and trespass by a defendant, who claims no right under a statute of the United States. 10 Nor a suit in support of an adverse claim to land or mining patent under U. S. R. S. § 2326; unless its decision turns upon a disputed construction of the Federal Constitution, a treaty, or a Federal statute.11 Where prior decisions have so determined the rights of the parties that they are removed from controversy, it cannot be said that the construction of the statute is disputed.12 The questions of fact: as to what is a "vein," "lode," or "ledge," and as to what is the top or apex of a vein or lode within the meaning of Sections 2320, 2322 and 2325 of the Revised Statutes of the United States; and as to what are the boundaries mentioned in a mining patent or land grant; 14 or the boundaries of a State as prescribed by the act of Congress admitting it to the Union, when the construction of the statute is not in question; or, it has been held, as to the priority of the location; 16 do not involve Federal questions. Questions as to what are the rights. recognized by the local laws, rules, regulations, customs and decisions, which the statutes of the United States direct shall he enforced, do not, it has been held, arise under the Constitu

13

10 Blackburn v. Portland G. M. Co., 175 U. S. 571, 44 L. ed. 276; Shoshone M. Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 44 L. ed. 864; Larned v. Jenkins, 109 Fed. 100, 48 C. C. A. 252. These cases overruled a number of previous decisions of the Circuit Courts to the contrary.

11 McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70, 54 L. ed. 95. See Columbia Valley R. Co. v. Portland & S. Ry. Co., C. C. A., 162 Fed. 603, where the construction of a statute was involved.

12 Colorado Central Consol. Min Co. v. Turck, 150 U. S. 138, 37 L. ed. 1030; Blackburn v. Portland Gold Min. Co., 175 U. S. 571, 585, 44 L. ed. 276, 282; Blue Bird Min. Co. v. Largey, 49 Fed. 289; Montana Ore-Purchasing Co. v. Boston & M. C. C. & S. Min. Co., C. C. A., 85 Fed. 867.

15

13 Colorado Central Consol. Min. Co. v. Turck, 150 U. S. 138, 37 L. ed. 1030; Blackburn v. Portland Gold Min. Co., 175 U. S. 571, 585, 44 L. ed. 276, 282; Blue Bird Min. Co. v. Largey, 49 Fed. 289.

14 Robinson v. Anderson, 121 U. S. 522; Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co. v. Hoff, 48 Fed. 340; Joy v. St. Louis, 122 Fed. 524. Contra, Green v. Valley, 101 Fed. 882.

15 Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U. S. 332, 50 L. ed. 776. But see Moore v. McGuire, 205 U. S. 214, 51 L. ed. 776.

16 Wise v. Nixon, 76 Fed. 3; Dewey Min. Co. v. Miller, 96 Fed. 1; Peabody Gold Min. Co. v. Gold Hill Min. Co., 97 Fed. 657. Contra, Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Miller, 97 Fed. 681.

tion and laws of the United States.17 An allegation in a declaration of ejectment, that the plaintiff was ousted in violation of a specified treaty and of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, is insufficient to support the jurisdiction.18 Where the complaint charged a continuing trespass, demanding a lump sum as damages, the plaintiff claiming under a series of titles to the same land, the adjudication of one of which alone involved a Federal question, it was held, that the whole case might be removed.19 Where the complaint showed that the controversy arose under the land laws of the United States, a Federal court of equity has entertained and determined all incidental questions between the respective parties arising out of their conflicting claims and granted an injunction and appoint a receiver.20

§ 32. Cases arising under the laws relating to navigable waters. It has been held: that cases arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, where the plaintiff by his complaint asserts a right under the Federal Constitution and certain acts of Congress, to maintain a dock on a navigable stream; 1 where a suit is brought to enjoin an obstruction upon a navigable stream, such as a bridge, or a log boom, and the plaintiff claims that the same is forbidden by an act of Congress, or by a Federal official acting under lawful authority,5

17 Trafton v. Nougues, Fed. Cas. No. 14,134 (4 Sawyer, 178); Telluride Power Transmission Co. v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 175 U. S. 639, 44 L. ed. 305; dismissing appeal 51 Pac. 146, 16 Utah, 125.

18 Filhiol v. Maurice, 185 U. S. 108, 46 L. ed. 827.

19 Evans v. Durango Land & Coal Co., 80 Fed. 433, 25 C. C. A. 531.

20 Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Miller, 97 Fed. 681; State Improvement-Development Co. v. Leininger, 226 Fed. 884. Where the bill prayed an injunction to restrain an officer of the United States from recording the cancellation of land selections and a decree directing a State offieer to issue to the plaintiff plaintiff's patents for such lands.

$32. 1 Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410, 47 L. ed. 525; Calumet Grain & Elevator Co. v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 431, 47 L. ed. 532; Kenyon v. Squire, 1 Wash. St. 9, 24 Pac. 28.

2 New Orleans M. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 26 L. ed. 96; E. A. Chatfield Co. v. New Haven, 110 Fed. 788.

3 U. S. v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U. S. 211, 44 L. ed. 437; reversing 81 Fed. 658, 26 C. C. A.

547.

