ting its saving clause, the provision is not materially different from § 4 of the original act, being the section providing for patents. As already said, the chief purpose of the resolution was to sanction a route-the one indicated on the map mentioned. The Secretary of the Interior had disapproved it because not within prior authorization. If it was to be approved it was but reasonable that the existing right to the patents should be applied to it. This evidently is what was intended. Another matter also claimed consideration. Three years had passed since the filing of the map, and in the meantime the situation had been complicated by a withdrawal of the adjacent lands, a revocation of the withdrawal and a suspension of the revoking order. The validity of the route shown on the map and of the withdrawal had been the subject of differing opinions, and some of the lands had come to be occupied by settlers, whose status was uncertain in view of the withdrawal. See 16 Op. A. G. 80. As reported to the Senate by one of its committees, the resolution was in its present form without the saving clause. That was added when the resolution was under consideration.1 Without it the resolution had two purposes, one to sanction the route which had been pronounced unauthorized, and the other to make secure the right to patents along that route. What was the purpose of the saving clause? Its words and the situation just mentioned leave no doubt that one purpose was to take care of the actual settlers then on the lands. Another, equally plain, was to require that the conditions and restrictions, that is, the exclusions and exceptions, of § 3 (the granting section) of the original act be applied to that route. But how were these purposes to be accomplished? Was it to be by patenting all the lands to the railroad company, even those occupied by

1 Congressional Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., parts 4 and 5, pp. 3349– 3351, 3828-3830, 3950-3953.

actual settlers, and inserting saving clauses in the patents? Or was it to be by giving effect to the rights of the settlers and to the exclusions and exceptions in the normal and rational way, that is, by patenting to the company no lands occupied by actual settlers or otherwise excluded or excepted from the grant? The latter seems to us the only admissible conclusion.1

Lastly, it is urged that the railroad company accepted the patent with the mineral-land exception therein and also expressly agreed that the latter should be effective as one of the terms of the patent, and so is bound by it or at least estopped to deny its validity. There are insuperable objections to this contention. The terms of the patent whereby the Government transfers its title to public land are not open to negotiation or agreement. The patentee has no voice in the matter. It in no wise depends upon his consent or will. He must abide the action of those whose duty and responsibility are fixed by law. Neither can the land officers enter into any agreement upon the subject. They are not principals but agents of the law, and must heed only its will. Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392, 406; Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U. S. 507, 527; Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U. S. 312, 337, 343. Nor can they indirectly give effect to what is unauthorized when done directly. Of course, if they enter into any forbidden arrangement whereby public land is transferred to one not entitled to it the patent may be annulled at the suit of the Government, but they cannot alter the effect which the law gives to a patent while it is outstanding.

Taking up the several questions in the light of what we have here said, we answer them as follows:

1. Did the said grant to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company include mineral lands which were known to

1 See Tome v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 5 Copp's L. O. 85; Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Rahall, 3 L. D. 321.

be such at or prior to the date of the patent of July 10, 1894?

Answer.-Mineral lands, known to be such at or prior to the issue of patent, were not included in the grant but excluded from it, and the duty of determining the character of the lands was cast primarily on the Land Department, which was charged with the issue of patents.

2. Does a patent to a railroad company under a grant which excludes mineral lands, as in the present case, but which is issued without any investigation upon the part of the officers of the Land Office or of the Department of the Interior as to the quality of the land, whether agricultural or mineral, and without hearing upon or determination of the quality of the lands, operate to convey lands which are thereafter ascertained to be mineral?

Answer. A patent issued in such circumstances is irregularly issued, undoubtedly so, but as it is the act of a legally constituted tribunal and is done within its jurisdiction, it is not void and therefore passes the title (Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147 U. S. 165, 174–175), subject to the right of the Government to attack the patent by a direct suit for its annulment if the land was known to be mineral when the patent issued. McLaughlin v. United States, 107 U. S. 526; Western Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 108 U. S. 510.

3. Is the reservation and exception contained in the grant in the patent to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company void and of no effect?

Answer. The mineral land exception in the patent is void.

4. If the reservation of mineral lands as expressed in the patent is void, then is the patent, upon a collateral attack, a conclusive and official declaration that the land is agricultural and that all the requirements preliminary to the issuance of the patent have been complied with?

Answer. It is conclusive upon a collateral attack.

5. Is petroleum or mineral oil within the meaning of the term "mineral" as it was used in said acts of Congress reserving mineral land from the railroad land grants?

Answer.-Petroleum lands are mineral lands within the meaning of that term in railroad land grants.

6. Does the fact that the appellant was not in privity with the Government in any respect at the time when the patent was issued to the railroad company prevent him from attacking the patent on the ground of fraud, error or irregularity in the issuance thereof as so alleged in the bill?

Answer.-It does.

7. If the mineral exception clause was inserted in the patent with the consent of the defendant, Southern Pacific Railroad Company, and under an understanding and agreement between it and the officers of the Interior Department that said clause should be effective to keep in the United States title to such of the lands described in the patent as were in fact mineral, are the defendants, Southern Pacific Railroad Company and the Kern Trading and Oil Company, estopped to deny the validity of said clause?

Answer.-No; such an agreement is of no greater force as an estoppel than the exception in the patent. The latter being void, the patent passes the title and is not open to collateral attack or to attack by strangers whose only claim was initiated after the issue of the patent.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.

No. 767. Argued March 3, 1914.-Decided June 22, 1914.

A suit does not arise under the laws of the United States unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of some law of the United States upon the determination of which the case depends and so appears not by mere inference but by distinct averments according to rules of good pleading.

In this case, held that a suit to restrain trustees in bankruptcy from prosecuting an equity suit against complainants in the state court on the ground that the bankruptcy proceedings were a fraud and that the appointment of the trustees was void was one arising under the laws of the United States within the meaning of § 24, Judicial Code, and the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is not final. Although there may be a general prayer for relief, if no relief other than injunction against prosecution of a suit in the state court is brought to the attention of either the District Court or the Circuit Court of Appeals, the general prayer should be treated as abandoned. The prohibition, § 720, Rev. Stat., now § 265, Judicial Code, against granting the writ of injunction by the Federal court to stay proceedings in a state court except where authorized by the Bankruptcy Act, held, in this case, to apply to a case commenced after adjudication of bankruptcy to enjoin the trustee from prosecuting a suit in ejectment, in the courts of the State where the land is situated. Such a case is not within the exception or in aid of the bankruptcy proceeding.

206 Fed. Rep. 4; 207 Fed. Rep. 543, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals from judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals and also the construction and application of § 265, Judicial Code (§ 720, Rev. Stat.), are stated in the opinion.

Mr. George C. Bedell, with whom Mr. H. Bisbee was on the brief, for appellants.