON COUNTY.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.

No. 225. Argued March 4, 1914.-Decided June 8, 1914.

At common law the right to maintain a public ferry lies in franchise. In England such a ferry could not be set up without the King's license, and, in this country, the right has been made the subject of legislative grant. Transportation of persons and property from one State to another by ferry is interstate commerce and subject to regulation by Congress, and it is beyond the competency of the States to impose direct burdens thereon; Congress not having acted on the subject, however, the States may exercise a measure of regulatory power not inconsistent with the Federal authority and not actually burdening, or interfering with, interstate commerce.

A State has the power to establish boundary ferries, not a part of a continuous interstate carrier system, and regulate the rates to be charged from its shores, subject to the paramount authority of Congress over interstate commerce; and, even though there might be a difference in the rate of ferriage from one side of the stream as compared with the rate charged from the other side.

Questions in respect to ferries such as the one involved in this case, generally imply transportation for a short distance, generally between two specified points, unrelated to other transportation, thus presenting situations essentially local and requiring regulation according to local conditions.

The absence of Federal action in such a case does not presuppose that the public interest is unprotected from extortion.

A State being able to exercise the power to regulate ferries, it follows that it may not derogate from the similar authority of another State; its regulating power therefrom extends only to transactions within its own territory and to ferriage from its own shores.

Rates of ferriage fixed by one State from its own shore on a boundary ferry do not preclude the other State from fixing other rates if reasonable with respect to the ferry maintained on its side.

Where the state court has not construed an ordinance fixing rates