NEGLIGENCE.
See ADMIRALTY, 2.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
See BILLS AND NOTES;
LOCAL LAW (N. Mex.).
NEW PROMISE.
See BILLS AND NOTES, 2.
OIL TRANSPORTATION.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
ONUS PROBANDI.
See EVIDENCE;
PUBLIC LANDS, 20.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 21;
UNITED STATES, 2.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 20, 21, 40.
PATENTS FOR LAND.
See PUBLIC LANDS.
Effect of payment by life insurance company to one of two claimants.
A payment made by a life insurance company to one of two claimants
on receiving a bond of indemnity, held, under the circumstances of
this case, not to have been the payment of a stakeholder seeking to
discharge his duty but of a person espousing the cause of one claim-
ant against the other and thereby subjecting himself to the legal
consequences arising from his action. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v.
Cohen, 123.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 31.
PENAL STATUTES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 20, 21, 28, 29.
VOL. CCXXXIV-53
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
See CONTRACTS, 10.
PERSONAL PROPERTY.
See LOCAL LAW (Ohio).
1. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court on appeal in criminal case.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands is not confined to errors of law but extends to a review of the
whole case. It has power to reverse the judgment of the Court of
First Instance in a criminal case and find the accused guilty of a
higher crime and increase the sentence. (Trono v. United States,
199 U.S. 521.) Ocampo v. United States, 91.
2. Equal protection of the law; territorial uniformity of guaranty.
The guaranty of equal protection of the law in the Philippine Bill of
Rights does not require territorial uniformity. It is not violated if
all persons within the territorial limits of their respective jurisdic-
tions are treated equally. Ib.
3. Arrest; finding of probable cause; sufficiency of.
A finding of probable cause for arrest by a prosecuting attorney is only
quasi-judicial; and a statute, otherwise valid, is not invalidated by
delegating the duty of investigation to a prosecuting attorney. Ib.
4. Preliminary examination of accused; right to; law in force.
Section 2 of act No. 612 of the Philippine Commission of February 3,
1903, providing that in cases triable before the Court of First In-
stance in the City of Manila the accused should not be entitled as of
right to a preliminary examination in any case in which the prose-
cuting attorney after due investigation shall have presented an in-
formation against him, necessarily operated to repeal inconsistent
provisions previously in force in the City of Manila. Ib.
5. Presentment or indictment by grand jury; right of accused to.
The Philippine Bill of Rights, as contained in § 5 of the act of July 1,
1902, contains no specific requirement, such as is contained in the
Fifth Amendment, of a presentment or indictment by grand jury,
nor is such a requirement included within the guaranty of due
process of law. Ib.
6. Warrants; prerequisite to issuance; conflict of laws.
Section 2 of Act No. 612 is not in conflict with that paragraph of § 5
of the act of July 1, 1902, which provides that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation; a pre-
liminary investigation by the prosecuting attorney upon which he
files a sworn information is a compliance with such provision. Ib.
7. Libel; responsibility for.
On the evidence in this case the trial court properly held that the de-
fendant was, under the law of the Philippine Islands, the re-
sponsible proprietor of the newspaper which published the libel
on which the prosecution was based. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19, 39;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 2, 17, 18, 19.
PLANT FACILITIES.
See COMMON CARRIERS, 1;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 10, 11.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9; JURISDICTION, A 1, 2, 11; C 4;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 7;
1. Chattel mortgage differentiated; effect on former of state statute requiring
delivery of chattel or recording of instrument.
There is a well-recognized distinction between a chattel mortgage and
a pledge; and a state statute requiring the delivery of the chattel or
recording of the instrument does not necessarily apply to a pledge
of personal property so situated that it is not within the power of
the owner to deliver it to the pledgee. Dale v. Pattison, 399.
2. Delivery; when delivery of warehouse receipt equivalent.
Where property is from its character or situation not capable of actual
delivery, the delivery of a warehouse receipt or other evidence of
title is sufficient to transfer the property and right of possession.
(Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384.) Ib.
3. Delivery; sufficiency of delivery of warehouse receipt; case followed.
The law of Ohio not being dissimilar from that of Pennsylvania in
recognizing the validity of transfers by delivering warehouse re-
ceipts representing property under conditions similar to those in-
volved herein, this case is controlled by Taney v. Penn Bank, 232
U. S. 174. Ib.
POLICE POWER.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7, 32;
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS, 2;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 8.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
1. Determination of scope of decision of state court.
What the Minnesota court determines as to the nature of the as-
sessment and its application to present and former stockholders
must be ascertained from the order itself. Selig v. Hamilton, 652.
2. Duty of this court in determining whether process in state court con-
stituted due process of law.
This court must exercise an independent judgment as to whether the
process sanctioned by the court of last resort of the State con-
stituted due process of law; it is not bound by, nor can it merely
accept, the decision of the state court on that question. Grannis v.
Ordean, 385.
3. Following concurrent findings of lower courts.
The settled rule of this court that the concurring findings of two courts
below will not be disturbed, unless shown to be clearly erroneous,
applies where the evidence is taken before an examiner. (Teras &
Pacific Railway Co. v. Louisiana Railroad Commission, 232 U. S.
338.) Gilson v. United States, 380.
4. Following lower courts' findings of fact.
Findings of fact concurred in by two lower Federal courts will not be
disturbed by this court unless shown to be clearly erroneous.
Washington Securities Co. v. United States, 76.
5. Following lower courts' findings of fact; what constitutes question of fact.
Whether the employer failed to provide a safe place to work is a ques-
tion of fact properly determinable by the Circuit Court of Appeals
in last resort, and this court will not disturb such a finding if con-
curred in by both courts below and justified by the record. At-
lantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 52
6. Following state court's findings of fact; when record examined to de-
termine existence of Federal question.
While, in ordinary cases, this court is bound by the findings of the state
court of last resort, that court cannot, by omitting to pass upon
basic questions of fact, deprive a litigant of the benefit of a Federal
right properly asserted; and it is the duty of this court, in the ab-
sence of adequate findings, to examine the record in order to de-
termine whether there is evidence which furnishes a basis for such
a Federal right. (Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601.)
Carlson v. Curtiss, 103.
7. Following territorial courts' ruling on local questions.
This court accepts the rulings of the territorial courts on local questions
of pleading and practice. (Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Friday, 232 U. S.
694.) Schmidt v. Bank of Commerce, 64.
8. Following state court's construction of state statute.
This court does not go behind the construction given to a state statute
by the state courts. Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 224.
9. Following state court's construction of state statute.
The state court having held that the term "railroad company" as used
in a state police statute is inclusive of natural persons operating a
railroad and that the statute is not unconstitutional as denying
equal protection of the law to railroad corporations because it
does not include natural persons, this court concurs in that view.
Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 280.
10. Raising Federal question; when too late.
A Federal question may not be imported into a record for the first time
by way of assignment of error made for the purpose of review by
this court. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 123.
11. Raising question of rights under full faith and credit clause; timeliness.
As a general rule, for the purpose of review by this court, rights under
the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution are re-
quired to be expressly set up and claimed in the court below. Ib.
12. Record; sufficiency of.
A motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals will
not be denied as premature because the record has not been printed
if the record of proceedings in the District Court is here and this
court is sufficiently advised as to the situation of the case to dispose
of it without doing injustice to the parties. (National Bank v.
Insurance Co., 100 U. S. 43.) Lazarus v. Prentice, 263.
See CLAIMS AGAINST UNITED STATES, 1;
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