The British position with regard to them is best given in the language of Lord Kitchener's letter to Mr. Brodrick, of December 6, 1901. It was, in part, as follows: Lord Kitchener's justification of them.-"Numerous complaints were made to me in the early part of this year by surrendered burghers, who stated that after they had laid down their arms, their families were ill-treated and their stock and property confiscated by order of the Commandants-General of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. These acts appear to have been taken in consequence of the circular dated Roos, Senekal, 6th November, 1900, in which the Commandant-General says: "Do everything in your power to prevent the burghers laying down their arms. I will be compelled, if they do not listen to this, to confiscate everything movable or immovable, and also to burn their houses.' "In addition to the families of surrendered burghers who either came in of their own accord, or were brought in solely to save them from the reprisals of the enemy, there are three other classes represented in our refugee camps: "(a) Families who were reported to be engaged in a regular system of passing information to the enemy. "(b) Families from farms which were constantly used by the enemy as places from which to snipe at our troops. "(c) Families from farms which were used as commissariat depots by the enemy. . "The majority of the women and children in the refugee camps are those of surrendered burghers; but neither they nor the wives of prisoners of war, nor of men on commando, make any serious complaint, although they are constantly being invited by commissions, inspectors, etc., to say something, however little it may be, against the arrangements made for their comfort, recreation and instruction."'" Where a whole population engages in warfare the distinction between combatant and noncombatant vanishes.To the majority in them, as Lord Kitchener states, the camps established by the British authorities were truly camps of refuge. To a minority, however, there can be no question that they were camps of concentration. But it has always been an accepted principle of war that, if those who are ordinarily noncombatants engage in hostili 38 Blue Book, 1902, Vol. 68 (cd. 902), p. 112. ties, they cannot claim the privileges of noncombatants. I The Boers felt they were fighting for the sacred cause of liberty. If they were willing to suffer martyrdom in that cause, all honor was due them, but when in order to continue the struggle, they found it necessary to resort to guerilla fighting, thus involving the whole people in the war, they had no right to complain when the British authorities made prisoners of those who had ceased to be noncombatants. The sufferings of those who were not brought into the camps worse than the suffering of those who were brought in.-Indeed, General Botha, in a letter to Mr. Chamberlain of November 12, 1902, lays special stress on the suffering of those who were not brought into the concentration camps. He said: "My remark at Paris about the sufferings of the women and children, which you quote, has reference more particularly to those remaining outside the camps, who had their dwellings with the furniture, food, and all that they contained, burnt or destroyed by British troops; their herds killed or removed, and they themselves left destitute on the veldt. These were certainly sufferings."" It was certainly a mercy to bring women and children such as these, who had had their provisions destroyed as a means of war, within the concentration camps. The conduct of the Concentration Camps.-The conduct of these camps has, however, been severely criticised. But, after careful investigation, it may be stated that the following extract from the letter of Mr. Chamberlain to General Botha, to which the letter from which the last extract was taken was a reply, sums up accurately the true facts with regard to them: "No one deplores more than the British Government the high mortality in the camps dur ing the epidemic of measles and pneumonia, but nothing was spared that money or science could afford to reduce it, and for the last six months the average total death rates in the camps have been about 21 per 1,000 per annum.""" The threat of banishment from South Africa.-One of the last important measures taken by the British authorities was embodied in the proclamation dated August 6, 1901, which, after stating that regular warfare had ceased, 39 Parl. Papers, 1902, Vol. 69 (cd. 1329), p. 7. declared that all Boers not surrendering before the 15th of next September should be permanently banished from South Africa, and that the cost of the maintenance of the families of all burghers fighting thereafter should be recoverable from them and should be a charge on the movable and immovable property in the colonies." A most unfortunate one.-This proclamation is very much to be regretted. The attitude taken toward the Boers for their continuing the struggle, and the refusal to recognize them as any longer entitled to belligerent rights, though in many ways the Boers were in a better position than they had been a year earlier, are explained but not justified by the strain which the continuance of the war had caused the British authorities. Especially was the threat of banishment for life reprehensible. As a matter of fact it was never carried out. Its fate was settled by the following telegram of May 27, 1902, from Lord Milner to Mr. Chamberlain, which reflects the unfortunate attitude which the British authorities finally assumed. Its approval by Lords Milner and Kitchener.