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COLLATERAL ATTACK.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 38;
JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 1, 4;
PUBLIC LANDS, 4, 20.

COLORED FREEDMEN.

See LOCAL LAW (Tenn.).

COMBINATIONS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 24, 26;
RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

COMMERCE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-9, 12;

INTERSTATE COMMERCE;

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

COMMERCE COURT.

See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 10, 11;
JURISDICTION, D;

MANDATE.

COMMERCIAL PAPER.

See BILLS AND NOTES.

COMMERCIAL USAGE.

See LOCAL LAW (Ohio).

COMMISSIONER OF LAND OFFICE.

See ACTIONS, 1;

PUBLIC LANDS, 5.

COMMODITIES CLAUSE.

See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 22, 23, 24.

COMMON CARRIERS.

1. What constitutes; conversion of plant facility into.

Although a railroad may have originally been a mere plant facility,
after it has been acquired by a common carrier duly organized un-
der the law of the State and performing service as such and regu-
lated and operated under competent authority, it is no longer a
plant facility but a public institution, even though the owner of the

industry of which it formerly was an appendage is the principal
shipper of freight thereover. Tap Line Cases, 1.

2. What constitutes; test as to character of railroad.

The extent to which a railroad is in fact used does not determine
whether it is or is not a common carrier, but the right of the public
to demand service of it. Ib.

3. What constitutes; railroads as.
Railroads owned by corporations properly organised under the laws of
the State in which they are and treated as common carriers by the
State, authorized to exercise eminent domain, dealt with as com-
mon carriers by other railroad corporations, and engaged in carry-
ing for hire goods of those who see fit to employ them, are common
carriers for all purposes, and cannot be treated as such as to the
general public and not as to those who have a proprietary interest
in the corporations owning them. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19, 39;

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

COMMON LAW.

See FERRIES, 1, 2.

COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP.
See ECCLESIASTICAL BODIES.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3, 5;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 5, 6, 7, 15, 25.

CONGRESS, ACTS OF.

See ACTS OF CONGRESS.

CONGRESS, POWERS OF.

Legislative discretion; evidence that, problem not beyond.

The fact that there has been a recent communication and recommenda-
tion from the President to Congress on a particular subject and
Congress has not acted thereon is evidence that the problem is not
so entirely obvious of solution that the courts can declare it to be
beyond the range of legislative discretion. Johnson v. Gearlds, 422.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-5;

GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS,

1;

INDIANS, 7, 8, 10;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1-4, 7, 9,
14, 16, 23, 34.

1. What constitutes.

CONSIDERATION.

See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 20.

CONSPIRACY.

An act, harmless when done by one person, may become a public wrong
when done by many acting in concert in pursuance of a conspiracy.
(Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U. S. 433.) Eastern
States Lumber Asso. v. United States, 600.

2. Proof of; inference from things done.

Conspiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct testimony and a
conspiracy to accomplish that which is their natural consequence
"may be inferred from the things actually done. Ib.

See RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 1.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Commerce clause; what within; ferries.

Transportation between States and foreign countries is within the
protection of the constitutional grant to Congress, and this includes
transportation by ferry. (Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114
U. S. 196.) Sault Ste Marie v. International Transit Co., 333.

2. Commerce clause; object of; dominant power of Congress.
The object of the commerce clause was to prevent interstate trade from
being destroyed or impeded by the rivalries of local governments;
and it is the essence of the complete and paramount power con-
fided to Congress to regulate interstate commerce that wherever
it exists it dominates. Houston & Texas Ry. Co. v. United States,
342.

3. Commerce clause; dominant power of Congress.
Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so

related that the government of the one involves and controls the
other, it is Congress, and not the State, that is entitled to prescribe
the final and dominant rule; otherwise the Nation would not be
supreme within the National field. Ib.

