234 J. S. Statement of the Case. in navigable waters, by one who has undertaken a maritime service, against one engaged in the performance of that service, is not embraced within the constitutional grant and the jurisdictional act, would be to establish a limitation wholly without warrant. The remaining question relates to the finding of negligence. It is urged that the neglect was that of a fellowservant and hence that the petitioner was not liable. Both courts below, however, concurred in the finding that the petitioner omitted to use proper diligence to provide a safe place of work. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 386. As the question belongs to a class which under the distribution of judicial power is determinable by the Circuit Court of Appeals in last resort, we shall not undertake to discuss it at length or to restate the evidence. Chicago Junction Rwy. Co. v. King, 222 U. S. 222, 224; Chicago, R. I. & Pac, Rwy. Co. v. Brown, 229 U. S. 317, 320; Grand Trunk Rwy. Co. v. Lindsay, 233 U. S. 42, 50. It is sufficient to say that we are satisfied from an examination of the record that the ruling was justified. Affirmed. ATLANTIC TRANSPORT COMPANY OF WEST VIRGINIA v. STATE OF MARYLAND TO THE USE OF SZCZESEK. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT. No..216. Argued January 29, 30, 1914.-Decided May 25, 1914. Decided on the authority of Atlantic Transport Company v. Imbrovek, ante, p. 54. 193 Fed. Rep. 1019, affirmed. THE facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Edward Duffy, with whom Mr. Nicholas P. Bond and Mr. Ralph Robinson were on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. W. H. Price, Jr., and Mr. John E. Semmes, Jr., with whom Mr. John E. Semmes, Mr. Jesse N. Bowen and Mr. Matthew Gault were on the brief, for respondent. MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court. This is a libel filed on behalf of the widow and infant children of Martin Szczesek to recover damages for injuries resulting in his death. Szczesek was a stevedore in the employ of the Atlantic Transport Company, the petitioner, and was engaged in loading the ship Pretoria. The District Court allowed a recovery against the petitioner (190 Fed. Rep. 240) which the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 193 Fed. Rep. 1019. The questions presented are the same as those which were considered in Atlantic Transport Company v. Imbrovek, ante, p. 52, decided this day and, for the reasons stated in the opinion in that case, the decree is affirmed. Affirmed. SCHMIDT v. BANK OF COMMERCE. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO. No. 281. Argued March 19, 1914.—Decided May 25, 1914. This court accepts the rulings of the territorial courts on local questions of pleading and practice. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Friday, 232 U. S. 694. Where some of the signatures of defendant makers had been obtained by means of fraudulent representations by the plaintiff holder of the paper, the whole transaction is vitiated even as to those makers who were liable on former existing paper of which that in suit was a renewal. Where a renewal note constitutes a new promise with distinct legal consequences, it cannot be enforced if fraudulently induced, even if there were no defense to the older note in renewal of which it is given. Under the Negotiable Instrument Act of 1907 of New Mexico, the title of a person negotiating commercial paper is defective if any signature thereto has been obtained by fraud, and if any one person is relieved from liability by proof of fraudulent inducement, all other persons who signed the paper are likewise relieved although they did not participate in and were ignorant of such fraud. Where the court, on plaintiffs' motion, has denied the right of defendants to show that the note sued on was void as to them because of subsequent alteration by addition of signatures of other comakers, the plaintiff cannot defeat defendants' defense of fraud in obtaining the later signatures on the ground that the notes were completed instruments and binding upon the makers before the others had signed. 16 New Mex. 414, reversed. THE facts, which involve the effect of fraudulent inducement to make commercial paper and the rights of comakers to be relieved of liability in such case, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Francis E. Wood, with whom Mr. O. N. Marron was on the brief, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. Harry M. Dougherty, with whom Mr. James G. Fitch was on the brief, for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court. This suit was brought by the Bank of Commerce in the District Court for Socorro County in the Territory of New Mexico to recover upon two promissory notes. The plaintiff bank was the payee and the defendants Broyles, Schmidt & Story, Crossman, Brown, Pratt (alias Anderson), Lewis and Evans, were the makers. Broyles deVOL. CCXXXIV-5 faulted; the other defendants answered, alleging in substance that they had signed the notes for Broyles' accommodation and had been induced to sign by the fraudulent representations of the bank. Upon the trial, the motion of the plaintiff for a direction of a verdict was granted as against all the defendants except Lewis, and as to him the plaintiff was permitted to take a non-suit. The judgment on the verdict was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory. 16 New Mex. 414. Several questions of pleading and practice are presented, but in view of their local character we accept, as to these, the rulings of the territorial court. Phoenix Rwy. Co. v. Landis, 231 U. S. 578; Work v. United Globe Mines, 231 U.S. 595; Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. Friday, 232 U. S. 694. We shall therefore assume that the complaint was sufficient; and that the defenses of alteration, the unauthorized filling of blanks, and the failure to credit certain payments, were not available because not suitably pleaded. The Supreme Court of the Territory also held that although both parties had requested peremptory instructions, the defendants were entitled, upon the denial of their motion, to ask that the case be submitted to the jury and that this request was properly made. See Empire State Company v. Atchison Company, 210 U. S. 1. The question before us then is whether, in view of the state of the evidence upon the defense that the notes were procured by fraud, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. It is apparent that there was evidence sufficient to go to the jury that the signatures of some of the defendants had been obtained by means of fraudulent representations. Upon this point, the Supreme Court of the Territory said, p. 423: "The defense, as we have seen, was principally that the signing of the notes was procured by fraud. There was undoubtedly evidence that the defendants Anderson" (impleaded as Pratt), "Evans, Brown and Lewis were told by plaintiff's repre sentative prior to signing the notes that Broyles was solvent and were further told that plaintiff had ample collateral for the notes, and there was also evidence from which the jury might have concluded that the defendants signed the notes in reliance upon these representations. We find also upon the record room for a conclusion by the jury that these statements were untrue and that they were known when made to be untrue. Indeed the trial court recognized this, for as to Lewis, in whose favor the testimony on this point was no stronger than on behalf of Anderson, Evans and Brown, the court held that the matter was one for the jury." Notwithstanding this estimate of the evidence, the court sustained the recovery against the last named defendants holding that as they were liable upon former notes for the same amount, which were renewed by the notes in suit, the defense was not available. It was said that, even assuming the notes in suit to have been given 'as the result of a wilful misrepresentation,' the defendants being bound by the former notes were 'held to no greater duty than previously rested upon them' and hence could not defend upon the ground that they were induced to sign the notes by fraudulent representations. . We are unable to agree with this conclusion. The question was not one of a recovery of damages in deceit. Ming v. Woolfolk, 116 U. S. 599, 602, 603. If there was fraud, it vitiated the transaction and the plaintiff could not avail itself of its own wrong by enforcing the notes. The fact that the three defendants, Anderson, Evans and Brown, were liable on the former notes did not place them under any legal obligation whatever to make the notes in suit. It appeared that the former notes were signed by Broyles, Anderson, Evans and Brown; the last three being in effect sureties for Broyles; and as the court states, 'upon the giving of the present notes, these former notes were surrendered by plaintiff bank and destroyed.' On the new notes Lewis, Schmidt & Story and Crossman were addi |