thing of the great increase of patronage. But the great and decisive objection was, that expenditures sufficiently large, to absorb the surplus would necessarily destroy, in their effects, the Compromise Act, and restore the protective system. It is easy to raise the expenditures, but very difficult to reduce them, of which the experience of the last five or six years affords abundant proof. The revenue at the time, though far beyond the wants of the government, was in the regular course of reduction under the compromise, which would, in the course of six years, bring it down to a sum only sufficient for the support of the Government with rigid economy. To have raised the expenditures sufficiently high to absorb the surplus, under such circumstances, would have required an unusual disbursement of between thirty and forty millions of dollars for the whole period, as experience has shown; and, of course, a sudden reduction of nearly twenty millions, to bring down the expenditures to what, with proper management, would be necessary. So great and sudden a reduction would prove impracticable, and the certain result would be loans, debts, the violation of the compromise, and a renewal of the protective system. All this was urged against the scheme by Mr. Calhoun at the time. It was defeated, at least in a great degree; and it may well be asked, after the experience of the last two years, what would have been the consequences if it had not been, when even its partial effects have brought on the Government and country, to the extent they have, the very evils then anticipated by him.

The objection to vesting the surplus in state stocks was not less serious Among so many other mischievous consequences, it would have been grossly partial; but the insurmountable objection was the danger of entangling the Government with the state stocks.

This scheme was in substance as much a deposite of the surplus revenue with the states as that proposed by Mr. Calhoun as an amendment to it. The latter placed the money with the states upon their promise to return it, if the General Government should require it, while the former exchanged the surplus for the obligations, by which the states, in another form, were bound to repay it; so that each scheme proposed to exchange the surplus for state credit in some form. With state stocks depreciating as they have since done, it would have been as unpopular and impossible to have used any means to recover the money by selling them, as it would have been to have recalled it directly from the states themselves. The difference was, that Mr. Calhoun's scheme bestowed upon the states all the patronage resulting from the use of the money, while the other gave it to the Secretary of the Treasury, in whom it vested an almost unlimited discretion, and to whom it gave the dangerous power of dealing in those stocks to large amounts. That this plan would have resulted in the entire loss of the money, with little or no benefit to the states, we may see from our past experience. The immense increase of executive patronage to which it would have led may also be estimated: But the endless train of mischiefs which would have followed in some of its remote consequences it would be difficult to measure, as we may readily perceive, when we come to consider the use which might have 'been made of such a power in the federal executive by those who have conceived the monstrous scheme of assuming the state debts. Indeed, the exist ence of such a power would naturally seem to suggest such a use of it, with the ideas now prevalent in the minds of many of our public men on the subject of state-indebtedness.

Nor was the last of the alternatives free from serious objections; but, under all circumstances, it was thought to be the least so by Congress, and it accordingly passed through both houses by a large majority. Mr. Calhoun made a very comprehensive and able speech against the first two, and explained his views of the substitute he offered.

This was not the only important measure that claimed his attention during the session. In the preceding recess the Abolitionists had for the first time

H

regularly organized as a party, with a powerful press, and attempted, by systematic operations, to force its publications on the South, with a view of acting on its slave population. It carried deep excitement throughout that entire section. Everywhere meetings were held and the attempt denounced, and the other sections called upon to adopt measures to stay the evil. The President, in his message at the opening of the session, called the attention of Congress to the subject, and recommended the adoption of efficient measures to prevent the circulation of their incendiary publications through the mail. Mr. Calhoun, although he appreciated and highly approved the patriotic motives of the President, could not agree with him to the full extent of his recommendation. He saw the danger of permitting Congress to assume the right of judging of what constituted an incendiary publication; for if it be conceded that it has the right of determining what is incendiary, and to prevent its circulation, it would, by necessary consequence, carry with it the right of determining what was not, and to enforce its circulation against the laws of such states as might prohibit them. With this impression, and in order to prevent the adoption of erroneous views, at the outset, on a subject so vitally important to the slave-holding states, he moved the reference of the portion of the message containing the recommendation to a special committee, of which he was appointed chairman.

The report he made took a very original and able survey of the whole ground, and conclusively proved, both by arguments drawn from the Constitution and the practice of the Government, that it belonged to the states separately to determine what is or is not calculated to affect or disturb its internal police, including its peace and safety, and to adopt the measures necessary for their security; and that it was the duty of the General Government not only to conform its acts, in reference to the mail or for the regulation of commerce, to the legislation of the states in such cases, but to aid in the execution of the laws of the states, as far as its power would permit, when it became necessary. The report was accompanied by a bill, drawn up in conformity with these views, and was ordered to the third reading by the casting vote of the Vicepresident, but finally failed.

This bill gave rise in the Senate to a very animated and interesting debate, principally between Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Davis of Massachusetts, in which the arguments for and against are strongly presented on both sides. For original views of the Constitution and strength of argument, Mr. Calhoun's speecht on the occasion ranks with his ablest, and is worthy of the study of all who desire to understand some of the most important provisions of that instrument.

