:

To maintain the ascendency of the Constitution over the law-making majority is the great and essential point, on which the success of the system must depend unless that ascendency can be preserved, the necessary consequence must be, that the laws will supersede the Constitution, and, finally, the will of the executive, by the influence of his patronage, will supersede the laws, indications of which are already perceptible. This ascendency can only be preserved through the action of the states as organized bodies, having their own separate governments, and possessed of the right, under the structure of our system, of judging of the extent of their separate powers, and of interposing their authority to arrest the enactments of the General Government within their respective limits. I will not enter, at this time into the discussion of this important point, as it has been ably and fully presented by the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bibb), and others who preceded him in this debate on the same side, whose arguments not only remain unanswered, but are unanswerable. It is only by this power of interposition that the reserved rights of the states can be peacefully and efficiently protected against the encroachments of the General Government, that the limitations imposed upon its authority will be enforced, and its movements confined to the orbit allotted to it by the Constitution.

It has, indeed, been said in debate, that this can be effected by the organization of the General Government itself, particularly by the action of this body, which represents the states, and that the states themselves must look to the General Government for the preservation of many of the most important of their reserved rights. I do not underrate the value to be attached to the organic arrangement of the General Government, and the wise distribution of its powers between the several departments, and, in particular, the structure and the important functions of this body; but to suppose that the Senate, or any department of this government, was intended to be the only guardian of the reserved rights, is a great and fundamental mistake. The government, through all its departments, represents the delegated, and not the reserved powers; and it is a violation of the fundamental principle of free institutions to suppose that any but the responsible representative of any interest can be its guardian. The distribution of the powers of the General Government, and its organization, were arranged to prevent the abuse of power in fulfilling the important trusts confided to it, and not, as preposterously supposed, to protect the reserved powers, which are confided wholly to the guardianship of the several states.

Against the view of our system which I have presented, and the right of the state to interpose, it is objected that it would lead to anarchy and dissolution. I consider the objection as without the slightest foundation, and that, so far from tending to weakness or disunion, it is the scurce of the highest power and of the strongest cement. Nor is its tendency in this respect difficult of explanation. The government of an absolute majority, unchecked by efficient constitutional restraint, though apparently strong, is, in reality, an exceedingly feeble government. That tendency to conflict between the parts, which I have shown to be inevitable in such governments, wastes the powers of the state in the hostile action of contending factions, which leaves very little more power than the excess of the strength of the majority over the minority. But a government based upon the principle of the concurring majority, where each great interest possesses within itself the means of self-protection, which ultimately requires the mutual consent of all the parts, necessarily causes that unanimity in council, and ardent attachment of all the parts to the whole, which give an irresistible energy to a government so constituted. I might appeal to history for the truth of these remarks, of which the Roman furnishes the most familiar and striking. It is a well-known fact, that, from the expulsion of the Tarquins to the time of the establishment of the tribunitian power, the government fell into a state of the greatest disorder and distraction, and, I may add, corruption. How did this happen? The explanation will throw important light on the sub

ject under consideration. The community was divided into two parts-the Patricians and the Plebeians: with the power of the state principally in the hands of the former, without adequate check to protect the rights of the latter. The result was as might be expected. The patricians converted the powers of the government into the means of making money, to enrich themselves and their dependants. They, in a word, had their American system, growing out of the peculiar character of the government and condition of the country. This requires explanation. At that period, according to the laws of nations, when one nation conquered another, the lands of the vanquished belonged to the victors; and, according to the Roman law, the lands thus acquired were divided into two parts, one allotted to the poorer class of the people, and the other assigned to the use of the treasury, of which the patricians had the distribution and administration. The patricians abused their power by withholding from the plebeians that which ought to have been allotted to them, and by converting to their own use that which ought to have gone to the treasury. In a word, they took to themselves the entire spoils of victory, and they had thus the most powerful motive to keep the state perpetually involved in war, to the utter impoverishment and oppression of the plebeians. After resisting the abuse of power by all peaceable means, and the oppression becoming intolerable, the plebeians, at last, withdrew from the city-they, in a word, seceded; and, to induce them to reunite, the patricians conceded to the plebeians, as the means of protecting their separate interests, the very power which I contend is necessary to protect the rights of the states, but which is now represented as necessarily leading to disunion. They granted to them the right of choosing three tribunes from among themselves, whose persons should be sacred, and who should have the right of interposing their veto, not only against the passage of laws, but even against their execution: a power which those who take a shallow insight into human nature would pronounce inconsistent with the strength and unity of the state, if not utterly impracticable; yet, so far from that being the effect, from that day the genius of Rome became ascendant, and victory followed her steps till she had established an almost universal dominion. How can a result so contrary to all anticipation be explained? The explanation appears to me to be simple. No measure or movement could be adopted without the concurring assent of both the patricians and plebeians, and each thus became dependant on the other; and, of consequence, the desire and objects of neither could be effected without the concurrence of the other. To obtain this concurrence, each was compelled to consult the good-will of the other, and to elevate to office, not simply those who might have the confidence of the order to which he belonged, but also that of the other. The result was, that men possessing those qualities which would naturally command confidence-moderation, wisdom, justice, and patriotism-were elevated to office; and these, by the weight of their authority and the prudence of their counsel, together with that spirit of unanimity necessarily resulting from the concurring assent of the two orders, furnishes the real explanation of the power of the Roman State, and of that extraordinary wisdom, moderation, and firmness which in so remarkable a degree characterized her public men. I might illustrate the truth of the position which I have laid down by a reference to the history of all free states, ancient and modern, distinguished for their power and patriotism, and conclusively show, not only that there was not one which had not some contrivance, under some form, by which the concurring assent of the different portions of the community was made necessary in the action of government, but also that the virtue, patriotism, and strength of the state were in direct proportion to the perfection of the means of securing such assent. In estimating the operation of this principle in our system, which depends, as I have stated, on the right of interposition on the part of the state, we must not omit to take into consideration the amending power, by which new powers may be granted, or any derangement

