voyage.23 But he appears to regard the abolition of contraband as impractical.

On this head, Meurer says:

My plan demands, furthermore, that the idea of conditional contraband disappear entirely from international law. While according to my proposal, all articles needed in warfare, hence the objects which hitherto constituted absolute contraband, can no longer be transported nor shipped in transit, and while the sovereign who fails in his supervisory duties renders himself liable to a breach of neutrality, for which he may be brought to account through diplomatic channels, commerce is to remain absolutely unrestricted in all other respects. It is easily perceived that the stakes involved in the control of war shipments are not too high; the sea becomes really free.

Kleen's plan, too, which was fully discussed in the preceding pages, is in agreement with my own views. He wants to prohibit only the shipment of "actual war munitions" (munitions de guerre properment dites) as constituting the chief articles of military aid. Kleen was of the opinion that it was not advisable to stamp as contraband and to prohibit by means of a contraband law the sale of such articles as were required too much in the course of daily life. According to paragraph 9 of his proposal, the Powers were to come to an agreement concerning a general international convention that would cover only objects of so-called absolute contraband, and likewise any changes in the contraband list that might eventually be required on account of inventions, progress in the art of warfare, or new international principles. For that reason, Kleen, whose far-seeing mind already perceived, as it were, the Hague Peace Conferences, had in view alternating revisions of the lists at periodically convoked conferences. He expressed himself strongly against contraband declarations being issued by the belligerents; these, in his opinion, were never determined by considerations of the general, but invariably of selfish, interests.24

Furthermore, Meurer is of the opinion that international law should impose upon neutral governments the obligation of preventing the shipment of absolute contraband. He strongly favors an international agreement prohibiting the exportation of arms. He cites in support of this view such authorities as Woolsey, Bulmerincq and Kleen; and, as shown in the above citation, endorses Kleen's plan of 23 The theory of continuous voyage, Meurer (op. cit., p. 65) characterizes as a "bluff for the purpose of covering up one's weakness through an artificially created fear among neutral nations."

24 Meurer, Das Program der Meersfreiheit, 1917, pp. 86-87.

1893-a plan which was rejected by the Institute of International Law. He says (p. 89): "The spirit of true impartiality can assert itself freely only through an international embargo against exportation of articles that constitute absolute contraband."

In respect to conditional contraband, Meurer (pp. 91, ff.) proposes that the conception be altogether abandoned by international law, that is, he favors absolute freedom of trade in conditional contraband. (It appears that on land Germany is to act in accordance with the law of military necessity; at sea this law does not apply. There is to be one law for land, and another for sea warfare.)

Meurer does not think much of the plan of an international maritime police force as a means of securing the observance of the freedom of the seas, but rather favors the economic boycott. He looks to the neutral community of nations to achieve this result. Should they fail, there remains the right of self-help. He thinks an international agreement could not make matters worse for Germany, but anticipates improved conditions for her after the war through the demonstrated success of the submarine, though he is honest enough to admit that German mastery would also mean the destruction of the freedom of the seas. Meurer concludes that the most effective safeguard of the freedom of the seas is eventually-not an international agreement, but the absolute certainty that all fresh ambitions for world dominance will be dashed to pieces against the Concert of Powers that will act as guardian of the seas.

There appears to be in Germany at the present time a strong current flowing in the direction of the abolition, or at least the limitation, of belligerent rights at sea under the guarantee of a League of Nations. In other words, under a socialistic or semi-socialistic régime, there is naturally a growing demand for a so-called neutralization or internationalization of the high seas and all international passage

ways.

Whether such schemes be looked upon as practicable or merely desirable but Utopian, whether regarded from the national or international point of view, the writer is convinced that belligerent rights at sea should not be surrendered lightly. They are all of one piece, and their preservation as a whole is certainly desirable from the

standpoint of a nation which is destined to be one of the Great Sea Powers of the world. But their preservation is no less desirable from the point of view of those who believe that the peace of the world and the freedom of the seas can best be secured and maintained through international action.25

AMOS S. HERSHEY.

25 In his pamphlet entitled Freiheit der Meere und der Kunftige Fridensschlus, published in 1917, the German publicist Triepel sets up the following thesis:

"The complete doing away of the rights of contraband and blockade is a Utopia. The abolition of the right of capture of prizes, without at the same time doing away with the rights of contraband and of blockade, would be not only a futile innovation, but one decidedly injurious to Germany. For the rights of capture, contraband and blockade are three fetters of maritime trade so ingeniously welded together, that as soon as one is loosened or destroyed the other lays hold so much the more firmly."

