iana and the Floridas, might she not prefer their independence to their subjection to Great Britain? Does not the proposition of the Count d'Estaing furnish us an opening to communicate our ideas on this subject to the court of France, and through them to that of Madrid? and our readiness to join them in guaranteeing the independence of those countries? This might save us from a war, if Great Britain respected our weight in a war; and if she does not, the object would place the war on popular ground with us. 2. As to England?-say to Beckwith, That as to a treaty of commerce, we would prefer amicable to adversary arrangements, though the latter would be infallible, and in our own power: that our ideas are, that such a treaty should be founded in perfect reciprocity, and would, therefore, be its own price: that as to an alliance, we can say nothing till its object be shown, and that it is not to be inconsistent with existing engagements that in the event of a war between Great Britain and Spain, we are disposed to be strictly neutral: that, however, we should view with extreme uneasiness any attempts of either power to seize the possessions of the other on our frontier, as we consider our own safety interested in a due balance between our neighbors. [It might be deemed advantageous to express this latter sentiment, because, if there be any difference of opinion in their councils, whether to bend their force against North or South America, or the islands (and certainly there is room for difference), and if these opinions be nearly balanced, that balance ought to be determined by the prospect of having an enemy the more or less, according to the object they should select.] July 12th, 1790. XVII. Heads of consideration on the Navigation of the Mississippi, for Mr. Carmichael, Aug. 22d, 1790. We have a right to the navigation of the Mississippi-1, by Nature; 2, by Treaty. It is necessary to us. United States is on the More than half the territory of the waters of that river. Two hundred thousand of our citizens are settled on them, of whom forty thouThese have no other outlet for their tobacco, sand bear arms. We have hitherto respected the indecision of Spain, because we wish peace ;—because our western citizens have had vent at home for their productions. A surplus of production begins now to demand foreign markets. Whenever they shall say, "We cannot, we will not, be longer shut up," the United States will be reduced to the following dilemma: 1. To force them to acquiescence. 2. To separate from them, rather than take part in a war against Spain. 3. Or to preserve them in our Union, by joining them in the war. The 1st is neither in our principles, nor in our power. 2d. A multitude of reasons decide against the second. It may suffice to speak out one were we to give up half our territory rather than engage in a just war to preserve it, we should not keep the other half long. 3d. The third is the alternative we must adopt. How are we to obtain that navigation? (A.) By Force. I. Acting separately. That we can effect this with certainty and promptitude, circumstances decide. Objection. We cannot retain New Orleans, for instance, were we to take it. Answer. A moderate force may be so secured, as to hold out till succored. Our succors can be prompt and effectual. Suppose, after taking it, we withdraw our force. If Spain retakes it by an expedition, we can recover it by a counter-expedition, and so as often as the case shall happen. Their expedition will be slow, expensive, and lead to catastrophes. Ours sudden, economical, and a check can have no consequences. We should associate the country to our Union. The inhabitants wish this. They are not disposed to be of the Spanish government. It is idle in Spain to suppose our Western inhabitants will unite with them. They could be quiet but a short time under a government so repugnant to their feelings. Were they to come under it for present purposes, it would be with a view to throw it off soon. Should they remain, they would communicate a spirit of independence to those with whom they should be mixed. II. Acting in conjunction with Great Britain, and with a view to partition. The Floridas (including New Orleans) would be assigned to us. Louisiana (or all the Western waters of the Mississippi) to them. We confess that such an alliance is not what we would wish. Because it may eventually lead us into embarrassing situations with our best friend, and put the power of two neighbors into the hands of one. L. Lansdowne has declared he gave the Floridas to Spain rather than the United States as a bone of discord with the House of Bourbon, and of re-union with Great Britain. Connolly's attempt (as well as other facts) proves they keep it in view. (B.) By Negotiation. I. What must Spain do of necessity? The conduct of Spain has proved that the occlusion of the Mississippi is system with her. If she opens it now, it will be because forced by imperious circumstances. She will consequently shut it again when these circumstances cease. Treaty will be no obstacle. Irregularities, real or pretended, in our navigators, will furnish color enough. Perpetual broils, and finally war will ensue. Prudence, and even necessity, imposes on us the law of settling the matter now, finally, and not by halves. With experience of the past and prospect of the future, it would be imbe cility in us to accept the naked navigation. With that, we must have what is necessary to its use, and without which it would be useless to secure its continuance; that is, a port near the mouth to receive our vessels and protect the navigation. But even this will not secure the Floridas and Louisiana against Great Britain. If we are neutral, she will wrest those possessions from Spain. The inhabitants (French, English, Scotch, American) would prefer England to Spain. II. What then had Spain better do of choice? Cede to us all territory on our side of the Mississippi: on condition that we guarantee all her possessions on the Western waters of that river, she agreeing further, to subsidize us if the guarantee brings us into the war. Should Great Britain possess herself of the Floridas and Louisiana, her governing principles are conquest, colonization, commerce, monopoly. She will establish powerful colonies in them. These can be poured into the Gulf of Mexico for any sudden enterprise there, or invade Mexico, their next neighbor, by land. Whilst a fleet co-operates along shore, and cuts off relief. And proceed successively from colony to colony. With respect to us, if Great Britain establishes herself on our whole land-board our lot will be bloody and eternal war, or indissoluble confederacy. Which ought we to choose? What will be the lot of the Spanish colonies in the jaws of such a confederacy? What will secure the ocean against the monopoly? Safer for Spain that we should be her neighbor, than England. Conquest not in our principles: inconsistent with our government. Not our interest to cross the Mississippi for ages. And will never be our interest to remain united with those who do. Intermediate chances save the trouble of calculating so far forward. Consequences of this cession, and guarantee: 1. Every subject of difference will be removed from between Spain and the United States. 2. Our interest will be strongly engaged in her retaining her American possessions. 3. Spain will be quieted as to Louisiana, and her territories west of that. 4. She may employ her whole force in defence of her islands and Southern possessions. 5. If we preserve our neutrality, it will be a very partial one to her. 6. If we are forced into the war, it will be, as we wish, on the side of the House of Bourbon. 7. Her privateers will commit formidable depredation on the British trade, and occupy much of their force. 8. By withholding supplies of provision, as well as by concurring in expeditions, the British islands will be in imminent danger. 9. Their expenses of precaution, both for their continental and insular possessions, will be so augmented as to give a hope of running their credit down. In fine, for a narrow slip of barren, detached, and expensive country, Spain secures the rest of her territory, and makes an ally where she might have a dangerous enemy. XVIII. Questions to be considered of. I. As to France. Shall it be proposed to M. de Ternan to form a treaty ad referendum to this effect: The citizens of the United States and of France, their vessels, productions, and manufactures, shall be received and considered each in all the dominions of the other as if they were the native citizens, or the ships, productions, or manufactures of the other; and the productions of the sea shall be received in all the dominions of each, as if they were the productions of the country by the industry of whose citizens they have been taken or produced from the sea. Saving only as to the persons of their citizens, that they shall continue under those in capacities for office, each with the other, which the constitution of France, or of the United States, or any of them, have or shall establish against foreigners of all nations, without exception? |