nished her by the United States, but we deprived ourselves of the means of finding substitutes for theirs: thus our adversaries could procure cotton from Brazil, Egypt, and the East Indies, tobacco from South America, naval stores from Sweden, lumber from Nova Scotia, grain from the Baltic, though at a greater cost; but we, exporting nothing, were unable to import the woollens, linens, silks, hardware and pottery, to which we were accustomed, and which we had not yet learnt to make.

There was also this less obvious disadvantage attending our policy. Trade thus forcibly driven into new directions would gradually wear away the first obstacles and make a smooth channel for itself, which it might afterwards spontaneously retain; and the West India colonies themselves, stimulated by their necessities, might find themselves possessed of resources of which they were previously not aware, and which they might be disposed to cherish, on account of their being less precarious. They might think that some additional pecuniary cost was well exchanged for the greater uniformity and steadiness of supply. This change did in fact take place, and it was long after the peace, before the West Indies furnished as extensive a market for American products as before the embargo. If its effect, as a measure of coercion, or as a means of appealing to the interests of Great Britain, was doubtful, it was clearly the most injurious expedient as a mere question of profit and loss. Whatever were the hazards of capture from the arbitrary edicts of the belligerents, they could be fairly estimated by the merchants, and would be a tax upon his foreign adventures, whether he paid for insurance, or was his own insurer. And no branch of commerce would be begun, certainly none would be persevered in, if it would not bear this charge. To prohibit the merchants, therefore, from employing their capital in this way, was to withhold from them a profit within their reach, and was so far an injury not only to them, but to the whole class of their customers, whether producers or consumers. It was further injurious, as by reason of the low price of domestic products, compared with their prices abroad, and the enhanced price of foreign merchandise, it greatly increased the profits of

illicit trade, and consequently the temptations to engage in it, so that the loyal and patriotic merchant saw himself interdicted from the pursuit of his vocation, merely that the fraudulent smuggler might be enriched.

It must, however, be recollected that the measure was defended by its advocates not as the most profitable, but only as preferable to war, since submission to the insolent abuses of power by the belligerents, the only other alternative, was defended by no one. It was therefore thought better to bear the evils of the embargo, for a time, serious as they were, than to resort to war. There was a chance that those nations would abandon their lawless pretensions when they were found hurtful to themselves as well as their enemies. There was also a chance of peace; and it was distinctly foreseen that beyond a limited time, war would be the preferable, as well as certain expedient. It is yet believed by some that, if persevered in a little longer, the first of these expectations would have been realized.

All these evils began to be sensibly felt in a few months after the embargo was laid, and their pressure was steadily increasing. In the violent opposition it produced, joined to the general antipathies of party, pains were taken to prove in the opposition journals that it operated more severely on us than on foreign nations. This was so natural a consequence that it might be regarded as one of the inherent defects of the policy. It was in reference to this course that Mr. Jefferson remarked in a letter to Dr. Leib, on the 23d of June: "They (the federalists) are now playing a game of the most mischievous tendency, without, perhaps, being themselves aware of it. They are endeavouring to convince England that we suffer more by the embargo than they do, and that if they will but hold out awhile, we must abandon it. It is true, the time will come when we must abandon it. But if this is before the repeal of the orders of council, we must abandon it only for a state of war. The day is not distant when that will be preferable to a longer continuance of the embargo. But we can never remove that, and let our vessels go out and be taken under these orders, without

making reprisal. Yet this is the very state of things which these federal monarchists are endeavouring to bring about; and in this it is but too possible they may succeed. But the fact is, that if we have war with England, it will be solely produced by their measures. I think that in two or three months we

shall know what will be the issue."

The question which now occupied the minds of all was, what course the country should pursue in its present difficulties. The alternatives were war, embargo, or submission; and for the latter there were no open, probably no real advocates. But the nation was greatly divided on the other alternatives. Many, especially in the navigating states, were for the repeal of the embargo, with any consequence that might result from its repeal. There was also a further diversity as to the course to be taken after it was repealed-some were willing to let the merchants arm and defend their ships-others were for open war, but here again they differed. The federal party were generally for war with France and most of their opponents for war with England; while a few, regarding the provocations received from those nations, by the United States, rather than their means of resenting it, were for going to war with both. These questions greatly agitated the public minds, and engrossed the journals so as to take away much of the interest usually felt in a presidential election. Mr. Madison having received the recommendation of a large majority of the members of Congress of the republican party, was regarded throughout the Union as the choice of that party, and it constituting a majority of the nation, he was accordingly elected. Mr. C. C. Pinckney of South Carolina, was the candidate of the federal party, and received the votes of all the New England states, except Vermont, the vote of Delaware, two votes in Maryland and three in North Carolina; making in all forty-seven votes. George Clinton received six of the nineteen votes of New York, and James Madison all the rest, amounting to 122 votes. George Clinton was elected vice-president. The effort made in Virginia to procure the vote of that state for Mr. Monroe proved utterly abortive, and his friends could succeed no farther than

to obtain for him three votes in New York, for the office of vicepresident.

It has been urged by Mr. Jefferson's enemies that he was prompted to recommend the embargo by way of "a co-operation with the French emperor, to diminish, and as far as possible to destroy, the commerce of Great Britain; and thereby compel her, at least, to make peace, if not absolutely to subject her to the control of the imperial conqueror; when it was apparent that the object of his ambition was universal empire." But the whole tenor of Mr. Jefferson's correspondence and acts disprove this injurious imputation.

That one of the considerations which recommended the embargo was that it would be deeply injurious to the commerce of Great Britain was unquestionable, and considering the great and continued injuries received by the United States from that nation, it would have implied a baseness of spirit not to have sought such retaliation. But that he preferred it as a less evil to his country than war, is equally evident. All his letters written at this time show that he looked to war as the certain alternative if the belligerents continued their hostile edicts, and the embargo only as less injurious to the United States than war. His correspondence further shows that he regarded Bonaparte's usurpations in the same light as the federalists themselves, and that as soon as the military chieftain threw off the mask, and showed that he was swayed by the love of power and self-aggrandizement, he lost Mr. Jefferson's confidence and good

will.

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CHAPTER XII.

The President's Message to Congress. The foreign relations of the United States. Correspondence between the American Minister at Paris and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Madison's Correspondence with Mr. Pinkney. Proceedings of Congress. The Embargo. Inquiry as to the two millions appropriated for the purchase of Florida. Effects of the Embargo. Measures of defence. Embargo taken off. Communication from Mr. J. Q. Adams. State of public affairs. Review of Mr. Jefferson's administration.

1808-1809.

HAVING seen the measures of self-defence adopted by the United States against the worst mischiefs to which the undiscriminating fury of the European belligerents exposed them, let us now see how these rights were asserted by their government, in its diplomatic intercourse with those belligerents.

Mr. Erskine having, on the 12th of March, 1807, sent a formal notice of the Berlin decree, and added, that his government, not exercising that retaliation which was justifiable, had merely issued an order of January, 1807, for preventing commerce between different ports of his enemies, Mr. Madison, in reply, remonstrated against this order, and the right of retaliation asserted in it; and Mr. Erskine having, on the 23d of February, 1808, explained the character of the order in council of November, 1807, Mr. Madison, on the 25th of March, replied to him at length. He denies the fact assumed by the orders, that the United States had acquiesced in the French decrees, and