4. Commerce clause; dominant power of Congress, incidental control of
intrastate commerce.

While Congress does not possess authority to regulate the internal
commerce of a State, as such, it does possess power to foster and
protect interstate commerce, although in taking necessary meas-
VOL. CCXXXIV-50

ures so to do it may be necessary to control intrastate transactions
of interstate carriers. Ib.

5. Commerce clause; paramount authority of Congress.
Although there is gravity in any question presented when state and
Federal views conflict, it has been recognized from the beginning
that this Nation could not prosper if interstate and foreign trade
were governed by many masters; and where the freedom of such
commerce is involved the judgment of Congress and the agencies it
lawfully established must control. Ib.

6. Commerce clause; validity of state statute attempting to regulate conduct
of telegraph companies.

The statute of South Carolina making mental anguish caused by the
negligent non-delivery of a telegram a cause of action is, as applied
to telegrams the negligent non-delivery of which occurred in the
District of Columbia, an unconstitutional attempt to regulate con-
duct within territory wholly under the jurisdiction of the United
States; such statute is also unconstitutional, as to messages sent
from that State to be delivered in another State, as an attempt to
regulate interstate commerce. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown,
542.

7. Commerce clause; validity of state police regulation incidentally affecting
interstate commerce.

A state police regulation designed to promote the payment of small but
well founded claims and to discourage litigation in respect thereto,
and which only incidentally includes claims arising out of interstate
commerce, does not constitute a direct burden on interstate com-
merce, and is not, in the absence of legislation by Congress on the
subject, repugnant to the commerce clause or otherwise in conflict
with Federal authority. (Atlantic Coast Line v. Mazursky, 216
U. S. 122.) Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 412.

8. Commerce clause; validity of Texas statute allowing attorney fee in cases
of claims for loss on interstate shipments.

The Texas statute of 1909 allowing a reasonable attorney's fee as a

part of the costs in suits on contested but proper claims of less than
$200 is not unconstitutional as applied to claims for loss on inter-
state shipments, nor is it inconsistent with any of the provisions
of the Act to Regulate Commerce. Ib.

9. Commerce clause; rights secured by; effect of refusal of state court to
allow filing of amended pleading averring indirect effect on interstate

commerce.

The State has full authority over shipments purely intrastate, and an

averment that a service required at one point as to intrastate ship-
ments might be required at other points in regard to interstate
shipments only avers an indirect effect upon interstate commerce;
and a defendant carrier denied leave to file an amended pleading
to that effect is not deprived of rights secured by the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution. Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co. v. Higdon, 592.

See INFRA, 12;

INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

10. Contract impairment; effect of change of decision of state court.
A change in decision of the state court in reference to the scope of a
state statute held, in this case, not to be a law impairing the obliga-
tion of a contract. Moore-Mansfield Co. v. Electrical Co., 619.
Delegation of power.-See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 34.

11. Due process and equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of state
statutes penalizing delay in payment of proper claims.

This court has already decided that state statutes, such as that of
Texas imposing a 12% penalty and an attorney's fee, for damages
for delay in payment of proper claims, are not unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment as depriving life insurance com-
panies of their property without due process of law or as denying
them the equal protection of the law. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v.
Cohen, 123.

12. Due process; equal protection; interstate commerce; validity of Georgia
Locomotive Headlight Law.

The statute of Georgia of 1908, Civil Code, §§ 2697, 2698, requiring
railroad companies to use locomotive headlights of specified form
and power, is not unconstitutional either as a denial of equal pro-
tection of the law, as deprivation of property without due process
of law, or as an interference with interstate commerce. Atlantic
Coast Line v. Georgia, 280.

13. Due process of law; what constitutes; distinction between actions in
personam and in rem in service of process.

In determining what is due process of law within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, there is a distinction between actions in
personam and actions in rem; in the former judgments without per-
sonal service within the State are devoid of validity either within or
without the State but in the latter the judgment although based
on service by publication may be valid so far as it affects property
within the State. (Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714.) Grannis v.
Ordean, 385.

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