A. C., 279, the ship was told that it could not go to the Prize Court and claim compensation because it was inconvenienced by a regulation which, having regard to the conditions, was justified as against the enemy. The second retaliatory order not only said that the neutral was not entitled to compensation, but created a new international law offence and asked the Prize Court to condemn any ship which had committed it. It was within the rights of a belligerent to make orders which created additional inconvenience for neutrals, but not to create a new offence. The order therefore was illegal.

LORD SUMNER said that if it was part of international law that a belligerent might retaliate, then a Prize Court in enforcing the order was only giving effect to a new chapter in well-established international law.

SIR JOHN SIMON said that the cargo was not of enemy origin within the true meaning of the Order in Council. In the case of retaliatory orders a neutral must put up with incidental inconvenience, the reason being that the belligerent was not attacking the neutral but was exercising a right which had sprung up in consequence of the bad conduct of his opponent; but while a neutral must suffer inconvenience, a retaliatory order should not expose him to the loss of his property by decree of a prize court. The inconvenience to which the second retaliatory order exposed a neutral was unreasonable and excessive. A neutral had certain rights, and those rights could not be turned into wrongs by a retaliatory order. International law was concerned with securing a true balance between the rights of neutrals and the rights of belligerents. One must work a retaliatory order so as not to forfeit the neutral's vested rights.

SIR ARTHUR CHANNELL.-Does not that take away the possibility of the power of retaliation? If your enemy does a wrong, you must do the same by way of retaliation.

SIR JOHN SIMON.-It is idle to talk about the rights of neutrals under international law if by the wrongdoing of belligerents those rights can be whittled away.

SIR JOHN SIMON, continuing his argument for the shipowners, said that the second retaliatory order was not only wrong in kind, but excessive in degree. In carrying out the order, the captain of the Leonora had said that he would have had to run enormous risks in going to and returning from a British port, as he would have had to pass over the British and German mine areas. Indiscriminate sinkmg was announced by the Germans on February 1, and this was ollowed by the second retaliatory order. In the meantime, the Admiralty took action quite inconsistent with what the order said neutral vessels must do. The Admiralty announced that it was dangerous for ships to cross certain areas, and later actually warned neutrals that those areas should be avoided.

2 This JOURNAL, January, 1919, p. 127.

of the rule of the law of nations. Nothing hinders the completion of this field of law extending toward the future as much as this mutual suspicion between states engendered by armaments."

Dr. Wehberg explains further that his book is not a piece of propaganda, but a "scientific treatment of the problem in respect to its historical development in theory and practice and its valuation from a sociological and international law standpoint.

Considerably more than one-half of the work is devoted to matters "historical" under the general captions of "Efforts of Private Persons and Associations," "Efforts of Parliaments" and "Efforts of Governments." This part of the book invites no particular comment, inasmuch as most of the material is contained in English works readily accessible to students of the subject. There is of course a full treatment of the discussions on this subject at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, including a condemnation of Germany's policy at these conferences. There is a failure, however, to utilize the interesting revelations of Andrew D. White, as contained in his luminous Autobiography.

The most important part of Dr. Wehberg's new book seems to be the part headed "Grundsätzliches" (Matters Fundamental). But even in respect to this portion of the work the reviewer confesses to a certain sense of disappointment. The author apparently treads none but beaten paths and contributes little or nothing to the discussion that might be called new or "striking." He dwells upon the insecurity of armaments in general, the dependence of national armaments upon one another, the need for an international understanding on the subject, the now almost universally acknowledged insufficiency of mere judicial or arbitral methods, etc. He states and answers methodically the various objections of an ethical, economic, political or technical nature that may be urged against a policy of limitation of armaments. He also discusses the powerful influences exerted by the armament industries and the various plans suggested for a limitation of armaments, as also the means of international guarantee and control, devoting a brief concluding section. to the "Limitation of Armaments at the End of the World War." Among advocates of a limitation of armaments, Dr. Wehberg may be classed as moderate or liberal rather than radical. He justly emphasizes throughout his work the importance of the international point of view, the need of a world treaty on the subject, and insists

that limitation must not be deferred until the completion of a world organization.

Appended to this volume are a considerable number of interesting documents, such as resolutions of various peace conferences, the scheme of an international treaty presented by Dr. Quidde, and the plans contained in various schemes for a League or Confederacy of Nations. It may be added that Dr. Wehberg's book will prove a valuable work of reference to German publications on the subject of which it treats.

AMOS S. HERSHEY.

The Society of Nations. By T. J. Lawrence. New York: Oxford University Press. 1919, pp. xi, 194. $1.50 net.

