When the bill came up he opposed it in a speech, in which he briefly stated his objections; and such was its effect that, though the measure had the support of the administration, and the whole of the Committee of Ways and Means but one, it was struck out, and the amendment he proposed was substituted by an overwhelming majority. His substitute was, that the government should use its own credit directly in the shape of treasury notes, to be issued to meet ts wants, and to be funded in the bank in the form of stock at six per cent. ; that the bank should be bound to pay its notes at all times, and should make the government no loans but short ones, in anticipation of its current revenue. By the issue of treasury notes, to be funded in the bank, he proposed to obtain the immediate supplies to carry on the government; and, by establishing a specie-paying bank, under proper restrictions, he hoped to sustain a strong position, from which the currency, then consisting, south of New-England, exclusively of the notes of suspended banks, might be restored to the specie standard on the return of peace. His substitute was, in its turn, defeated. Two other bills, differently modified, were successively introduced, and were both defeated-one by the casting vote of the speaker, Mr. Cheeves, and the other by the President, who vetoed it on the ground that, as modified, it would not afford the relief required by the treasury.

The greater part of the session had been spent in these various attempts to pass a bill, and many who entirely agreed with Mr. Calhoun in his view of the subject, and had stood fast by him at first, now yielded to the pressure. Finally, a rally was made, a short time before the close of the session, to pass a bill, and it was again introduced in the Senate much improved in some of its objectionable features, but still defective enough to prevent him and the friends who stood by him from giving it their support. It speedily passed that body, and was sent to the House, where it was pressed through to its passage with all possible despatch. On the question of ordering it to the third reading, Mr. Calhoun made a few remarks, in which he warned the House against adopting a measure which a great majority decidedly disapproved, but for which they were prepared to vote under a supposed necessity, which did not exist. He concluded by saying that the bill was so objectionable that, were it not for the supposed necessity, if, for instance, the news of peace should arrive before its passage, it would not receive fifteen votes, and concluded by saying that he would reserve a full statement of his objections to the bill for the question on the passage to be taken the next day, when he intended to make a final stand against it, and appeal to the public for the vindication of his course. At the time there was not the slightest rumour or indication of peace, and no one expected it. On the contrary, every indication was, that the war would be pushed with vigour in the approaching campaign. The attack had been made on New-Orleans, and by every mail it was expected to hear of its fate; and yet, strange as it may seem, that very day. subsequent to the adjournment of the House, a despatch, sent on by a mer cantile house in New-York, to be forwarded by the mail to the South to its agents, arrived in the city, with the intelligence that a vessel had come in after the departure of the mail, bringing the treaty of peace. The member to whom it was sent was so struck with the coincidence, that he informed Mr. Calhoun of the fact in confidence. By some means, a rumour got out that there was a late arrival at New-York bringing important intelligence. Next day the friends of the bill made an effort to push it through before the arrival of the mail in the afternoon. Mr. Calhoun moved to lay the bill on the table, saying that there was a hope that the mail from New-York, which would arrive in a few hours, might bring intelligence that would have an important bearing on the bill. The vote on his motion verified his prediction. The mail arrived with the treaty of

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peace. It was then proposed to him to modify the bill in conformity with his views, if he would withdraw his opposition. He refused, and demanded other and severer restrictions than those which he had heretofore proposed. An attempt was then made to take up the bill and pass it, which failed by a large majority.

It was thus his sagacity and firmness, under the most trying circumstances, against the whole weight of the administration, defeated a measure, which, if it had been adopted as first proposed, would have been fol lowed by consequences more disastrous than could well be anticipated. He had the satisfaction to receive the thanks of many of the members for its defeat, who but a short time before were ready to denounce him for his resistance to it. It is now to be regretted that none of Mr. Calhoun's speeches against the measure were published. He declined publishing at the time on the ground that his object was to defeat the bill, but to do so without distracting the party or impairing confidence in the administration, on which the success of the war so much depended. For that reason, he not only avoided publishing, but bore patiently the denunciations daily levelled against him for his opposition to the bill. On all other measures of the session he gave the administration an active and hearty support. It was, indeed, a rule with him, when compelled to differ from his party on an important measure, to limit his opposition strictly to the measure itself, and to avoid, both in manner and matter, all that could by possibility give offence. By a rigid observance, too, of this rule, he succeeded in maintaining his individual opinion in reference to all important questions on which he differed from his party without weakening his standing with them.