4 U. S. v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U. S. 211, 44 L. ed. 437; reversing 81 Fed. 658, 26 C. C. A. 547; where the statute permitted such a suit, when the obstruction was not affirmatively authorized by

or where the court takes judicial notice of an act of Congress under which the defendant contends that the obstruction is authorized; where the plaintiff claims the right to accretions along a river front under letters patent of the United States, issued in pursuance of an act of Congress and the construction of the act under which the patent was issued is in question; 7 but that the defendants cannot obtain a writ of error to review a judgment of a State court granting an injunction against their interference with the plaintiff's possession of lands claimed in the complaint under an act of Congress, when the defense is that they have acquired by priority of possession rights to the use of the water which have vested and accrued, are recog nized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws and decisions. as provided in $2339 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,8

§ 32a. Cases arising under the Interstate Commerce Law. The Interstate Commerce Law provides: "Any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act may either make complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit in his or their own behalf for the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this act, in any District or Circuit Court of the United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person or persons shall not have the right to pursue both of said remedies, and must in each case elect which one of the two methods of procedure herein provided for he or they will adopt."1

The essential character of commerce, not the bill at the place where title passes, determines whether it is interstate or intrastate.2

It has been held: that a bill by one railroad company against

law, whether State or Federal, and the only question for consideration was whether the obstruction was authorized by a State statute.

5 E. A. Chatfield Co. v. New Haven, 110 Fed. 788.

6 New Orleans, M. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 26 L. ed. 96.

7 King v. St. Louis, 98 Fed. 641.

8 Telluride Power Transmission Co. v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 175 U. S. 639, 44 L. ed. 305; dismissing appeal 51 Pac. 146, 16 Utah 125; In re Helena & L. Smelting & Reduction Co., 48 Fed. 609.

§ 32a. 124 St. at L. 382, Comp. St. § 8573.

2 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Clark Bros. Coal Min. Co., 238 U. S. 456.

another and its employee, to enforce the interstate commerce act, by enjoining the defendants from refusing to receive plaintiff's cars, and one to enjoin a common carrier from enforcing an unreasonable rate for transportation, in violation of the same statute; arose under the Constitution and laws of the United States. It has been held: that an application for a mandamus, to compel a railroad engaged in interstate commerce to run its trains to a certain station, in obedience to a State statute, involves a Federal question, since a judgment therein may impose a burden on interstate commerce. But, it has been said, that a constitutional question is not presented where the court has occasion to apply the rules of the common law regulating transportation charges, whether or not the carriage be interstate.6 Suits to enjoin combinations, and to cancel agreements, which are in restraint of commerce between States, or to prevent by trespass interference with the performance of a contract with the National Government 9 arise under the laws of the United States.

10

The value of the matter in controversy is immaterial to the jurisdiction; except in the case of a removal where the statutes provide that: "No suit brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction against a railroad company, or other corporation, or person, engaged in and carrying on the business of a common carrier, to recover damages for delay, loss of, or injury to property received for transportation by such common carrier under sections of the Act to regulate commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, as amended June

3 Ex parte Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 41 L. ed. 1110.

4 Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 215 U. S. 501, 54 L. ed. 300, affirming Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Macon Grocery Co., C. C. A., 166 Fed. 206; Tift v. Southern Ry. Co., 123 Fed. 789: Kalispell Lumber Co. V. Great Northern Ry. Co., 157 Fed. 845; Sunderland Bros. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 158 Fed. 877.

5 Illinois v. Rock Island & P. R.

Co., 71 Fed. 753.

6 Murray v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.

Co., 92 Fed. 868, 35 C. C. A. 62; affirming 62 Fed. 24.

7 Mannington v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 183 Fed. 133.

8 Chalmers Chemical Co. v. Chadoloid Chemical Co., 175 Fed. 995.

9 Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. District Lodge No. 9, I. A. of M., 252 Fed. 597. Contra, Pickering Land & Timber Co. v. Wisby, 242 Fed. 993.

10 Jud. Code, $ 24, 30 St. at L. 416, 36 St. at L. 1094, Comp. St. 991.

twenty-ninth, nineteen hundred and eight, February twentyfifth, nineteen hundred and nine, and June eighteenth, nineteen hundred and ten, shall be removed to any court of the United States where the matter in controversy does not exceed, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000.'' 11 An action in a State court, to recover for personal injuries. alleged to have been received by reason of the failure of defendant railroad company properly to equip its cars with safety appliances, is not removable merely because of an allegation in the complaint that defendant is engaged in interstate commerce, where it does not appear that there is any controversy as to the construction or effect of the Federal law relating to railroads engaged in such commerce, since the questions of fact whether defendant is engaged in interstate commerce, and, if so, whether it has complied with the law, are not Federal questions. 12

The District Courts have jurisdiction of suits to set aside or restrain the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.13 The cases in which such a review is proper are explained in a subsequent section.14

A District Court has jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin a railroad company from refusing to transport goods although the controversy has not been submitted to the commission; when no question concerning the charges for transportation is involved in the suit; 15 but not when the refusal has been confined to a single carload.15a

The District Courts have jurisdiction of actions to collect damages awarded by orders of reparation made by the Interstate Commerce Commission.16 Such an action may be brought

11 36 St. at L. 1094, Comp. St. 991; E. H. Emery Co. v. Ame. Refrig. Tr. Co., 246 U. S. 634; Southern Pac. Co. v. Stewart, 245 U. S. 359; Adams v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 210 Fed. 362.

12 Myrtle v. Nevada C. & O. Ry. Co., 137 Fed. 193.

13 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, 218 Fed. 914; Chestnut Ridge Ry. Co. v. United States, 248 Fed. 792; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Spiller, C. C. A., 246 Fed. 1. 14 Infra, § 151.

Fed. Prac. Vol. I-8

15 Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U. S. 70; Royal Brewing Co. v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co., 217 Fed. 146.

15a Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Van Dusen Harrington Co., C. C. A., 245 Fed. 454.

16 Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Meeker, C. C. A., 211 Fed. 785.

"If a carrier does not comply with an order for the payment of money within the time limit in such order, the complainant, or any person for whose benefit such order was