During the same session he made another speech on the same subject, distinguished for its foresight and knowledge of the Constitution. For the first. time there began to pour in that flood of petitions on the subject of abolition which has since deluged Congress. The members from the non-slave-holding states on both sides, though adverse to the petitions, were opposed to taking strong and decided grounds against them; and their respective political friends in the South were naturally indisposed to force them to take higher grounds than they were inclined to do. The result was a sort of compromise, to re-. ceive the petitions, but not to refer or act upon them. Mr. Calhoun, whose rule has ever been to meet danger "on the frontier," to use his own expression, saw the peril of receiving the petitions, and determined to take a decided stand against it. He expected to stand alone; but with such force did he maintain his objections to receiving, that he was supported by a large portion of the Southern senators, and the motion to receive was laid on the table. Since then, no petition of the kind has been received by the Senate.

The prominent question at the next session was the Specie Circular. The President had issued an order in the recess prohibiting the receipt of banknotes, or anything but specie in payment of the public lands. The opposition

* See "Speeches," &c., No. 11.

+ Ibid, No. 12.

+ Ibid, No. 13.

§ Ibid, No. 14.

ure.

was unanimously opposed to it, both on the ground of expediency, and the want of authority on his part to issue such an order, while his friends and supporters were greatly divided, some sustaining, but the greater part opposing the measMr. Calhoun agreed with those who denied the right of the President to issue the order, on the broad principle that neither the Constitution nor the laws conferred it, and that the executive had no power but what was conferred by the one or the other. Nevertheless, he declined voting for the bill to supersede the order, which was passed by a great majority, a large portion of the administration party voting for it. His reasons were, that the diseased state of the currency was beyond remedy, and whether the circular was repealed or not, the result would be the same. He regarded the catastrophe as inevitable, and that the only question was, at whose door the responsibility should be laid. He saw that if the circular should be rescinded, it would be charged on those by whose vote it was done; and as he felt conscious that he had done all that he could to arrest the approaching calamity, he was determined to avoid all. responsibility, and therefore declined voting for the bill. He was entitled to the floor, and intended to offer his reasons at large; but when it came up on its passage, was accidentally prevented from speaking. On his return home in March, several of his friends in Charleston, interested in trade and the banks, asked his opinion of the prospect ahead. His reply was, that the storm was approaching, and was just at hand, and his advice was to reef-reef-reef-quickly and closely, to avoid being wrecked. In two months the banks suspended payments, and the commerce and business of the country were prostrated.

During the same session an important question arose in reference to the admission of Michigan. She had been admitted at the preceding session on the condition of agreeing to the boundary between her and Ohio, as presented by the act for her admission. The Legislature of the state, in compliance with the act of Congress, called a convention of the people of the state, in order to determine whether the conditions should be accepted or not. The convention rejected the condition. Subsequently, an informal meeting or caucus was called by the party in favour of accepting it, without legal authority, or any other ceremony than is used for convening such meetings for ordinary political objects. It met, and agreed to the condition, which had been in due form considered and rejected by the convention legally and regularly called. The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom the subject was referred, reported in favour of admitting the state on the authority of the informal meeting or caucus, for it was, in fact, nothing more. Mr. Calhoun opposed the report in two speeches on the ground of the unconstitutionality and the danger of the precedent, in which he displayed, with great force of argument, that thorough knowledge of the Constitution for which he is remarkable. But, as powerful as was his resistance, it proved vain. The bill passed, and has made a precedent, the danger of which time only can disclose.

CHAPTER VI.

in which the Narrative is continued until the Termination of the Second Session of the 27th Congress.

THE suspension of the banks in the spring of '37 marks an important period in the life of Mr. Calhoun and the political history of the country. Fortunately, under the operation of the joint resolution of 1816, and the Deposite Act of the preceding year, in the passage of both of which he took a decided part, the act of suspension of itself entirely separated the Government and the banks. The former prohibited the Government from receiving the notes of suspended banks

* See "Speeches," &c., Nos. 16 and 17.

in the public dues; and the latter prohibited it from using such banks as the depositaries of the public money, or as the fiscal agents of the Government. Without these, the union of the Government with the banks would still have continued, and the former would have found itself reduced to the same condition that it was at the end of the war in 1815, of receiving and paying away the notes of discredited banks, and using them as its depositaries and agents in the management of its revenue.

The suspension, as has been stated, was not unexpected to Mr. Calhoun ; and he was not long in making up his mind as to the course he would pursue. He resolved to resist the reunion of the Government and the banks in any form, and to oppose the establishment of a national bank. Indeed, he regarded it as the first occasion that ever occurred which offered an opportunity for car rying into execution what he had long believed to be the true policy of the country, the divorce of the Government from all connexion with banks; an opinion which he had first publicly and plainly indicated in 1834, in his speech on the removal of the deposites, already cited. He made known his determination to a few confidential friends long before the call of the extraordinary session, and resisted decidedly all attempts to influence him to support a national bank.

