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HISTORY OF THE WAR.

these lakes is absolutely necessary to the secure and permanent possession of the province. It was therefore the duty and the interest of the British government, as soon as the war broke out, to have secured the superiority of these lakes in so decided a manner as to have effectually protected Canada: this, however, during the two years which the war had already lasted, they had neglected to do. In fact, though on some of the lakes the British were occasionally successful, yet this success was never of long continuance, and it was so chequered with defeat as to give confidence to the Americans and to dispirit the Canadians. For the former, when they commenced the war, could hardly have looked forward to such victories as they had obtained over the British; and being naturally a sanguine and ardent people, the achievement of victory over such a nation as Britain could not fail to gratify and invigorate their feelings, and to reconcile to the war those who at its commencement were averse to it.

In some respects, indeed, the Americans possessed advantages which we did not enjoy for carrying on operations on the lakes; they were nearer to the supplies necessary for the equipment and repair of their squadrons.But, on the other hand, it seems to have been abundantly shown in the house of commons, that their superiority arising from these advantages was greatly increased by the ignorance or inattention of our ministry. Indeed it was disputed in parliament, to what department of government the equipment of the flotilla on the lakes properly belonged. Common sense would have said that it belonged to the admiralty; but the admiralty denied this, because forsooth the lakes were inland seas of fresh water; and they threw the duty of equipping the flotilla on the secretary of state for the colonial department. It may be remarked by the by, that there seems some deficiency in the executive part of our government in this respect: the prime minister, though not recognised by the constitution, ought certainly to have such a directing and controlling power as, in cases of doubt, to assign to each department its proper duties, and to see that those duties are performed as they ought to be.

With respect to the other branches of the

war on the frontiers of Canada, the inhabi-
tants of that province complained that they
were left almost entirely to defend them-
selves; for during the two years of hostilities,
the operations of which have been already
A sufficient reason,
detailed, they had procured little assistance
from Great Britain.
however, was assigned for this, viz., that the
troops of Britain were so fully employed
This
against Buonaparte that she could not send
strong reinforcements to Canada.
should, however, have induced the ministry
to exert themselves more in the equipment
of a proper flotilla on the lakes, in order that
Canada might have been adequately pro-
tected by our superiority on them, till such
time as we could send out more troops. As
it was, had it not been for the incapacity of
the American generals, and the badness of
their troops, on the one hand; and on the
other hand, the activity of sir George Pre-
vost, and the valour of the troops under his
command, Canada must have fallen into the
possession of the enemy. The Americans,
indeed, as we have seen, fought so ill on land,
that no alarm seems to have been excited
that they would ever be a match for even the
Canadian provincial troops. It seems to have
been most strangely and culpably overlooked,
that their bad fighting on land arose from
causes and circumstances which must in the
nature of things gradually die away, and be
replaced by such as would render them as
good soldiers as they had proved themselves
to be sailors. This we might have antici-
pated from what had occurred to ourselves,
Till the war against Buonaparte, even Bri-
tons were disposed to acknowledge that their
countrymen, though the best sailors in the
world, were very indifferent soldiers; as if
either in their case, or in that of the Ameri-
cans, the men who had courage sufficient to
fight well by sea would not soon be taught
to fight well on land.

The British ministry were therefore blamed for protracting the war with America; they were blamed for not annihilating their navy at once. This seemed a well-grounded charge, considering the immense superiority of our navy, and that we had no other employment for it. They were also blamed for not having sent out more troops to Canada :-this

L

charge, during the continuance of the war with Buonaparte, was not so well founded as that relative to the navy; but as soon as the European war was terminated, it was expected that the American would be speedily brought to a close.