This volume presents in book form the substance of six lectures given by the distinguished author in the autumn of 1917 at the University of Bristol. Although delivered when the great war was at its height, their purpose was to give to laymen sufficient understanding of the history of international relations to enable them to form reasonable convictions as to the possibility of developing, after the war, a society of states within which civilization might continue to progress, together with a knowledge of the best lines of advance towards this end. The first three lectures sketch in broad lines the upbuilding of international society and the law of nations, from the earliest times to the outbreak of the great war. The absence of any general obligation to enforce accepted rules, the scientific arming of the nations, and the German doctrine of Kriegsraison are set forth as the fatal weaknesses of the system. The fourth lecture is a picture, done in war-time colors, of the acts and the policies by which Germany partially destroyed the existing structure of international law. The blows struck at good faith and the obligation of treaties by the violation of Belgium, at humanity and the obligation of law by German "frightfulness," and at neutral rights by the widespread application of the doctrine of reprisals are declared to have reduced to ruins the law of war and the law of neutrality. The law of jurisdiction and the law of diplomacy, on the other hand, still stand untouched.

In lectures five and six, which have been entirely rewritten, are set forth the conditions of reconstruction, and the author's plan for

the rebuilding of international society. The development of a recognized and enforceable code of international law is declared to have been rendered imperative by the conditions under which modern wars are fought, and the conscious organization of the world for peace rather than for war, together with a general recognition by all civilized states of a positive duty to enforce the law, are emphasized as the necessary steps to reform. In the light of subsequent proceedings in Paris, Lawrence's suggestions as to procedure, and his scheme for world organization, are of interest. At the time he wrote. he would have had the Peace Conference decide upon the general principles of the new world order, and then appoint one international committee to work out the details and another to revise and codify international law. Both would report to a great international congress, and in the meantime an authority would be created for deciding disputes which could not be settled by diplomacy.

A League of Nations possessing certain definite characteristics is nis solution of the problem of world organization. "There are four needs," he writes, "the satisfaction of which civilized mankind should insist upon in any scheme for the creation of a new and better international order whether by means of a league of nations or in some other way. They are, first, the provision of Arbitral Courts to deal with cases susceptible of judicial treatment; secondly, the establishment of conciliation committees for the settlement of cases not capable of judicial treatment; thirdly, the organization of an international force to be used in the last report for the purpose of compelling recalcitrant states to submit to the decisions of these tribunals and committees; and fourthly, the proportional and simultaneous disarmainent of all civilized Powers, saving only the forces necessary to safeguard the social fabric."

It is to be noted also that he would reserve for the "Great WorldPowers" a position "of advantage" upon the conciliation committee, or committees, otherwise, "we cannot be sure that predominant force would always be available to support, if necessary, the decisions arrived at. Yet unless this union of irresistible force with impartial justice can be established and maintained, the new order will break down, like the old, in a welter of bloodshed and misery."

Finally, the author recognizes that no constitutional machinery will accomplish much of itself, and places the ultimate hope of mankind upon the development of an international moral and spiritual

brotherhood. The Church and the Labor Movement are seen as the great forces which may effect such a development, as, "the union of the two in a demand for a League of Nations would make it irresistible, and at the same time purify it from all ignoble elements." These lectures are admirably adapted to accomplish their purpose, and it is fortunate that they have been made available for an audience far greater than that for which they were originally prepared.

RALSTON HAYDEN.

Les Alliés et les Neutres (Aôut 1914-Décembre 1916). By Ernest Lémonon. Paris: Librairie Delagrave. 1917. Deuxième édition, pp. xi, 335. Price 3 fr. 50c.

The contents of this work, whose interest properly attaches to those days of 1915 and 1916, now historic, when all minds were engrossed in the varying vicissitudes of war, fall into two rather loosely connected sections. In the first of these, after an interesting chapter dealing with the repercussion of the war upon the political disunion of the several Entente Powers in 1914 and the resultant development, internally, of a recrudescence of national unity and, externally, of the "union sacrée," there follows an account, illuminated by statistics, of the extraordinary military, financial, and industrial "efforts" which the Allies found it necessary to put forth in order to meet their enemies upon tolerably equal terms. A final chapter summarily outlines the immediate diplomatic origins of the war.

The second and more extended portion of the work consists in substance of monthly reviews of foreign affairs contributed by the author to the Revue Politique et Parlementaire during the period from May, 1915, to December, 1916. In effect, the official and, more especially, the popular attitude of the various European neutral countries and of the United States is described from the point of view of a belligerent critic, who, though apparently not entirely willing to exculpate neutral states for their attitude of indifference in the face of Teutonic criminality, nevertheless, attempts impartially to gauge the extent to which neutral opinion was at the time favorable to the Entente. As might be anticipated, the then crucial developments in the Balkans -the perfidious duplicity of Bulgaria, the vacillations and reticent