themselves prepared linen and other material for the care of the sick and wounded. In the large centers, at least, quittances were given for requisitions." On the other hand violence to noncombatants was not infrequent and in Thessaly the Greeks were ordered to return to their homes under penalty of the confiscation of their goods.28 In the administration of the occupied territory perhaps the most notable measures were the imposition of the Turkish imposts on sheep, salt and tobacco and the direction of the Greek Government to its functionaries to resign their positions.30

Expulsion of Greeks from Turkey.-Immediately after the declaration of war a decree of the Sultan pronounced the expulsion en masse within fifteen days of the Declaration of all Greeks residing in Ottoman territory. There were then nearly 200,000 of these, most of them merchants." The fifteen days of grace were confined to merchants and other Greek subjects having a permanent occupation. All other Greeks were ordered to quit in three days, and at Smyrna, for instance, Greek subjects were forcibly embarked from the first day of the war. Scarcely eight days after the declaration of war 15,000 of them had left Turkey.

By a special decree of May 2, the Imperial Government declared that until the reestablishment of relations with Greece, the process of Greek subjects pending before Ottoman tribunals would be suspended, that those owing debts either to the fisc or to individuals should, before quitting the Empire, furnish sufficient guarantees of solvency, and that those who possessed immovables would not be able to sell them. Special commissions were instituted in most of the provinces composed of four Turkish functionaries. They were to agree to the request of the Greeks to remain on condition of their changing their nationality.

Against this decree the ambassadors of the great powers protested. They said it would give rise to regrettable disorders and that especially it should not be applied to Greeks employed in foreign houses, in hospitals, embassies and consulates. They demanded a prolongation of the fifteen 26 Ibid., p. 699.

27 Ibid., 706.

28 Ibid., pp. 701-702.

29 Ibid., 710.

so Ibid., 709. 81 Ibid., 525.

days of grace, and while the Porte acceded to this by granting an extension of a week he expressly refused to except the employees of consulates, hospitals and foreign houses from the decree. This brought out another protest from the ambassadors, and henceforth such employees do not seem to have been molested. The last day of grace was finally fixed at May 25, but before that time hostilities had ceased."

Spanish-American War principally maritime.—The Spanish-American War was largely maritime in character. As already noticed, the Additional Articles to the Geneva Convention of 1868 had not received the unanimous approval of the signatories of the Geneva Convention and so had not become binding. On the suggestion of the Swiss Government, however, the practice of the Franco-German War was followed and they were adopted so far as they related to naval warfare, as a modus vivendi for the war." Nor was the Declaration of Paris binding on either of the parties. However, immediately on the outbreak of hostilities the United States declared that its "policy" would be not to resort to privateering, and although Spain reserved the right to make use of letters of marque she did not avail herself of the reservation. To the second, third and fourth articles of the Declaration of Paris, the United States adhered, as "recognized rules of international law." Spanish vessels in ports of the United States were allowed thirty days from the outbreak of hostilities to load their cargoes and depart, and were assured of exemption from seizure during their home voyage, on condition, however, of not carrying coal, contraband or analogues of contraband, such as despatches or Spanish officers. Spanish vessels sailing from a foreign port to a port in the United States, before the outbreak of hostilities, were likewise allowed to enter, discharge their cargo and leave without fear of capture during the remainder of the voyage. The Spanish decree made no such provision with regard to vessels sailing for a Spanish port, and instead of thirty days for the departure of vessels already in port allowed five."

32 Ibid., pp. 525–532.

33 J. B. Moore, Maritime Law in the Spanish War, in Inter. Law, Situations-Naval War College-1901, pp. 144-145.

24 lbid., p. 152. ·

25 Ibid., p. 153.

Neutral ships allowed to clear for Spanish ports.—“On April 27, 1898, the Treasury Department issued to collectors of customs certain instructions, which were prepared in consultation with the Department of State. These instructions forbade the clearance of an American vessel for a Spanish port, but the only restriction they placed upon the clearance of any other vessel for such a port was that the vessel should not carry cargo of contraband of war or of coal. Thus the clearance of a neutral ship with an American-owned cargo for a Spanish port was permitted, and to this extent trading between enemies was allowed."