of the system be corrected, by the concurring assent of three fourths of the states, and thus, in the same degree, strengthening the power of repairing any derangement occasioned by the eccentric action of a state. In fact, the power of interposition, fairly understood, may be considered in the light of an appeal against the usurpations of the General Government, the joint agent of all the states, to the states themselves, to be decided under the amending power, affirmatively in favour of the government, by the voice of three fourths of the states, as the highest power known under the system. I know the difficulty, in our country, of establishing the truth of the principle for which I contend, though resting upon the clearest reason, and tested by the universal experience of free nations. I know that the governments of the several states will be cited as an argument against the conclusion to which I have arrived, and which, for the most part, are constructed on the principle of the absolute majority; but, in my opinion, a satisfactory answer can be given: that the objects of expenditure which fall within the sphere of a state government are few and inconsiderable, so that, be their action ever so irregular, it can occasion but little derangement. If, instead of being members of this great confederacy, they formed distinct communities, and were compelled to raise armies, and incur other expenses necessary to their defence, the laws which I have laid down as necessarily controlling the action of a state where the will of an absolute and unchecked majority prevailed, would speedily disclose themselves in faction, anarchy, and corruption. Even as the case is, the operation of the causes to which I have referred are perceptible in some of the larger and more populous members of the Union, whose governments have a powerful central action, and which already show a strong tendency to that moneyed action which is the invariable forerunner of corruption and convulsions.

men.

But, to return to the General Government, we have now sufficient experience to ascertain that the tendency to conflict in its action is between southern and other sections. The latter having a decided majority, must habitually be possessed of the powers of the government, both in this and in the other house; and, being governed by that instinctive love of power so natural to the human breast, they must become the advocates of the power of government, and in the same degree opposed to the limitations; while the other and weaker section is as necessarily thrown on the side of the limitations. One section is the natural guardian of the delegated powers, and the other of the reserved; and the struggle on the side of the former will be to enlarge the powers, while that on the opposite side will be to restrain them within their constitutional limits. The contest will, in fact, be a contest between power and liberty, and such I consider the present-a contest in which the weaker section, with its peculiar labour, productions, and institutions, has at stake all that can be dear to freeShould we be able to maintain in their full vigour our reserved rights, liberty and prosperity will be our portion; but if we yield, and permit the stronger interest to concentrate within itself all the powers of the government, then will our fate be more wretched than that of the aborigines whom we have expelled. In this great struggle between the delegated and reserved powers, so far from repining that my lot, and that of those whom I represent, is cast on the side of the latter, I rejoice that such is the fact; for, though we participate in but few of the advantages of the government, we are compensated, and more than compensated, in not being so much exposed to its corruption. Nor do I repine that the duty, so difficult to be discharged, as the defence of the reserved powers, against apparently such fearful odds, has been assigned to us. To discharge successfully this high duty requires the highest qualities, moral and intellectual; and should we perform it with a zeal and ability in proportion to its magnitude, instead of being mere planters, our section will become distinguished for its patriots and statesmen. But, on the other hand, if we prove unworthy of this high destiny-if we yield to the steady encroachment of

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power, the severest calamity and most debasing corruption will overspread the land. Every Southern man, true to the interests of his section, and faithful to the duties which Providence has allotted him, will be forever excluded from the honours and emoluments of this government, which will be reserved for those only who have qualified themselves, by political prostitution, for admission into the Magdalen Asylum.

VI.

SPEECH ON HIS RESOLUTIONS, AND REPLY TO MR. WEBSTER, FEBRUARY 26, 1833.

THE following resolutions, submitted by Mr. CALHOUN, came up for consideration, viz. :

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Resolved, That the people of the several states composing these United States are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of each state acceded as a separate and sovereign community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification; and that the Union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a union between the states ratifying the same.