This expectation had very much the appearance of being gratified; for, as soon as possible after the peace of Paris, the British ministry sent to America about 14,000 of those troops who had gained such fame under the duke of Wellington. The annihilation of the American army was now thought to be at hand: even the most sceptical could not hesitate to expect that troops which had ignominiously fled before a Canadian militia, would be dissipated like chaff before the victors of the peninsula; and the more sanguine already anticipated the conquest of at least a part of the United States, and that we should dictate peace at Philadelphia or Washington. Besides the troops which were sent to Canada, a strong naval force, with an adequate number of troops on board, was collected for the purpose of invading different parts of the United States. The object of this kind of expedition seems to have been two-fold in the first place, by actually landing in different places, and keeping the coast in constant alarm, to prevent the American government from sending as many troops as they would otherwise have done to the invasion of Canada; and in the second place, to retaliate on the Americans the destruction which they had committed at York Town and other places. It was also expected that, if either or both these objects were effected, the war would become more unpopular in America than it actually was; and that the clamours of the inhabitants of those towns and districts which were invaded and laid waste by our troops would either compel the president to make peace, or to withdraw the troops from Canada for their protection and defence. These invading expeditions were also defended on the ground that they were intended to retaliate the devastation and cruelty which the Americans had committed in their invasion of Canada. But it was asked in the house of commons, why did not we, on the same principle, imitate the cruelty of the Indians when we were at war with

them, and scalp our prisoners? In case of war with the pirates of the Barbary coast why should we not, on the same principle, make slaves of our prisoners? In short, if we were right in imitating the devastation of the Americans, we should be justified in imitating and retaliating all the inhuman practices of the most savage nations, with whom we might chance to be at war. The inexorable consequences resulting from such a system of retaliation would be a general feeling of alarm and revenge: the federalists, who hated Mr. Madison, and were averse to all his measures, would be drawn into the arms of the republican party, in order to avoid the greater evil of being passive while their country was laid waste, and our character for rectitude, humanity, and moderation, would be lost. But the determination of the British ministry remained immoveable; the commercial and mercantile classes in England regarded the American war with comparative indifference, now that the trade of Europe was open to their goods; a great proportion of the community who had opposed the war while the orders in council remained in force, considered themselves bound to support the system of hostility as soon as they were repealed. The ministers, therefore, exulting in this change of public temper, confiding in the supposed unpopularity of Mr. Madison, and trusting to the prowess and experience of the veterans whom we had sent from Spain, publicly announced their sanguine anticipations of success.

The operations began in the early part of July. The American army effected a landing at the ferry of Lake Erie, having driven in the picquets of the garrison of Fort Erie. As soon as major-general Riall, who commanded the troops in the neighbourhood, heard of this event, he ordered the immediate advance of five companies of the royal Scots, towards Chippawa, to reinforce the garrison of that place. About the same time a detachment of the 100th regiment, with some militia, and a few Indians, moved forward for the for the purpose of reconnoitring the position. and the numbers of the enemy. They amounted to about 6000 men, with a numerous train of artillery, and were strongly posted at and above Fort Erie. The force

of the British, in regular troops, amounted to about 1500, exclusive of 300 militia and Indians. In the afternoon of the 5th, major-general Riall having made the necessary dispositions, ordered the attack to commence. The enemy had taken up a position with his right resting on some villages and orchards close on the river Niagara, and strongly supported by artillery; his left was towards a wood, having a considerable body of riflemen and Indians in front of it. These were first attacked, and after a sharp but short contest were dislodged. After this success major-general Riall ordered the king's regiment to move to the right, while the royal Scots and 100th regiments were directed to charge the enemy in front. On this arduous enterprize they advanced with the greatest coolness and gallantry, notwithstanding they were exposed to a very heavy and galling fire. The enemy, aware of the advantages of their position, and finding that their fire was very destructive, stood firm, till at length major-general Riall finding that farther efforts would be unavailing, and that his troops had suffered severely, ordered them to relinquish the attack. In this affair lieutenant-colonel Gordon, and lieutenant-colonel the marquis of Tweedale, who charged in the most gallant manner at the head of their respective regiments, were wounded. A retreat now became necessary on Chippawa, which was conducted with good order and regularity, not a single prisoner falling into the hands of the enemy, except those who were disabled by wounds. The object of the enemy's advance was evidently to gain possession of Fort Erie, and major-general Riall was in hopes of being able to save it. After the battle, he understood that it had surrendered on the Sd. Major Back, who commanded that fort, appears to have been very ill informed of the movements of the enemy, since he was wholly unapprized of their having landed on both sides of him, and only at the distance of a mile. After this, instead of endeavouring to atone for his want of circumspection by determined courage, he surrendered the fort without firing a gun; himself and 150 men being made prisoners of war.