"Triepel dedicates to the proving of this thesis more detailed explanations. He tries to show that, in the first place, there is not the least prospect that the institution of contraband will ever disappear from the law of warfare. If the right of capture should be abolished but that of contraband be retained, then the conception of contraband, which up to the present has referred only to neutral property, would be applied also to that of the enemy. This enemy property would then fall a prey to the opponent, not as booty but as contraband. There would then arise the danger that by the great extension of the idea of contraband sea-booty might again be introduced, by means of which the maritime commerce of the enemy could be crippled just as much as by the right of capture. The abolition of the right of capturing prizes, without the abolition of the right of declaring contraband, would be advantageous to the sea-power which could manipulate the weapon of the capture of contraband goods the more readily. As long as the geographical situation and the proportions of power have not changed, Germany will derive more harm than benefit from such a freedom of the seas. The prospects for an abolition of blockade are just as slight. If, moreover, the right to capture prizes should be abolished but not that of blockade, the result would be ineffectual. For blockade would then signify to the adversary nothing else than capture. Ships would fall a prey to the enemy either as prizes or as blockade-runners. The blockade would destroy the enemy's commerce by its very existence. Therefore a blockading sea-power could, if necessary, dispense with the right of capture, for one military measure could be substituted for another. The abolition of the right of captur ing prizes would have to be followed, as a logical conclusion, by the abolition of the right of blockade. In England the correct deduction was made that, because they could not dispense with blockade, neither could they with the capturing of prizes. At any rate, the retention of the right of blockade would make the abolition of the right of capture an illusion. On the other hand, the abolition of the right of blockade with the retention of the right of capture would not have the least advantage for Germany. Yes, even if both institutions

should be abolished, there would be no gain; for at once sharper emphasis would be laid upon other means of warfare, upon substitutes for blockade. The suppression of the introduction of contraband goods might very successfully replace blockade; even the mere prohibition of the right to import contraband goods might operate as a blockade. The same effect might be attained by the extension of the conception of contraband; likewise by the obliteration of the distinction between absolute and relative contraband. At any rate, the abolition of blockade could without the least difficulty be rendered ineffectual by the energetic application of the right to declare contraband. The problem would work out just as in the case of trying to abolish the capture of prizes. Capture, contraband, and blockade are like the three keyboards of an instrument, on any one of which one can at pleasure play the same melody. If necessary, contraband could be renounced if it were permitted to retain blockade; both blockade and capture could be given up if contraband remained. A renunciation of the capture of prizes is, therefore, according to Triepel, only possible if both blockade and contraband are abolished without leaving either a trace or a substitute. And that, he says, is impossible of realization. Substitutes for the one or the other would always be present. Moreover, Triepel does not lose sight of the possibility that England in a future naval war might be more vulnerable than it has so far been. In that case the Germans would be fools if they should rob themselves of the right of capture and of blockade. Consequently, Triepel comes to the conclusion that the abolition of the right of capture would bring Germany no advantage, but perhaps also no detriment." Citation from Nippold, Die Gestaltung des Völkerrechts nach dem Weltkriege, 1917, pp. 279-281.

I was unfortunately unable to procure a copy of Triepel's important pamphlet in time for the preparation of this article.

THE NEUTRALITY OF SWITZERLAND

IV

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR (Concluded)

IT has been finely said of Switzerland that while the present war has demonstrated in a sinister manner Swiss dependence upon its powerful neighbors for fuel and food, and thus for its very existence, nevertheless neither these neighbors nor the world at large could for a moment spare the example of heroism and devotion so constantly and consistently set by the Swiss nation in its political and social life. This quality of devotion has been illustrated during the war not alone by the struggles unavoidable in the maintenance of neutrality, but also in the far-reaching activities of the International Red Cross at Geneva. Indeed, the work accomplished through the agencies of this wonderful organization in the internment and care of wounded soldiers and their repatriation where permissible under belligerent agreement, in the repatriation of civilians driven from occupied territory, the transmission of mail to prisoners, and the discovery of vast numbers of the missing, constitute one of the most striking chapters in the war's history.

No feature of the Red Cross work is more worthy of study than the Bureau of Information established at Geneva (Bureau de Renseignments sur les prisonniers de guerre), and which is the issue of an interesting development. The earlier conceptions of Red Cross activities had the sick and wounded alone in view. At the first it was thought that the interests of interned prisoners might be safely left to the various national Red Cross societies, but the vast exigencies born of the present conflict have amply confirmed the foresight of provisions made at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and which sought a distinctly international scope if adequate work was to be done. A nearly contemporaneous line of thought is seen in