With his course thus fixed, he went to Washington at the commencement of the extra session, resolved to await the development of the views of the twogreat parties before he should publicly make known his own, and to act with or against them, according as their course might agree or disagree with his own. He listened attentively to the reading of the President's Message at the opening of the session, which explicitly opposed the establishment of a United States Bank, and the renewal of the union of the Government and the banks, and made up his mind, as soon as the reading was finished, that he would give it his support.

The impression got out that Mr. Calhoun would support the message. It caused much excitement; but as it was only a rumour, the development of his course in his place in the Senate was looked to with deep solicitude. It was not long before an occasion offered. The Committee on Finances reported, shortly after the message was received, a bill for the establishment of what was called a Sub-treasury, but without any provision for collecting the Government dues in specie.

Mr. Calhoun rose in his place, and declared himself in favour of the entire separation of the Government from the banks, but denounced in strong terms the report of the committee for omitting what he regarded as essential to a separation; a provision for collecting the public dues in the constitutional currency, without which the measure they had reported would prove a perfect abortion. He declared that if that was what was meant by a sub-treasury, he washed his hands of all concern with it. His remarks made a deep sensation, and he was solicited by many of the friends of the administration to bring forward, in the shape of an amendment, a proposition to collect the public dues in specie. He replied that he had not intended to offer any proposition of his own; but, as they requested it, he would comply with their wishes. When the bill for the issue of treasury notes came up a few days after, he stated his opinion at large on the subject of the separation of the Government and the banks, in a speech, which made a permanent impression on the public mind, in reference to the whole banking system. He gave notice in his speech of his intention of moving an amendment, at the proper time, to the bill, for the gradual but permanent separation of the Government from the banks, but finally agreed to postpone his motion till the bill for the establishment of the Subtreasury should come under consideration. When that came up, he moved his amendment, and made a second speech,† in which he traced the rise and progress. of the banking system, and marked the several stages through which it had * See "Speeches," &c., No. 18. † See "Speeches," &c., No. 19.

passed; he showed that it contained within itself the principle of its own destruction; and finally exposed the mischievous character and tendency of the system, economically, politically, and morally. His amendment prevailed. and the bill passed the Senate as amended, but failed in the House.

Such was Mr. Calhoun's course on this memorable occasion. All things considered, it has seldom been equalled for patriotism, magnanimity, sagacity, and boldness. We have seen him, in obedience to his principles, and what seemed to be his duty, separate himself from General Jackson and the party when in the plenitude of their power, and when he held the second office in the Government, with every prospect of reaching the highest. We have seen him, after his separation, instead of courting the opposition in order to maintain himself against the power and influence of the executive, again pursue a course in obedience to principle and duty, which brought him into direct conflict with both, and left him with his state alone to maintain the unequal struggle against a course of policy which, he believed, if not arrested, would prove ruinous to the Government and country. We have seen him, when the state, in pursuance of his course, had effected its object, availing himself of the aid of the opposition to bring down the power and influence of the executive department (originating in the encroachments of the Congress) within proper constitutional, legal limits. That done, we next see him, when the reaction of the very system to oppose which he separated from the party had prostrated them, and when the opposition with which he had for a time acted were preparing to rush on and overwhelm them in their weakness, and to re-establish their old doctrines and principles, rising up promptly, overcoming all personal feelings, forgetting all past differences, boldly repelling the assaults of his recent allies, and defending and protecting those from whom he had been so long separated, and by whom he had been much wronged, in stern obedience to his principles and to what he believed to be his duty: thus clearly showing, by his whole course throughout this eventful period, that when they were at stake, neither ambition, fear, enmity, friendship, nor popularity could bend him from his course.

The stand which he took drew down on him, as might be expected, the bitter denunciation and vengeance of the opposition, who had now assumed the name of Whigs. Among other things, they charged him with desertion, as if he had ever been of their party, and when, in fact, he had kept himself distinct from both the great parties from the time of his separation from General Jackson. That there might be no mistake on that point, he took the earliest opportunity in the Senate to avow what his position was. In his speech on Mr. Webster's motion, in 1834, to renew the charter of the United States Bank for six years, he said, "I am the partisan of no class, nor, let me add, of either political party. I am neither of the opposition nor administration. If I act with the former in any instance, it is because I approve of their course on the particular occasion, and I shall always be happy to act with them when I do approve. If I oppose the administration, if I desire to see power change hands, it is because I disapprove of the general course of those in authority."

To which he added: "But mine has not been, nor will it be, a systematic opposition. Whatever measure of theirs I deem right I shall cheerfully support, and I only desire that they will afford me more frequent occasions for support and fewer for opposition than they have heretofore done." He often avowed the same sentiments, and acted throughout in strict conformity to the principles here laid down; and when Mr. Clay, for the first time in the Senate, assumed the name of Whig for himself and the party, intending to comprehend under it all that did not support the administration, the State Rights as well as the national parties, Mr. Calhoun rose in his place and disavowed the name, as applied to himself, and expressed himself contented with the name he bore. If to this it is added, he never, on any occasion, joined in their political meetings or party consultations, and always kept himself free on every question to