-"Referring to your telegram of 26th May, no promises have been made or asked for. The Boers are no doubt aware that legislation is required to give effect to banishment, and feel that we would not introduce such legislation if Article 3 of proposed agreement is accepted. This is obvious, and it follows that if surrender comes off banishment will be passively dropped. I was in favor of banishment proclamation and was prepared to go even further, as I thought, and I still think, that resistance of Boers had ceased to be legitimate at that stage, and that it was our duty to impose special penalties upon those responsible for adoption of guerilla methods by which the country was being ruined and by which alone the struggle could be kept up at all. "So far from regretting the proclamation, I believe it has had great effect in increasing the number of surrenders, and in inducing the Boers still in the field to desist from further fighting. That has certainly been Kitchener's opinion, as he has always pressed and given the greatest publicity to the lists of banished leaders, but it would be a mistake if the Boers now give in in a body and live as British subjects to continue a proscription which would only 41 Parl. Papers, 1901, Vol. 47 (cd. 732), p. 6. keep up bitter feeling and tend to prevent the country from settling down. Boxer uprising in China.-While the South African war was still in its earliest stages, there broke out in China the Boxer uprising, followed by the shooting of the German Ambassador, and the siege of the legations. In bidding farewell to the troops which he sent to avenge the murder of his representative, Emperor William is reported to have bade them give no quarter to their enemies, and make their name a by-word for centuries to come." As this was a measure of reprisal and no very definite limitations have yet been developed with regard to reprisals, this cannot be said to have been a violation of the laws of war; but it takes us back to the stern measures of Cromwell, which many had supposed were relegated to the memories of a less humane age. Other measures taken during the campaign in China can likewise be justified only as part of the scheme of reprisals, and cannot serve as precedents for the conduct of ordinary warfare. The war in the Philippines.-The principal feature of the war in the Philippines was the establishment of zones of refuge, outside of which supplies of every kind were either removed or destroyed. The condition of affairs much resembled that in South Africa, although in many respects they were much worse. An irregular guerilla warfare was carried on, friendly populations were terrorized, and outrages of every kind were frequent. The only apparent remedy for this state of things was to draw a sharp line between territory which could be effectively policed and that which could not be, and then to destroy the provisions in that which could not and thus reach the enemy through their stomachs. Accordingly, the inhabitants were invited within the protected area, and cared for there while the territory outside was ravaged. There were no concentration camps in the sense that inhabitants were forced to come into them. The results were almost instantaneous. In a few months order was restored and the inhabitants were able to return to their homes."4 42 Parl. Papers, 1902, Vol. 69 (ed. 1096), p. 9. 48 Annual Register, 1900, p. 300. 44 House Doc. No. 2, 57th Cong., 2d Session, pp. 231–234. CHAPTER XIV. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.1 Outbreak of hostilities.-The world was watching with ever-increasing interest the apparently inevitable approach of the conflict between Russia and Japan over Manchuria and Korea when it was electrified by the news that about midnight of the 8th of February, 1904, the Japanese had "made a torpedo boat attack on the Russian fleet in the outer harbor of Port Arthur with a probable loss to the Russians of a first-class protected cruiser and the two most powerful battleships of the fleet. But no formal declaration of war had yet been made by Japan, nor was any made until the tenth and the admiration for the brilliancy and dash of the Japanese was even exceeded by the indignant clamor of Russian partisans who claimed that the attack had been a violation of international law in that it had been treacherous and that it had been made prior to the formal declaration. A declaration not a prerequisite.-There was nothing in the second charge as the law with regard to formal declarations at the beginning of the century had not changed, and this was conceded by F. de Martens, the ablest of Japan's critics. France had been especially punctilious in declaring war in 1870, and it was urged by some writers, principally French, that the practice of the preceding fifty years had made a declaration a prerequisite to hostilities, but this is disproved by the careful study of M. Dupuis of the wars of that period. In view of the facts he brings out, the contention that modern practice required a prior declaration must have been based on a conception of declaration other than that generally accepted. The Institute 1 It is a matter of regret that notice of the publication of La Guerre Russo-Japonaise au Point de Vue Continental et le Droit International, by Nagao Ariga, reached the writer too late to allow him to make use of it. See supra, p. 41. 11 R. G. D. I. P., 148. 413 R. G. D. L. P., 725. |