The enemy, emboldened by the success

which attended their first operations, looked forward to still greater advantages; but in this they were disappointed, for general Drummond advanced in considerable force to the support of general Riall, who was now posted near the falls of Niagara. Scarcely had the junction taken place when intelligence arrived that the American army was advancing in great force. General Drummond immediately proceeded to meet them: he found them already in possession of a rising ground, while their light troops were in the surrounding woods. The 84th regiment, the royal Scots detachment, and the 41st light companies, were immediately formed in the rear of the hill, their left resting on the road; while two twenty-four pounders were advanced in front of the centre, and the remainder of the British troops were posted on the left of the road. Scarcely were the troops thus arranged, when the whole front was warmly and closely engaged. The principal efforts of the enemy were directed against the left and centre of the British. They made repeated attacks, in the course of which the troops on the left were partially forced back, and the enemy obtained a momentary possession of the road. He derived, however, no material advantage from this circumstance, as the troops which were forced back formed again in the rear of the 89th regiment, fronting the road and securing the flank. About this time major-general Řiall, having been wounded, fell into the power of the enemy. In the centre, also, their attacks were repeated with considerable determination, but they were met and repulsed by our troops in that quarter with the most perfect steadiness and gallantry, and with very considerable loss to their opponents. The intrepidity of the Americans was equally remarkable; our artillerymen were bayonetted in the act of loading, and the muzzles of the enemy's guns were advanced within a few yards of ours. The darkness of the night during this extraordinary conflict occasioned several unusual incidents. Our troops having for a moment been pushed back, some of our guns remained for a few minutes in the enemy's hands. They were, however, not only quickly recovered, but the two pieces which the Americans had brought up were captured.

One of the enemy's six-pounders was put by mistake on a limber or cradle of ours, and one of our six-pounders on a limber of theirs, by which means the pieces were exchanged. About nine o'clock, three hours after the commencement of the action, and during a short interruption of the firing, the Americans brought up the whole of their remaining force, and shortly afterwards renewed their attacks with fresh troops, but were every where repulsed with equal gallantry and success. They continued their efforts, however, against the hill till midnight, when they had suffered so severely that they gave up the contest, and retreated with great precipitation to their camp beyond the Chippawa. On the next day they abandoned their camp, throwing the greatest part of the baggage and ammunition into the rapids, and continued their retreat in great disorder towards Fort Erie. The loss of the Americans, in this severe contest, was estimated at 1500 men; and their two commanding generals were wounded. Our loss was also very se

vere.

Soon after the decision of this battle general Drummond resolved to attempt the recapture of Fort Erie. For this purpose, on the 13th of August, he opened the fire of a battery against it, and having soon afterwards reason to believe that a sufficient impression had been made, he determined on assaulting the place. Two attacks were ordered to be made; one against the entrenchments on the side of Snake-hill, and the other against the fort and entrenchments on the opposite side. The troops appointed for the latter enterprise advanced to the attack as soon as the firing occasioned by the other attack was heard, and succeeded in getting possession of the demi-bastion, the guns of which they had actually turned against the enemy; when most unfortunately some ammunition caught fire, and a most tremendous explosion took place, by which almost all the troops which had succeeded in making a lodgment were dreadfully mangled. Panic was instantly spread among them; and the enemy taking advantage of it pressed forward, and commenced a heavy fire of musketry: under these circumstances it became absolutely necessary to abandon the fort, and the British

troops retreated towards the battery. Our loss was very severe in killed and wounded, and a very great number were made prisoners.

It was abundantly evident from these accounts, that we had beaten the Americans till we had taught them to fight. But it was fondly hoped that, as soon as sir George Prevost received the reinforcements which were dispatched to him immediately after the peace of Paris, he would obtain a splendid and decisive victory over the enemy. As soon as these reinforcements did arrive, he lost no time in advancing to the frontier; on which the American army abandoned its entrenched camp. Sir George immediately proceeded against Plattsburg, which place it was determined to attack both by land and water.The enemy were resolved to defend this place; and for that purpose their land forces occupied an elevated ridge, while their flotilla were at anchor out of gun-shot from the shore. As soon as this disposition of the enemy's forces was observed, sir George Prevost communicated the circumstance to captain Downie, who had been recently appointed to command the vessels on Lake Champlain. When sir George observed the flotilla steering for Plattsburg Bay, he ordered his troops to advance, and to escalade the enemy's works upon the heights.

