question presented is the same as that decided by this court in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky (ante, p. 216). It was found that the statute in its reference to 'real value' prescribed no standard of conduct that it was possible to know; that it violated the fundamental principles of justice embraced in the conception of due process of law in compelling men on peril of indictment to guess what their goods would have brought under other conditions not ascertainable.

The Harvester Company was prosecuted for being a party to a price-raising combination; Collins, for breaking a combination agreement and selling outside the pool which he had joined. With respect to each, the test of the legality of the combination was said to be whether it raised prices above the 'real value.' If it did-in Collins' case he would be subject to penalties for remaining in the combination; if it did not, he would be punishable for not keeping his tobacco in the pool. He was thus bound to ascertain the 'real value'; to determine his conduct not according to the actualities of life, or by reference to knowable criteria, but by speculating upon imaginary conditions and endeavoring to conjecture what would be the value under other and so-called normal circumstances with fair competition, eliminating the abnormal influence of the combination itself, and of all other like combinations, and of still other combinations which these were organized to oppose. The objection that the statute, by reason of its uncertainty, was fundamentally defective was as available to Collins as it was to the Harvester Company.

In this view, it is unnecessary to consider the objection under the commerce clause or the alleged conflict, as to interstate transactions, with the Federal Anti-trust Act.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

234 U. 8.

Opinion of the Court.

MALONE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
KENTUCKY.

No. 36. Submitted April 22, 1914.—Decided June 22, 1914.

141 Kentucky, 570, reversed on the authority of the preceding case.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Same counsel as in Collins v. Kentucky, ante, p. 634, and argued simultaneously therewith.

MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court.

This writ of error has been sued out to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky which affirmed the conviction of Thomas Malone, the plaintiff in error, for selling pooled tobacco, without the consent of the agents of the pool, contrary to § 3941a of the Kentucky statutes. 141 Kentucky, 570.

The case is the same in all material respects as that of Collins v. Kentucky, decided this day, ante, p. 634, with the exception that the tobacco in question was sold by the plaintiff in error within the State of Kentucky. For the reasons stated in the opinion in the Collins Case, the judgment must be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Statement of the Case.

234 U.S.

ORDER OF ST. BENEDICT OF NEW JERSEY v. STEINHAUSER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF WIRTH.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 267. Argued March 11, 1914-Decided June 22, 1914.

In a suit by an ecclesiastical society to recover from the administrator of a deceased member assets of the estate as community property under the provisions of the constitution and membership, the question for the courts is not one of canon law or ecclesiastical polity, but one solely of civil rights.

Where the State has chartered a society as one of "religious men

living in community," a provision in its constitution for community. ownership, with renunciation of individual rights in private property during continuance of membership, with freedom of withdrawal, is not invalid as opposed to the public policy of, but is directly sanctioned by, the State creating the society.

An agreement to live in community and renounce individual rights of property, but with a right to withdraw at any time invades no constitutional right; nor, in this case, does it transgress any statute of the State of New Jersey which chartered the society with which the agreement is made.

Subject to the inhibitions of the Constitution of the United States the legislature of each State is the arbiter of its public policy.

In this case held that an agreement made by a member of a religious order, chartered as a society of religious men living in community, that his individual earnings and acquisitions, like those of other members, should go into the common fund, included his earnings from copyrights of books; and also held, that as such agreement contained a right to withdraw at any time there was no infringement of any right protected by the Constitution of the United States nor was it against the public policy of the State of New Jersey which granted the charter to the society.

194 Fed. Rep. 289, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the validity under the laws of New Jersey and the public policy of that State of an agree

ment between an ecclesiastical order and one of its members, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Morgan J. O'Brien, with whom Mr. Otto Kueffner, Mr. Albert Schaller, Mr. Frederick C. Gladden, Mr. J. Warren Greene and Mr. Frank W. Arnold were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. William H. Pitzer and Mr. William Hayward for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was brought by The Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey, a corporation of that State, to establish its title to personal property left by Augustin Wirth, deceased, a member of the Order who died at Springfield, Minnesota, in December, 1901. The defendant, Albert Steinhauser, as administrator of the estate of the decedent, holding letters from the Probate Court of Brown County, Minnesota, filed a cross-bill asserting ownership in his representative capacity and praying discovery and account with respect to whatever part of the estate had come into the complainant's possession. The Circuit Court entered a decree dismissing the cross-bill and granting the relief sought by the complainant's bill. 179 Fed. Rep. 137. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decree, directing the dismissal of the original bill and the granting of the prayer of the cross-bill. 194 Fed. Rep. 289. Certiorari was allowed.

The monastic brotherhood known as the Order of St. Benedict was established by St. Benedict in the early part of the sixth century at Subiaco, Italy, whence it spread over western Europe. It was brought to the United States in 1846. The members of the brotherhood follow what is known as 'The Rule of St. Benedict,' a collection VOL. CCXXXIV-41

of mandates essentially unchanged from the beginning. The vows are those of obedience, stability, chastity and poverty.

We are not concerned in the present case with any question of ecclesiastical requirement or monastic discipline. The question is solely one of civil rights. The claim in suit rests upon the constitution of the complainant corporation, and the obligations inherent in membership.

The Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey was incorporated in 1868 by special act of the legislature of that State. The incorporators were described as 'being a society of religious men living in community and devoted to charitable works and the education of youth.' The corporation was empowered to hold property and to make by-laws for the government of the Order, provided that these should not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or of the State of New Jersey, that the clear yearly income of the real estate should not exceed a sum stated, and that no one should remain an incorporator 'except regular members of said religious society, living in community and governed by the laws thereof.' Under this charter the Order adopted a constitution, among the provisions of which are the following:

"Section XI. Membership is lost at once:

"1. By being dismissed according to the disciplinary statutes of the Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey approved of by Pope Pius IX for the American Cassiness Congregation of Benedictines.

"2. By voluntarily leaving the Order for any purpose whatsoever.

"3. By joining any other order or secret society or any other religious denominations.

"Section XII. Since the Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey is solely a charitable institution, the real estate of said Order and the individual earnings of its members, are and must be considered as common property of the