vestigation that unjust discrimination against localities exists
under substantially similar conditions of transportation the Com-
mission has power to correct it; and this notwithstanding the lim-
itations contained in the proviso to § 3 of the Act to Regulate
Commerce. Ib.
8. Power to prevent unjust discrimination; prior action; effect of.
The earlier action of the Interstate Commerce Commission was not of
such controlling effect as to preclude the Commission from giving
effect to the Act to Regulate Cominerce, and in this case having,
after examination of the question of its authority, decided to make
a remedial order to prevent unjust discrimination and the Com-
merce Court having sustained that authority of the Commission
this court should not reverse unless, as is not the case, the law has
been misapplied. Ib.
9. Power to make order permitting lower rate for longer haul, etc.
Under 8 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by the act of
June 18, 1910, the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to
make an order, such as that involved in these cases, permitting a
lower rate for the longer haul but only on terms stated in the order,
establishing zones for the intermediate points and relative per-
centages upon which proportionate rates should be based. Inter-
mountain Rate Cases, 476.
10. Review of orders of, by Commerce Court; what constitutes affirmative
order.
An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, based on its
finding that the service rendered by a connecting line is not a serv-
ice of transportation by a common carrier railroad, but a plant
service by a plant facility, to the effect that allowances and divi-
sions of rates are unlawful and must be discontinued, is affirmative
in its nature and subject to judicial review by the Commerce Court.
Tap Line Cases, 1.
11. Review of orders of; what reviewable.
Where the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
directing discontinuance of divisions of rates with another railroad
depends upon whether the latter is a common carrier or a plant
facility, the determination of that question upon undisputed facts
is a conclusion of law which is subject to judicial review. Ib.
12. Review of findings; what are conclusions of fact not subject to review.
Findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission as to the character
and use of industrial spur-tracks within the switching limits of a
city are conclusions of fact and not subject to review. Los Angeles
Switching Case, 294; Interstate Com. Comm. v. Southern Pacific Co.,
315.
13. Review of findings; conclusions of fact not reviewable.
This court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Interstate
Commerce Commission upon matters of fact within the province of
the Commission. Ib.
14. Findings of fact by; binding effect; limitation upon rule.
The rule that a finding of fact made by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission concerning a matter within the scope of the authority dele-
gated to it is binding and may not be reexamined in the courts, does
not apply where the finding was made without any evidence what-
ever to support it; the consideration of such a question involves
not an issue of fact, but one of law which it is the duty of the courts
to examine and decide. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. United States,
167.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 5, 6, 8, 27, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38;
JURISDICTION, D;
STATUTES, A 8.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
See INDIANS, 6-11.
INTRASTATE COMMERCE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4, 9.
1. Collateral attack; decision as to removability not subject to; mode of
review.
When a Federal court decides that a case removable from a state court
on independent grounds is not made otherwise by § 6 of the Em-
ployers' Liability Act, the decision is a judicial act done in the
exercise of jurisdiction conferred by law, and, even if erroneous, is
not open to collateral attack, but only subject to correction in an
appropriate appellate proceeding. Ex parte Roe, 70.
2. Review; mode of, in case of decision as to removability of cause.
The authorized mode of reviewing such a ruling in an action at law is
by writ of error from the final judgment. Judicial Code, §§ 128,
238. Ib.
3. Validity of judgment in suit in rem; sufficiency of service of process.
Where a State has jurisdiction over the res the judgment of the court to
which that jurisdiction is confided, in order to be binding with re-
spect to the interest of a non-resident not served with process
within the State, must be based upon constructive service by mail-
ing, publication or otherwise in accordance with the law of the
State. Grannis v. Ordean, 385.
4. Correction of determination of stockholder's liability under Minnesota
law, collateral attack.
Whether a former stockholder is ratably or otherwise liable with
present stockholders is not a question which goes to the jurisdiction
of the Minnesota court making the order, but a question to be sub-
mitted for correction, if any, to the court making the order and
not to another court in a collateral attack. Selig v. Hamilton, 652.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13, 37, 38; INDIANS, 2, 3;
JURISDICTION, A 17;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1.
JUDICIAL CODE.
See INJUNCTION;
JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 2;
JUDICIAL SALE.
See INDIANS, 3.
JURISDICTION.