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Paquete Habana.-The decisions of the Supreme Court belong rather to the second part of this work than to the first, but there was one decision of such importance as to merit special attention. That was "in the case of the Spanish fishing smacks, the Paquete Habana and the Lola. The particular point decided was that 'coast-fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war.' In reaching this conclusion, however, the court, through Mr. Justice Gray, who delivered the opinion, announced and applied a principle which, though often recognized by publicists, has perhaps never before been so clearly and precisely enunciated by a judicial tribunal— that is, the principle of the progressive development of international law. Referring to a decision of Lord Stowell, in which it was said that the exemption of vessels, such as those in question, was 'a rule of comity only, and not of legal decision,' Mr. Justice Gray said:

But

""The word "comity" was apparently used by Lord Stowell as synonymous with courtesy or good will. the period of a hundred years which has since elapsed is amply sufficient to have enabled what originally may have rested in custom or comity, courtesy or concession, to grow, by the general assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of international law. As well said by Sir James Mackintosh: "In the present century a slow and silent but very substantial mitigation has taken place in the practice of war; and in proportion as that mitigated practice has re30 Ibid., pp. 176-177.

ceived the sanction of time, it is raised from the rank of mere usage and becomes part of the law of nations.' Discourse on the Law of Nations, 38; Miscellaneous Works, 360."

The progressive character of International Law.-"It may be hoped that this enlightened declaration will lead our courts to abandon the repetition of the unfortunate dicta in Brown v. United States, based upon the theory that it was the peculiar prerogative of a remote age to fix by its customs, however rude and barbarous they may have been, an immutable law, in comparison with which the customs of modern times are merely 'comity' or 'courtesy,' which may be discarded at will.""

The question of the Cuban debt.-In the Peace Negotiations the question was earnestly argued of the obligation of the United States to assume the so-called Cuban debt.. The Spanish Commissioners claimed that all outstanding obligations that had been legally contracted for the service of Cuba and Porto Rico, and which were chargeable to their individual treasuries, always distinct and separate from the Treasury of the Peninsula, were Cuban or Porto Rican obligations, that is, local obligations, solely and exclusively affecting the territory of the islands and their inhabitants."

The American Commissioners, in reply, pointed out that while it was true that the "Cuban Treasury" was not branch of the Spanish Treasury, the finances of the islands were exclusively controlled by the Spanish Government; that the debt creating power, such as commonly belongs to communes or municipal corporations, never was delegated to Cuba, and that such a thing as a Cuban obligation, created by the Island in the exercise of powers either inherent or delegated, was unknown to the markets of the world. They then sketched the history of the debt, showing that most of it had been incurred in suppressing the insurrections in the islands, and that, while the Spanish Government had undertaken to pay the bonds issued as late as 1890, out of the revenues of Cuba, their national character was demonstrated by the fact that on their face their payment was guaranteed by the Spanish nation. From no

37 Ibid., pp. 165-166.

38 Sen. Doc. No. 62, Part II, 55th Cong. 3d Sess., p. 43.

1

point of view, said the American Commissioners, could these debts be considered as local debts of Cuba, or as debts incurred for the benefit of Cuba. In no sense were they obligations properly chargeable to that island. They were debts created by the Government of Spain for its own purposes and through its own agents, and in whose creation Cuba had no voice." To this the Spanish Commissioners replied that, since the bonds in question had been expressly secured by certain and determinate revenues and receipts, Spain had a right to consider that she was only under a subsidiary obligation to pay them in the event of the revenues and receipts primarily hypothecated for the payment thereof proving insufficient." The American Commissioners closed the discussion by quoting the degree of autonomy signed by the Queen Regent on the 25th of November, 1897, in which it was declared that the future payment and guarantee of the debts should be the subject of a law on the termination of the war, as evidence that the so-called Cuban debt was really a national debt, and that the pledge of the revenues of Cuba was considered by the Spanish Government itself as being wholly within its control, so that it could be modified or withdrawn at will without affecting the obligation of the debt."

Were they properly mortgage debts?-Here the Commissioners were clearly at issue. Did the promise of the Spanish Government to pay the bonds out of the revenues of Cuba give the purchasers of those bonds a property right in those revenues, analogous to the right of the ordinary mortgagee, which with other private properties was bound to be respected by the cession or relinquishment of the island! Or did the promise at best create merely a moral obligation on the part of Spain to turn over those revenues to the holders of the bonds as long as she retained her sovereignity over the island?! To state the question would appear to answer it. The holders of the bonds had apparently no such means of enforcing the alleged hypothecation in the ordinary courts as the ordinary mortgagee possesses, nor was there apparently any means taken to make it effective by placing someone in the customs house in the

* Ibid., pp. 48-50.

40 Ibid., p. 87. 41 Ibid., p. 101.