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CHAPTER XI.

WARS IN THE EAST AND WEST,

Progress shown by Japan in the Chino-Japanese War.The Chinese-Japanese War was noteworthy for the progress Japan was shown to have made in the observance of occidental standards in the conduct of warfare, and for the high tone which she took in observing those standards against an enemy which failed to recognize their binding force. One of the first questions that confronted her was the treatment of Chinese resident in Japan. By a decree of August 4, 1894,1 she allowed those who wished to remain to do so during good behavior on condition of registering within twenty days. Mr. Ariga, in his able work entitled La Guerre Sino-Japonaise, says that about half the Chinese resident in Yokohama and Kobe took advantage of this act. Registered Chinese were to continue in their employments, including commercial intercourse with China. As an incident to this continued right of residence and of com. merce, the Japanese courts remained open to the Chinese who remained.

Care in restricting hostilities to the regular combatants.— Great care was taken that those not entitled to combatant privileges should not engage in hostilities. It was feared that the volunteers who offered themselves at the beginning of the war might not live up to the high standard which the Empire had set for itself, and their services therefore were refused.*

Afterwards, on the invasion of Chinese territory, it was found that the coolies, contract laborers attached to the army, were committing depredations, and as a consequence their arms were taken from them. As a result, ten days later, a large number of them were killed while transporting provisions for the army. Notwithstanding this, the order forbidding them to bear arms was not withdrawn."

1 Ariga, La Guerre Sino-Japonaise, p. 23.

2 Ibid., pp. 28–29. Ibid., pp. 34-38. 4 Ibid., pp. 45–50.

H XXVI provides that a commander, before commencing a bombardment will do all in his power to warn the inhabitants unless it accompanies an assault. The bombardment of Kinchau came within the exception being simultaneous with the assault, and accordingly no notice was given the inhabitants.

The taking of Port Arthur.-The taking of Port Arthur was the one regrettable incident of the war on the part of the Japanese. The occurrences there are well summed up by Prof. Holland, who says:

"It was the torture and mutilation of those Japanese who happened to be made prisoners during the operations against Port Arthur which stung their fellow countrymen into madness, and explains, though nothing can excuse, the massacres which were carried on by them for four days after the place was taken.”

The account of the taking by Marshal Oyama.-In his official response to the inquiry of the General Staff as to what happened at Port Arthur, Marshal Oyama replied: "(a) The facts disclosed below will make it evident that the confusion of the soldiers and of the civil population was necessary:

"1. The city of Port Arthur, which was a military port, was composed of a great number of soldiers and workers.

"2. The retreating soldiers fired on the Japanese from the interior of the houses.

"3. Arms, bullets and powder were left in each house. "4. The entry of the Japanese army into the city took place towards sunset.

"(b) Those, among the soldiers, who were killed after the 21st, had all opposed an obstinate resistance or attempted to escape. Death was therefore a necessary punishment.

"(c) The pillage of the property of the civil population is an accusation without foundation. It may be that the Japanese army, which passed the night in the city, exacted certain objects of which it had need, such as tables, benches, candle-sticks, cups, firewood, coal, etc.; but, as to pillage, I am able to affirm that it never existed. Some rare infractions under this head were condemned, conformably to establish laws.”

Ibid., pp. 88-89.

Criticism of this account.-As to (a), Mr. Ariga considers that Marshal Oyama has made good his point provided the assault of the city and the fighting in the streets was necessary at all; and as to (b), that the Marshal is not sufficiently precise as to whether the prisoners were shot in endeavoring to prevent their escape, or after their recapture for having attempted to escape.' In the former case the killing would have been justified, in the latter, not. If the obstinate resistance of the prisoners amounted to insubordination, then it may have justified their being killed; but if it occurred, not after they were made prisoners, but before, it must certainly be condemned, their punishment therefor being something that would have occasioned the severe rebuke of even Bynkershoek.