A. OF THIS COURT.
1. Of appeals from Circuit Courts of Appeals; when suit one arising under
A suit does not arise under the laws of the United States unless it really
and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the
validity, construction or effect of some law of the United States
upon the determination of which the case depends and so appears
not by mere inference but by distinct averments according to rules
of good pleading. Hull v. Burr, 712.
2. Of appeal from Circuit Court of Appeals; when suit one arising under
law of United States.
In this case held that a suit to restrain trustees in bankruptcy from pros-
ecuting an equity suit against complainants in the state court on
the ground that the bankruptcy proceedings were a fraud and that
the appointment of the trustees was void was one arising under
the laws of the United States within the meaning of § 24, Judicial
Code, and the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is not final.
Although there may be a general prayer for relief if no relief other
than injunction against prosecution of a suit in the state court is
brought to the attention of either the District Court or the Circuit
Court of Appeals, the general prayer should be treated as aban-
doned. Ib.
3. Of direct appeal from District Court under § 238, Judicial Code; in-
volution of construction of treaties with Indians.
Where complainant's entire case rests on the construction of treaties
with Indians in regard to reservations and on the claim that cer-
tain of such treaties have been repealed by the subsequent admis-
sion of the Territory within which the reservations are situated,
this court has jurisdiction of a direct appeal from the District Court
under § 238, Judicial Code. Johnson v. Gearlds, 422.
4. On direct appeal from District Court under § 238, Judicial Code; scope
of consideration.
On a direct appeal under § 238, Judicial Code, from a judgment of the
District Court dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction on the
ground that neither of the parties was a resident of that district
and that the suit was one that could only be brought in a district
in which one of the parties resided, this court is only concerned
with the jurisdiction of the District Court as a Federal court;
whether appellant is entitled to the relief sought is not a jurisdic-
tional question in the sense of § 238. Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 369.
5. On direct appeal from District Court under § 238, Judicial Code; ques-
tion open.
When the matter in controversy is of the requisite value and diverse
citizenship exists, the question is simply whether the case is cog-
nizable in the particular District Court in which the case is brought.
6. Of direct appeal from District Court under § 238, Judicial Code; involu
tion of constitutional question.
A case otherwise within the jurisdiction of the District Court of the
United States and reviewable in the Circuit Court of Appeals is not
a case which may come direct to this court under § 238, Judicial
Code, merely because in the course of the case a question has arisen
as to whether a change in decision of the state court as to the effect
and scope of a state statute amounts to an impairment of the ob-
ligation of a contract. Moore-Mansfield Co. v. Electrical Co., 619.
7. To review judgment of state court; when judgment rested on non-Federal
grounds sufficient to sustain it.
Denial of full faith and credit to the statutes of another State cannot
be made the basis of review by this court where it appears that the
court below reached the same result that plaintiff contended for on
grounds wholly independent of the Federal question and sufficient
to sustain its action. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 123.
8. To review judgment of state court involving question of extraterritoriality
of its laws.
There is a clear distinction between questions concerning the operation
and effect of the law of a State within its borders and upon the con-
duct of persons within its jurisdiction, and questions concerning the
right of the State to extend its authority beyond its borders with
the same effect; and a decision upon the former does not constitute
a ground for refusing to entertain a writ of error to review the judg-
ment of the state court involving the latter. New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Head, 149, 166.
9. To review judgment of state court in case transferred from territorial
court.
Under §§ 32 and 33 of the Arizona Enabling Act of June 20, 1910, the
judgment of the state court in a case transferred to it from the
territorial court is not reviewable by this court simply because it
was pending in the territorial court at the time of the Enabling
Act; such a judgment can only be reviewed by this court where a
Federal question exists to give jurisdiction as in the case of judg-
ments from the courts of other States. Van Dyke v. Cordova Cop-
per Co., 188.
10. To review judgment of state court; when Federal question sufficiently
raised.
Although the state appellate court may not have referred to the con-
stitutional questions in its opinion, this court cannot regard such
silence as a condemnation of the time at, or manner in which, those
questions were raised; and, if the record shows that they were
raised in that court, this court has jurisdiction. International Har-
vester Co. v. Missouri, 199.
11. To review judgment of state court; when Federal question raised too late.
Attempts to inject Federal questions into the record by filing amended
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