the right under those Federal laws to prevent the accomplishment by defendant of an act destructive of the navigability of the stream." Plaintiffs in error state their contention another way. They say the acts of the two sovereignties, state and National, in furtherance of a common object, are so interwoven and related that the rights and questions arising from them, and the construction of their effect necessarily create.Federal questions. But we have seen that the Supreme Court of the State decided there was no concurrence of the State in furtherance of the so-called common object, that is, that the various acts in regard to the Illinois and Michigan Canal or the Sanitary District did not include any general scheme for the improvement of the Des Plaines River, and it was certainly within the competency of the court to so determine. The court was also of the view that under the constitution of the State the State did not have the "sovereign right, and as parens patriae" to restrain the acts of defendant in error. The court seemed to consider that it had decided all of the contentions of the State when it had decided the question of the navigability of the river both in its natural condition and its condition after the addition of the waters of the Sanitary District. The fact was and is pivotal. The ordinance for the government of the Northwest Territory and the subsequent acts of Congress set out in the information do not determine navigability of the streams but only define rights which depend upon its existence. Passing the question, therefore whether the ordinance or the acts refer to physical obstructions or to political regulations, and also passing the question whether they were of force after the admission of the State into the Union (on both questions see Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1), the fact of navigability having been decided against the State by the state court, there is no Federal Opinion of the Court. 234 U.S. right left to review. Crary v. Devlin, 154 U. Ș. 619; Cameron v. United States, 146 U. S. 533; Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188. In the latter case it was decided that the question of navigability is purely one of fact. It is said, however, that by the acts of 1899, 1900 and 1902 Congress has taken jurisdiction of the Des Plaines River. If so, the State is not the instrument through which the jurisdiction can be exercised. United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U. S. 211; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, supra; Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Ry. Co., 201 U. S. 529. But the cited acts are not appropriations for improvements undertaken but for improvements which may be undertaken; not a jurisdiction exercised but a jurisdiction to be exercised. And, as we have seen, it is alleged in the answer, and the allegation is sustained by the evidence, that the plans of defendant in error's structure were submitted to the War Department and it was declared by that department, "The work proposed is in general harmony with the work of improvement recommended by the Board of Engineers appointed under the authority of the Rivers and Harbors Act of June 13, 1902 (32 Stat. 331, 334, c. 1079)." But the department, inasmuch as Congress had not authorized the improvement of the river, did "not deem it expedient to take further and definite action in the matter of approving the plans." It is manifest, therefore, that the State has no right under Federal laws which it may assert for itself or "on behalf of the citizens of all of the United States," and the motion to dismiss must be granted. Dismissed. 234 U.S. Statement of the Case. LANE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, v. WATTS. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 889. Argued April 14, 15, 1914.-Decided June 22, 1914. A title which has passed by location of a grant and its approval by proper officers of the Land Department cannot be subsequently divested by the then officers of the department. Ballinger v. Frost, 216 U. S. 240. The action of the Commissioner in approving the location of a nonmineral float cannot be revoked by his successor in office, and an attempt so to do can be enjoined. Noble v. Union River Logging Co., 147 U. S. 165. A suit to restrain the Secretary of the Interior and the Land Commissioner from doing under color of their office, an illegal act which will cast a cloud upon the title of complainant is not one against the United States; nor in this case is it one for recovery of land merely or an attempted appeal from the decision of the Interior Department or a trial of title to land not within the jurisdiction of the court and wherein the United States is not present or suable. A survey is necessary to segregate from the public domain lands attempted to be located by a float grant. Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U.S. 240. In this case, held, that a survey was made and approved. In this case, held, that the report of the Surveyor General and the subsequent proceedings and survey by the Surveyor General of Arizona amounted to a survey and finding that the lands were non-mineral and that title thereto vested in the holder of the float grant selecting the lands and passed out of the United States. Where, as in this case, in order to accommodate conflicting claims and, at the instance of the Government, claimants have given up rights to a definite tract and accepted float grants for an equal amount of land, it will be presumed that the Government would make provision for the location of the substituted land as expeditiously as possible and without expense to the holders of the float. 41 App. D. C. 139, affirmed. THE facts, which involve the title to lands assigned on one of the Baca Float Grants issued in substitution of the Las Vegas Grant, are stated in the opinion. See 235 U. S. 17, for further opinion in this case. Mr. Assistant Attorney General West and Mr. C. Edward Wright for appellants. Mr. Herbert Noble, Mr. G. H. Brevillier and Mr. Joseph W. Bailey, with whom Mr. James W. Vroom was on the brief, for appellees. By leave of court Mr. William C. Prentiss filed a brief as amicus curiæ. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court. Appeal from the decree of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirming a decree of the Supreme Court of the District enjoining the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office from proceeding in the matter of certain attempted entries under the public land laws of the United States upon lands which the decree finds were selected and located by the heirs of Luis Maria Cabeza de Baca on June 17, 1863, and known as Baca Float No. 3, the title to which, the decree further finds, passed out of the United States and vested in said heirs on April 9, 1864. The decree further directs the filing of the field notes and plats of survey of the Float for the purpose of defining the out-boundaries thereof and segregating the same from the public lands of the United States. The origin and history of the Baca grant are set out in Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U. S. 312, Maese v. Herman, 183 U. S. 572, and Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U. S. 604. It appears that there was a conflict between this grant and the grant to the town of Las Vegas, which was settled by an act passed on June 21, 1860 (12 Stat. 71, 72, c. 167), which enabled the heirs of Baca to select "an equal quantity of vacant land, not mineral, in the Territory of New Mexico, to be located by them in square bodies, not ex ceeding five in number." It was made the duty of the Surveyor General of New Mexico "to make survey and location of the lands so selected by said heirs of Baca when thereunto required by them: Provided, however, that the right hereby granted to said heirs of Baca shall continue in force during three years from the passage of the act, and no longer." The Las Vegas grant was ascertained to contain nearly 500,000 acres (496,446 96-100). The Baca heirs were, therefore, entitled to locate that many acres "in square bodies, not exceeding five in number." This controversy concerns the third of the bodies selected. The selection of each tract was to be determined by the same considerations, and those considerations are declared in Shaw v. Kellogg, supra. Each location, it is there said, would necessarily be of considerable size; in fact, each one was nearly 100,000 acres; and each as a whole was to be nonmineral. "No provision was made for indemnity lands in case mineral should be found in any section or quarter section. So that when the location was perfected the title passed to all the lands or to none." (170 U. S., p. 332.) The limits of location, it was said, was the Territory of New Mexico, limits not so broad as those of the territory ceded by Mexico; within the limits there were large areas of arid lands; "its surface was broken by a few mountain chains, and crossed by a few streams." Lands, it was declared, could not be selected already occupied by others. The lands must be vacant. Nor could lands be selected "which were then known to contain mineral." "Congress did not intend to grant any mines or mineral lands, but with these exceptions their right of selection was coextensive with the limits of New Mexico. We say 'lands then known to contain mineral,' for it cannot be that Congress intended that the grant should be rendered nugatory by any future discoveries of mineral. The selection was to be made within three years. The title was then to pass; and |