The transition from a state of war to that of peace gave rise to many important questions, the most prominent of which grew out of the finances and the currency. At the succeeding session, Mr. Lowndes and Mr. Calhoun were placed at the head of the committees which had charge of these important subjects; Mr. Lowndes was made chairman of the Ways and Means, and Mr. Calhoun, from the prominence he had acquired at the preceding session on the Bank Question, was appointed chairman of that on currency. The most prominent question connected with the finances was that of the readjustment of the duties on the imposts. The duties had been doubled at the commencement of the war, and the question now presented was, how much they should be reduced. It was one that took in the whole range of the future policy of the government, and involved the consideration of many important subjects; the military and naval establishments, the debt, and the new direction given to a large amount of the capital and industry of the country in consequence of the war, the Embargo, the Nonimportation, and Non-intercourse Acts, which preceded it. These, in turn, involved the question of our foreign relations in all their bearings. After a survey of the whole ground, the Committee of Ways and Means reported the bill, with the full concurrence of the administration, which passed with but few changes, and has since been called the Tariff of 1816.

Few measures have been less understood or more misrepresented. It has been the general impression that the duties were adjusted by the bill mainly in reference to the protection of manufactures. Such is far from being the fact. With the exception of a few items, such as the minimum duty on coarse cottons, the duties on rolled iron, and, perhaps, one or two more, the duties would have been arranged substantially as they were if there had not been a manufacturing establishment in the whole country. It was in other respects a revenue bill, proposed and reported by the committee to whom the subject of revenue properly belonged, and regulated in its details, with the few exceptions referred to, by revenue considerations.

The first great question in the adjusting of the duties was, what amount of revenue would the future policy of the country require? And, in deciding that, the leading question was, whether the public debt should be rapidly or slowly paid? In this decision were involved, not only the question of the policy of freeing the government as soon as possible from debt, but also the collateral effects of such a process on the country under the particular circumstances of the case. In that view, the effects which raising the duties, with a view to the speedy discharge of the debt, would have in sustaining the manufacturing establishments which had grown up under the war, and the restrictive system preceding it, served to create a strong motive for adopting that policy, and for fixing the duties as high as they stand in the act. In conformity with this policy, an efficient sinking fund of $10,000,000 annually was provided for the payment of the principal and interest of the debt, with the proviso that all moneys remaining in the treasury at the end of each year exceeding $2,000,000 should be carried to its aid. It was in reference to these views, and the necessity of providing for the military and naval establishments on a scale sufficiently extended for the public service, that the details of the bill and the rates of the duties were mainly adjusted, and not solely or principally for the protection of manufactures, as has been erroneously supposed. If proof is required, conclusive evidence will be found in the bill itself, which imposes a much lower average rate of duties on what are now called the protected articles, that is, articles similar to those made at home, or which may come into competition with them, than upon the other descriptions. Nor has the course of Mr. Calhoun in reference to it been less misunderstood or misrepresented than the measure itself. He has frequently been called the author of the protective system, Nothing is more untrue. He was not on the committee, and took no part in the discussion, except to make a short off-hand speech at the request of a friend, at a particular stage of the debate. He was engrossed with the duties of his own committee, and had bestowed but little attention to the details of the bill. He concurred in the general views and policy in which it originated, and the more readily because it would sustain the manufacturing establishments that had grown up under the war-measures of the government. Shortly after he came into Congress, he had anticipated, as has been stated, the difficulty that would be occasioned by the new direction which so considerable a portion of the capital and labour of the country had taken; and, while he professed a disposition at the time to do what could be legiti mately done to support them on the return of peace, yet he xsed his best efforts to diminish the necessity, as far as practicable, by removing every remnant of the restrictive system during the war. He ad not then, nor do we believe that he has since doubted that, in deciding whether the debt should be more speedily or more tardily discharged, He favourable effects which the former mode would have in sustaining th manufacturing establishments was, under the circumstances of the cae, a legitimate and proper consideration. But truth and candour requie us to say, that, as far as the details of the bill went beyond, and raid the duties above the revenue point, with the view to protection, s on our coarse cottons and rolled iron, he has long believed it to be anconstitutional, unjust, and unwise. The subject was new, and his attention was drawn to other subjects, and he did not take the proper Astinction between duties for revenue and for protection, nor was it, as it is believed, taken at the time by any one. He who will examine My. Calhoun's remarks on the occasion will not fail to perceive that the sapport he gave the bill looked, not to what has since been called the protective policy, but almost wholly to considerations of a public character connected th the foreign relations of the

country, and the danger resulting from war to a country, as ours was then, in a great measure, dependant on agriculture and commerce with foreign nations, without the requisite naval power to keep open in war the channels of trade with the rest of the world. In fact, it is difficult at this time, in the changed condition of the country and the world, to realize the circumstances under which the public men of that day acted, and the mo tives which guided them.