The

In consequence of the light airs and the smoothness of the water, the fire between the flotillas was very destructive on both sides. From the commencement of the engagement, it was evidently the intention of the enemy to direct nearly all his efforts against captain Downie's vessel the Confiance. This vessel was fought with great gallantry, till on the death of her brave commander she was compelled to strike her colours. whole of the enemy's force was then directed against the Linnet of 18 guns, which was also most bravely defended by her commander, till at length he was under the painful necessity of giving orders that her colours should be struck. Another of the British flotilla unfortunately stranded on a reef of rocks, and of course was prevented from rendering any assistance.

In the mean time the land forces had succeeded in effecting a passage across the Sara

nac. But at this time sir George Prevost was informed of the defeat of the flotilla; upon which he ordered the troops to give over the attack, and soon afterwards he commenced his retreat within the frontier. In the course of this retreat, a very considerable quantity of his baggage was obliged to be left behind; and the enemy stated, that upwards of 3000 men deserted from the British. It is scarcely possible to conceive the degree of mortification and disappointment which the intelligence of this defeat created in Great Britain. Troops which had been victorious in Spain and France; which had not only fought and conquered under Wellington, but which had received his particular commendation for their steadiness and bravery, had been defeated by the Americans, by men who could scarcely be called soldiers ;---who but a few months before had run from the Canadian militia :-and not only had the heroes of the peninsula fled before such raw troops, but also before a very inferior force; since sir George Prevost had at least 14,000 men, while the American army was not half that number.

In Canada the complaints were loud and general against sir George Prevost; and sir James Yeo, who commanded his majesty's ships and vessels on the lakes, distinctly gave it as his opinion, in his official dispatch, that captain Downie was urged, and his ship hurried into action before she was in a fit state to meet the enemy: he also gave it as his opinion, that there was not the least necessity for the British squadron giving the enemy such decided advantages, by going into their bay to engage them; since, even if they had been successful, it would not in the least have assisted the troops in storming the batteries; whereas, he adds, had the troops taken the batteries first, it would have obliged the squadron of the enemy to quit the bay, and thus given the British a fair chance. In this opinion of sir James Yeo most military men agreed; and it is even said that, after the defeat of the flotilla, the officers were of opinion they could have taken Plattsburg; and that they obeyed sir G. Prevost's orders for a retreat with great reluctance and murmuring.

Nor was this the only misfortune which

attended our troops towards the close of the campaign on the frontiers of Canada; for the garrison of Fort Erie on the 17th of September made a sortie, in which we lost 800 men; and in consequence of this sortie general Drummond was under the necessity of commencing a retreat, in which he was followed and harassed by the American army. As soon as the winter set in, the enemy evacuated Fort Erie; and the campaign terminated, certainly without any ground being gained, or any decisive advantages being reaped, on either side, but with the character and confidence of the enemy greatly raised, and ours proportionally depressed.

Great expectations were at one time formed, of a very large ship which had been constructed upon the lakes, mounting 100 guns; but the season of the year was so far advanced before she was completed, that no other advantage was derived, but that of blockading the enemy's squadron in Sackett's harbour, and gaining the mastery of the lake on which it stands, at a period when that mastery could be of no service. We shall now turn our attention to the circumstances and results of our operations on different parts of the coasts of the United States; and we shall first notice the landing which was effected on the most northern part of them.

The Penobscot river is about 80 miles S. W. of the Passamaquoddy, which forms the barrier between the United States and the British province of New Brunswick. At the mouth of the latter river we took possession of some small islands; and after this, lieutenant-general sir J. Sherbrooke and rearadmiral Griffith, who commanded the land and sea forces on this station, determined to push their attack as far as the Penobscot.— To this they were most especially determined, from the intelligence which they received, that the John Adams frigate had taken refuge by running 27 miles up that river, to Hamden, where she had landed her guns, and lay under their protection. On the 26th of August, therefore, a combined sea and land force, under the command of these officers, set sail from Halifax on this determination. On the 1st of September they reached the town and fort of Castine, built on a peninsula on the eastern side of the Pe

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