"Resolved, That the people of the several states thus united by the constitutional compact, in forming that instrument, and in creating a General Government to carry into effect the objects for which it was formed, delegated to that government, for that purpose, certain definite powers, to be exercised jointly, reserving, at the same time, each state to itself, the residuary mass of powers, to be exercised by its own separate government; and that, whenever the General Government assumes the exercise of powers not delegated by the compact, its acts are unauthorized, void, and of no effect; and that the said government is not made the final judge of the powers delegated to it, since that would make its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among sovereign parties, without any common judge, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction, as of the mode and measure of redress.

"Resolved, That the assertions that the people of these United States, taken collectively as individuals, are now, or ever have been, united on the principle of the social compact, and, as such, are now formed into one nation or people, or that they have ever been so united, in any one stage of their political existence; that the people of the several states composing the Union have not, as members thereof, retained their sovereignty; that the allegiance of their citizens has been transferred to the General Government; that they have parted with the right of punishing treason through their respective state governments; and that they have not the right of judging, in the last resort, as to the extent of powers reserved, and, of consequence, of those delegated, are not only without foundation in truth, but are contrary to the most certain and plain historical facts, and the clearest deductions of reason; and that all exercise of power on the part of the General Gevernment, or any of its departments, deriving authority from such erroneous assumptions, must of necessity be unconstitutional— must tend directly and inevitably to subvert the sovereignty of the states-to destroy the federal character of the Union, and to rear on its ruins a consolidated government, without constitutional check or limitation, and which must necessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself."

Which being read,

Mr. CALHOUN said: When the bill with which the resolutions are connected was under discussion, the senator from Massachusetts thought proper to give his remarks a personal bearing in reference to myself. I had said nothing to

justify this course on the part of that gentleman. I had, it is true, denounced the bill in strong language, but not stronger than the rules which govern parliamentary proceedings permit; nor stronger than the character of the bill, and its bearing on the state which it is my honour to represent, justified. I am at a loss to understand what motive governed the senator in giving a personal character to his remarks. If he intended anything pakind-(here Mr. WEBSTER said, audibly, Certainly not; and Mr. C. replied, I will not, then, say what I intended, if such had been his motives)--but still I must be permitted to ask, If he Was his motive intended nothing unkind, what was the object of the senator?

to strengthen a cause which he feels to be weak, by giving the discussion a personal direction? If such was his motive, his experience as a debater ought to have taught him that it was one of those weak devices which seldom fail to react on those who resort to them. If his motive was to acquire popularity by attacking one who had voluntarily, and from a sense of duty-from a deep conviction that liberty and the Constitution were at stake-had identified himself with an unpopular question, I would say to him that a true sense of dignity would have impelled him in an opposite direction. Among the possible motives which might have influenced him, there is another to the imputation of which he is exposed, but which, certainly, I will not attribute to him-that his motive was to propitiate in a certain high quarter-a quarter in, which he must know that no offering could be more acceptable than the immolation of the character of him who now addresses you. But whatever may have been the motive of the senator, I can assure him that I will not follow his example. I never had any inclination to gladiatorial exhibitions in the halls of legislation, and if I now had, I certainly would not indulge them on so solemn a question: a question which, in the opinion of the senator from Massachusetts, as expressed in debate, involves the union of these states, and in mine, the liberty and the Constitution of the country. Before, however, I conclude the prefatory observations, I must allude to the remark which the senator made at the termination of the argument of my friend from Mississippi (Mr. POINDEXTER). I understood the senator to say that, if I chose to put at issue his character for consistency, he stood prepared to vindicate his course. I assure the senator that I have no idea of calling in question his consistency, or that of any other member of this body. It is a subject in which I feel no concern; but if I am to understand the remark of the senator as intended indirectly as a challenge to put in issue the consistency of my course as compared to his own, I have to say that, though I do not accept of his challenge, yet, if he should think proper to make a trial of character on that or any other point connected with our public conduct, and will select a suitable occasion, I stand prepared to vindicate my course, as compared with his, or that of any other member of this body, for consistency of conduct, purity of motive, and devoted attachment to the country and its institutions.

may,

Having made these remarks, which have been forced upon me, I shall now proceed directly to the subject before the Senate; and in order that it with all its bearings, be fully understood, I must go back to the period at which I introduced the resolutions. They were introduced in connexion with the bill which has passed this house, and is now pending before the other. That bill was couched in general terms, without naming South Carolina or any other state, though it was understood, and avowed by the committee, as intended to act directly on her.

Believing that the government had no right to use force in the controversy, and that the attempt to introduce it rested upon principles utterly subversive of the Constitution and the sovereignty of the states, I drew up the resolutions, and introduced them expressly with the view to test those principles, with a desire that they should be discussed and voted on before the bill came up for consideration. The majority ordered otherwise. The resolutions were laid on the table, and the bill taken up for discussion. Under this arrangement, which it was under