To do so, we must go back to the history of that period. A just and necessary war had been honourably terminated with the greatest power in the world, after a short but perilous struggle. The violent and unpatriotic course of the opposition during the war had so discredited it, that the name and doctrines of the Federal party, once so respectable, had become odious. After the war, they ceased to use their old name, or to avow their doctrines as a party; and the long struggle between them and their principles and policy, and the Republican party and their principles and policy, was supposed to have finally terminated in the ascendency of the latter. The impression was almost universal, that the danger to our popular system of government from the Federal consolidation doctrines was ended. The only cause of danger to the country and its institutions was then supposed to be from abroad. The overthrow of Bonaparte was followed throughout Europe by a powerful reaction against the popular principles on which our government rests, and to which, through the influence of our example, the French Revolution was traced. To counteract their influence, and to put down effectually their revival in Europe, a league of all the great Continental monarchs was formed, called the Holy Alliance. Great Britain did not expressly accede to it, but countenanced and supported it. Our country of all the world stood alone in opposition, and became an object of the deepest jealousy. The Spanish provinces of South America, it is true, were in a revolutionary state, and struggling to form governments similar to ours. It was known that this formidable combination of crowned heads meditated hostile movements against them on political grounds, which could not be made without involving us. In such a state of the world, well might the patriots of that day be roused to the dangers from without, almost to the neglect of those from within. Had events taken the course which then seemed so probable, much that was then said and done, which now seems to require explanation, would have been regarded as profoundly wise. This is pre-eminently true of Mr. Calhoun's course. Always vigilant and solicitous for he safety and prosperity of the country, he kept his eyes steadily dirested, at that critical period, to the point from which he and all then though the country was menaced, and was active and zealous in giving such a diction to the policy of the government, for the time, as was best calculate to meet it. During this period, he spoke at large on the subject of defense against external danger, in a speech delivered on the subject of the repel of the direct taxes, and which, for its eloquence, ability, and lofty and patiotic sentiments, gained him great applause. To the same cause may be trad his course, and that of the great body of the party at the time, on most of the subjects in reference to which different views are now entertained by hem, and, among others, on that of internal improvements. On that subject, as well as upon the tariff, his views have been much misunderstood as well as misrepresented. Of these views a brief explanation may here be importent.

During the war, while the coasting trade was interrupted, the whole in ternal commercial intercourse, and the military transportations and move. ments over our widely-extended country, had to pass through internal routes, then in a state far less perfect than at present, and the difficulties

were immense. Great delay, uncertainty, and expense attended the concentration of any considerable force or supply on a point where the defence of the country or an attack on the enemy made it necessary. This greatly enfeebled our military operations, and contributed much to exhaust the means of the government. So great were the expense and difficulties, that it is estimated, for example, that much of the flour delivered at Detroit during the war cost $60 per barrel, and most of the cannon and ball transported to the lakes not less than 50 cents per pound.

At the commencement of the first session after the war, while the recollection of these things was fresh, Mr. Madison, in his opening message, among other things, invited the attention of Congress to the subject of internal improvements, and recommended Congress to call into exercise whatever constitutional power it might possess over the subject, and if that should not prove adequate, to apply for an amendment to the Constitution granting such additional powers as would be sufficient. Mr. Calhoun, acting, as he supposed, in strict conformity to this recommendation, reported a bill at the next session, to set apart and pledge the bonus of the United States Bank and their share of its dividends as a fund for internal improvement. It made no appropriation, nor did it intend to affirm that Congress had any power, much less to fix the limits of its power, over the subject; but to leave both, as well as the appropriations thereaf ter to be made, to abide the decision of Congress, in conformity with the President's views. Nor did Mr. C. undertake to establish either in his speech. He declined both, and confined his remarks to the general benefit of a good system of internal improvements. When urged to assert the power of Congress, he refused, saying that, although he believed it possessed the power to a certain extent, he was not prepared to say to what limits it extended. He had not the least suspicion, in reporting and supporting the bill, that he went beyond the President's recommendation, or that he would have any difficulty in approving it, till the bill had passed both Houses, and was sent to him for his signature.

It was Mr. Madison's last session, and only a few days before its termination, when the bill was sent to him; and while it was still before him, Mr. Calhoun called to take his leave of him. After congratulating him on the success of his administration, and expressing the happiness he felt in having had the opportunity of co-operating with him in its most difficult period, that of the war, he took his leave. When he reached the door, Mr. Madison requested him to return. He did so, and took his seat; and for the first time Mr. M. disclosed to him his constitutional objections to the bill. Mr. Calhoun expressed his deep regret, first, that he should entertain them, and, next, that he had not intimated them to him in time, saying that, if he had, he (Mr. Calhoun) would certainly not have subjected him to the unpleasant duty, at the very close of his administration, of vetoing a bill passed by the votes of his friends, nor himself to having the weight of his name and authority brought against him on such a subject. He then stated that he had introduced the bill, as he believed, in strict conformity to his recommendation, and if he had gone beyond, it was not intentional, and entreated him to reconsider the subject; but it was too late. In this connexion, it is due to candour to state, that although Mr. Calhoun has never committed himself, in any speech or report, as to the extent of the constitutional powers of Congress over internal improvements, yet his impression, like that of most of the young men of the party at the time, was, that it was comprehended under the money-power of the government. Experience and reflection soon taught him this was an errorone, in all probability, originating with him, and others of his own age, in the precedent of the Cumberland Road, which may be regarded as the first