Treatment of the dead.-No attempt was made by the Japanese to identify the Chinese dead, as it was practically impossible to do so on account of the Chinese military authorities having taken no notice of the civil status of the soldiers. If it had been possible to identify them, one of the great reasons for identification, the right of the family of the deceased to a pension, did not exist among the Chinese.” In disposing of the dead, regard was had to the prejudice of the Chinese against cremation, and at first they were usually buried, although the icy condition of the ground made the digging of graves very difficult. Later, however, it was found that the Chinese in the neighborhood regarded the soldiers as strangers and so cared little what was done with the dead bodies. Accordingly less care was taken in this regard.10

Treatment of prisoners of war.-Little complaint can be made as to the treatment of prisoners of war, except in the case of Port Arthur. The Geneva Convention was not always observed, but this question presented peculiar difficulties. While Japan had adhered to the convention, China had not. Moreover, the Chinese had no organized medical staff, and their knowledge of medicine was so imperfect as to make reciprocity of treatment impossible." Consequent•Ibid., pp. 89-92.

↑ Ibid., pp. 92–93.

Bynershoek, Law of War, p. 22.

Ariga, pp. 98-99.

10 Ibid., pp. 101–104.

11 Ibid., p. 111.

ly, the convention was not so perfectly observed, even in respect of aid to the sick and wounded in the field as might have been desired," although the general standard maintained by Japan was by no means low.

In this relation the illustrious work of an Englishman, Dr. Daly, at Incau must be mentioned. In the hospital established there by himself and others were gathered more than a thousand wounded Chinese, while in the Japanese hospital at the same place, out of thirty in all, only one was a Chinese, though the number later increased to five." Except in special cases, the Red Cross Society was not allowed to carry on its work within the scene of active operations. This, Mr. Ariga considers to have been unfortunate, as the regular staff was not able to attend to all that was to be done.14

Treatment of private property.—In the treatment of private property, the action of the Japanese seems to have been all that could be desired. Goods requisitioned were paid for, no imposts or fines were exacted, nor, to Mr. Ariga's knowledge, were any contributions." The rate of exchange and the price to be paid for provisions were settled by the military authorities. Among the services requisitioned were those of guides and of drivers, with their wagons and teams." Little aid in the execution of requisitions was given by the local functionaries, as most of them had fled. In Kinchau, however, a body of merchants, which had been made use of by the Chinese authorities, was made use of by the Japanese also.18

The administration of the occupied territory. The administration of the occupied territory was at first entrusted to civil officials, most of them being the old consuls or secretaries of legation, or secretaries of provinces having a port open to strangers; but the friction that this brought about between them and the army caused them to be superseded later by purely military men." The local function

12 Ibid., p. 117.
18 Ibid., p. 119.
14 Ibid., pp. 138-147.
18 Ibid., pp. 163–164.
16 Ibid., pp. 167–172.
17 Ibid., pp. 165–166.
18 Ibid., p. 165.
19 Ibid., pp. 178–179.

aries having fled, it was necessary to get others to take their places. The city of Kinchau, for example, was divided into four districts, over each of which some popular citizen was placed while two citizens of similar standing were placed over the entire city. Finally it was decided that mayors should be placed at the head of each village and elections were held for that purpose.20 A notable feature of the occupation was the effort made to improve the sanitary condition of the territory occupied." Of penal measures the most noteworthy was that of holding the villages to collective responsibility for offences committed against the law of nations, after the manner of the Germans in France in 1870.22 The conduct of the Chinese.-At the beginning of the war, the Chinese Government, through the American Ministers at Pekin and Tokio, proposed to the Japanese Government the exemption of private property at sea from capture. This was accepted. Later the Chinese Government refused to exempt Japanese vessels entering Chinese ports from capture, but as this was only the enforcement of the rule of non-. intercourse, it can not be held to be in contradiction to China's previous action with regard to the exemption of private property at sea." In other respects the action of the Chinese does not seem to have materially improved over that of previous times. Prices were offered for heads and hands, heads actually were cut off and exhibited in triumph, and bodies were sadly mutilated."

The Graeco-Turkish War of 1897.-The Graeco-Turkish War of 1897 is especially interesting for the care which the Turkish authorities took to show the world their intention to live up to modern standards in the care of prisoners of war" as well as to the obligations of the Geneva Convention. Elaborate orders were issued in accord with the latter, special envoys of the Sultan visited the hospitals and ambulances and it is said that the members of his harem

20 Ibid., pp. 195-196.

21 Ibid., pp. 97-201. 22 Ibid., pp. 207–209.

23 But see Takahashi, International Law during the Chino-Japanese War, pp. 9-11.

24 Holland, Studies in International Law, pp. 116, 128; Ariga, La Guerre Sino-Japonaise, p. 87.

25 Nicolas Politis, Chronique des Faits Internationaux, 4 R. G. D. L. P. 697.

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